OPPORTUNITY IN BERLIN

James P. Warburg

Office memo

"We—meaning my social studies students," writes a California junior college teacher, "have used six different magazines over the last three years as supplementary classroom reading, and the vote is almost unanimous that *The Progressive* has been the most valuable and has aroused the greatest interest." A Methodist church study club of young adults in Buffalo has been subscribing to *The Progressive* for three years now; the chairman reports to us, "We meet monthly, and while we use many sources of topics for discussion, we seem to wind up at least half the time with an article or an editorial from *The Progressive*." And from Wayne University in Michigan, a teacher writes, "I have used *The Progressive* in my political science classes for years—I consider it *essential* rather than *supplementary* reading in my field, for both teachers and students."

These three comments are representative of scores of letters received during the past year, a year in which *The Progressive* recorded an all-time high in the number of subscriptions for school use. Throughout its history *The Progressive* has been much used by teachers and students, but never before has it enjoyed such solid acceptance in high schools, colleges, and study groups from Maine to Hawaii—and now in several foreign lands.

Naturally, we're delighted. We have always believed that the magazine's mission could best be fulfilled by reaching the young men and women of America during their most formative years.

Because we are well aware of the limited budgets of schools, teachers, and students, it has been a long-standing policy of *The Progressive* to make the magazine available to students of all ages at the bare cost of the paper and printing that go into producing it. This policy has paid handsome dividends. Many professional men and women, teachers, ministers, and politicians who now subscribe and read *The Progressive* regularly first became acquainted with it during their impressionable school years.

For the school term beginning in September, we are offering *The Progressive* at $1 per student per semester—five months—when there are ten or more subscriptions going in a single bundle to one address. This special rate applies to any high school, college, or adult study group.

Free sample copies of *The Progressive* are available in any reasonable number to anyone interested in arranging a classroom subscription order—and there is no obligation if an order does not materialize. There is a coupon on Page 37 for your convenience in ordering. Address your subscription order or request for sample copies to School Department, The Progressive, Madison, Wisconsin.

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The Progressive makes no attempt to exact complete conformity from its contributors, but rather welcomes a variety of opinions consistent with its general policies. Signed articles, therefore, do not necessarily represent the opinion of the management of the magazine.

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PROGRESSIVE

"YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH
AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE"

The Military in Politics

ONE OF THE most firmly fixed principles of the American constitutional system is the supremacy of the civilian authority over the military. This cornerstone of our freedom has been eroding in recent years as the military establishment has grown ever more powerful in shaping foreign policy and dominating our domestic economy. President Eisenhower, himself a lifelong professional soldier, was sufficiently alarmed over the trend to warn, in his last days in office, against its "grave implications."

In his farewell address to the nation, Mr. Eisenhower dealt with many themes, but he surprised the pundits by expressing greatest concern over the "conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry." Speaking in somber terms he rarely employed, the departing President appealed to his countrymen to stand "guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence" by the military and its potent partner, the arms industry. No American in our time could draw on so long and successful a career in military life and so elevated a role in civilian affairs as Mr. Eisenhower as he hammered home his point that the ascendancy of the "military-industrial complex" carries "the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power."

Evidence of this "disastrous rise of misplaced power" was made available to the nation during the past month by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Arkansas Democrat and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, whose voice today is one of the sanest and most courageous in the Senate on almost all issues but race relations. A painstaking investigation by Senator Fulbright confirmed what had long been suspected —that the military establishment has been engaged for half a dozen years in a systematic campaign of political indoctrination which, under the guise of "fighting Communism," challenges the loyalty of such patriots as Adlai Stevenson, equates moderate social reform with Communism, and classifies negotiation with our adversaries as "appeasement."

Sometimes on its own, more often in association with organizations so far to the right that they regard the income tax as Communism, the Pentagon has conducted a series of "cold war seminars" around the country which has put the military establishment in the position of taking sides on domestic political issues which are none of its official business. All too frequently the content of the seminar programs has been indistinguishable from the right-wing lunacy of the John Birch Society and kindred organizations that reject the Twentieth Century.

"Do you want Federal aid to education?" shouted an Air Force officer at a cold war seminar in California.

"Do you want Federal aid to our churches?"

"Do you want socialism?"

This, keep in mind, is supposed to be the military establishment "fighting Communism" at home—by corruptly associating Federal aid to education with socialism and fraudulently dragging in Federal aid to our churches.

Studying the content of eleven of the cold war seminars, Senator Fulbright found that "radical right-wing speakers dominate the program," that the central theme emphasizes internal subversion as our greatest danger, and that all our difficulties, past and current, are the consequence of this "subversion," "softness," "sell-outs," and "appeasements."

There is method in this madness, for after attributing all our woes to internal subversion, the forces of the far right move on to expound their doctrine that this subversion finds its outlet in a form of socialism at home that is draining our strength and endangering the security of the republic.

"The thesis of the nature of the Communist threat," Senator Fulbright reported, "is developed by equating social legislation with socialism, and the latter with Communism. Much of [the present] Administration's domestic legislative program, including continuation of the graduated income tax, expansion of social security (particularly medical care under social security), Federal aid to education, and the like, under this philosophy would be characterized as steps toward Communism.

"This view of the Communist menace renders foreign aid, cultural exchanges, disarmament negotiations, and other international programs as extremely wasteful, if not actually subversive."

That Senator Fulbright was not exaggerating was quickly confirmed by Senator Strom Thurmond, South Carolina Democrat, who bitterly attacked Fulbright for his exposure of military indoctrination on political issues. In a speech *defending* the practices of the military, Thurmond said: "If the military teaches the true nature of Communism, it must necessarily teach that Communism is fundamentally socialism. When socialism, in turn, is understood, one cannot help but realize that many of the domestic programs advocated in the United States, and many of those adopted, fall clearly within the category of socialism."

This, then, is the heart of the scheme—to seek the destruction of our modest program of social welfare and prevent the enactment of additional social measures—all in the name of "fighting Communism" at home. The cold war seminars turn out to be training centers conducted by those who are far less interested in developing creative programs that would enable us to whip the Soviets in the struggle of competitive coexistence than they are with winning the cold war against the vast majority of Americans, especially those who are underprivileged and who are helped by social legislation.

Senator Fulbright, who must soon stand for reelection in a state where his position on this issue is being distorted in some quarters with flagrant disregard for the truth, has performed a service of extraordinary patriotism in exposing the character and content of some of the programs of political indoctrination conducted by the military establishment. President Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara have responded affirmatively to Senator Fulbright's inquiries and conclusions, but they must act even more firmly and decisively to end military meddling in domestic politics if we hope to retain the constitutional supremacy of civilian authority over the military and cope effectively with that "potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power" against which General Eisenhower warned so urgently.

Pope and Premier

Nikita Khrushchev and Pope John XXIII are clearly irreconcilable antagonists in the global conflict of ideologies, but during the past month they demonstrated an extraordinary kinship in evaluating the nature of the struggle in which our world is locked. In historic documents released within a fortnight of each other, the political leader of world Communism and the spiritual leader of world Catholicism emphasized, each in his own way, the overriding significance of social planning for the general welfare as the dominant challenge of our time.

In a month in which the United States was absorbed in a frenzied campaign to strengthen the nation's military might as our major offering in the world-wide competition of ideas, the Pope and the Premier were speaking to the world of the need to eradicate social injustice by harnessing the resources and skills of modern society for the universal enrichment of humanity.

Khrushchev, of course, in his draft statement of a new Communist Party program, relied heavily on more massive doses of Communism to achieve a better life for the people. What came as a surprise—and one which captured little attention in the American press—was Pope John's refusal to shrink from accepting socialism as a major instrument in the pursuit of social justice.

The Pope and Socialism

In his memorable encyclical, *"Mater et Magistra"* ("Mother and Teacher"), the Pope spoke in terms more progressive than those employed by the most liberal members of the Democratic Party. Socialization, he said—and he was speaking more of the social welfare state than any doctrinaire form of socialism—is "the fruit and expression of a natural tendency, almost irrepressible, in human beings, the tendency to join together to attain objectives which are beyond the capacity and means at the disposal of single individuals. . . .

"It is clear that socialization, so understood, brings many advantages. It makes possible, in fact, the satisfaction of many personal rights, especially those called economic-social, such as, for example, the right to the indispensable means of human maintenance, to health services, to instruction at a higher level, to a more thorough professional formation, to housing, to work, to suitable leisure, to recreation."

The Pontiff warned against forms of socialization that would "restrict the range of the individual as regards his liberty of action." But social planning, morally conceived and executed for the common good, he said, will do much to improve both the general welfare and the freedom of the individual.

"So long as socialization confines its activities within the moral order, along the lines indicated," the Pope declared, "it does not, of its nature, entail serious dangers of restriction to the detriment of individual human beings. Rather, it helps to promote in them the expression and development of truly personal characteristics. It produces, too, an organic reconstruction of society."

The Big Question

Neither the Pope's reflections on social planning nor Khrushchev's program for Soviet economic development seemed to attract much serious attention from Congress or the Kennedy Administration. They were too deeply engrossed in increasing the nation's military strength. Typical of such response as there was to the social and economic challenge laid down by Khrushchev was the statement by Assistant Senate Republican Leader Thomas H. Kuchel of California that "this latest Communist manifesto supplies all the more reason for the United States to discharge her responsibilities for world leadership"—by which he meant, he emphasized, supporting the President's request for $3.4 billion in additional defense appropriations.

A distinguished dissenter from this popular position was Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "The big question," he said in commenting

on the Soviet scheme for vast economic development, "is the maturity of our response. The tendency in Congress is to respond to every Soviet threat by increasing our military strength. That won't be enough. We must also develop our economy."

Three days after Senator Fulbright spoke up, the Senate acted precisely as he had predicted. It not only approved every penny the President and the Pentagon had requested in their multi-billion dollar expansion of the military program; it voted an additional billion dollars that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara said he didn't want and couldn't use.

New Attack on Social Measures

It was inevitable that this unprecedented spree of military spending would be accompanied by a demand for a slash in appropriations for social welfare programs. Oblivious to the challenge proclaimed by both Pope John and Premier Khrushchev, conservatives in both the Republican and Democratic parties insisted on reduction of "non-essential spending," a term used to characterize appropriations for health, housing, education, and social services.

President Kennedy, perhaps unintentionally, provided the impetus for this drive for a cutback in social legislation when, in his Berlin crisis speech to the nation, he called for greatly increased military appropriations: "Meanwhile, to help make certain that the current deficit is held to a safe level, we must keep down all expenditures not thoroughly justified in budget requests."

Mr. Kennedy may not have meant to proclaim a moratorium on social progress, but his words were quickly converted by the tories of both parties into ammunition to support their demand for cutbacks in expenditures for domestic programs like housing, health services, and education. It seems to us a tragic commentary on the mood of our Congress that in the month in which it poured additional billions into the military establishment, it was powerless to act on urgently needed legislation to build schools and provide our teachers with somewhat higher salaries. The aid-to-education bill was imprisoned in the House Rules Committee by a new coalition—composed of a usually liberal Catholic, Representative James J. Delaney of New York, who insisted on making aid to parochial schools a prerequisite for aid to public education, and the hard-shelled Republican and Democratic reactionaries who oppose Federal aid to education altogether.

It is ironic that an Administration that came to power committed to moving forward on the home front must now, as a consequence of its own policies, fight a rearguard action to hold the line where it is. It is equally ironic that the President, who has spoken so eloquently in the past of the social and economic character of the world struggle, abandoned that concept to Pope John and Premier Khrushchev in a month in which he seemed almost totally absorbed in the military aspects of the conflict with Communism.

Sauce for the Gander

The Wall Street Journal, which doesn't much approve the Kennedy Administration's "somewhat frantic casting about for moves to counter the Soviet pressure on Berlin," found one it liked the other day. The Administration, it observed editorially, "has come up with at least one good idea—to make an issue of self-determination in Eastern Europe."

We like the idea, too, but we fell to brooding about what would happen if the Soviets accepted the prin-



Mauldin in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

"If I Were You I Wouldn't Wait"

ciple of self-determination and insisted it be applied to the whole world, and not only Communist-dominated Eastern Europe.

How would this affect Formosa, our great ally in the Pacific, where the Formosans, the vast majority of the people, now have no right to self-determination in Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese dictatorship?

What would this do in Spain, where our great ally on the Atlantic, Franco's dictatorship, permits nothing resembling self-determination?

What would this do to our allies closer to home, in the Caribbean Sea, like Haiti, for example, where the present tyranny could not survive any test of self-determination?

And right here at home, how long would the Eastlands, the Talmadges, and Thurmonds survive a true test of self-determination in their own states?

The Wall Street Journal, of course, didn't say it was for self-determination for all peoples, just for those in Eastern Europe. But what if the idea should spread? The boys at the *Journal* would find themselves mounted atop a wild elephant they never meant to ride.

Sword and Plowshare

What started out as a relatively minor Congressional appropriation of $95 million for the construction of electric generators at the Atomic Energy Commission's Hanford, Washington, reactor has developed into a full-scale Donnybrook over the issue of atomic public power.

The reactor at Hanford has been making nuclear bomb fuel almost since the atomic age began, and in the process produces a prodigious amount of heat—an AEC member described it as the largest heat source in the United States, and perhaps in the world. Until now, this heat has simply been cast off into the Columbia River.

When the AEC authorized a new reactor, to be completed next year, provision was made for harnessing the otherwise wasted heat to electric generators. Electric production would run to 800,000 kilowatts—almost double that of giant Bonneville Dam. Senator Henry Jackson of Washington said of the Hanford plant, "There we have indeed a sword and a plowshare—a sword which will help to defend our country through the production of plutonium and a plowshare in the form of the production of electricity."

But the powerful private power lobby descended upon the House, and, aided by members from coal-producing areas, knocked the appropriation for generators out of the bill. The principal argument: that old bogey, socialism.

The Senate put the appropriation for power back into the bill, although not without lengthy discussions, again revolving around socialism. The issue is headed for a showdown in a Senate-House conference committee. However, the project was dealt what is probably a killing blow when the House took the unusual action of instructing its conferees not to give in to the Senate on the power issue in conference.

Much more than the Hanford generators may be at stake. "The nuclear power reactor issue," said a recent editorial in the trade journal, *Nucleonics Week,* "has lit the public versus private power fuse that has long been in the shadows of nuclear power but, despite many close calls, has never quite caught fire . . . it will have long-range effects on the power reactor program."

What are the facts about Hanford? Every expert agrees the Northwest can now, or soon, use the additional power; lacking both coal and oil, the area is almost wholly dependent on hydroelectric power. No one denies that a potential of 800,000 kilowatts of power is being utterly wasted by the Hanford plant. The reactor itself requires half this amount, and the other half would go into the Bonneville distribution system. Most of the additional power would be purchased —eagerly—by private utilities in the Northwest, which are generally in favor of constructing the Hanford power facilities. The $95 million taxpayer investment would be repaid easily, with interest, within the life of the equipment. Who, then, is against the project?

Justus in The Minneapolis Tribune

"Whoa!"

Large private utilities, mostly Eastern and Midwestern. Some of the more vocal of the power interests have themselves been the beneficiaries of $100 million of direct financial support, and one billion dollars worth of Federal-financed research and development, in constructing their privately owned nuclear power projects. Yet private development of nuclear power has been slow and hesitant, and several projects have been cancelled.

Pandora's Box

In spite of their own reluctance to invest in atomic power, in spite of the overwhelming evidence that practical considerations make the Hanford power project highly desirable, these utilities, far-removed from the Bonneville marketing area, stubbornly insist on perpetuating an enormous and senseless waste, using only the empty argument of "socialism."

But the power lobby may have opened a Pandora's box. Senator Clinton Anderson, New Mexico Democrat and member of the AEC, after reviewing the faltering private power efforts in the nuclear field, warned in a scathing Senate speech, "The whole partnership program should be re-evaluated and a hard look should be taken at all aspects of government assistance. . . . The whole concept of long-term licensing should also be examined."

The country can ill afford Hanford's monumental waste of power to satisfy a few men's greed. The Northwest and the nation need Hanford's plowshare as well as its sword.

That Old Socialist, James Madison

In its desperate efforts to defeat

the old age medical bill in Congress, the American Medical Association has reached all the way back to James Madison, third President of the United States, and named him as a constitutional authority who would be opposed to the social security medical aid proposals. But a letter to the Washington *Post* by Irving Brant, noted biographer of Madison, asks the question, "If the AMA wants to know what Madison would think of the medical bill . . . why not inquire what he said and did in the actual field the AMA miscalls 'socialized medicine'?"

"On February 27, 1813," Brant points out, "President Madison signed 'An Act to Encourage Vaccination' containing these opening words:

" 'That the President . . . be . . . authorized to appoint an agent to preserve the genuine vaccine matter, and to furnish the same to any citizen of the United States, whenever it may be applied for, through the medium of the Post Office.' "

Madison appointed as agent the doctor who suggested the idea, with instructions to spread the benefits as widely as possible throughout the United States.

"What does that leave," Brant asks, of the AMA's contention that 'under Madison's views . . . medical care would have been a state and not a national function'?"

Furthermore, Brant claims, "The whole social security and public health system of the United States stems constitutionally from a remark Madison made in the Federal Convention of 1787, that one of the purposes in levying Federal tonnage taxes was 'the support of seamen.' "

Within a decade, Congress was making deductions from seamen's wages to establish and maintain maritime hospitals. Thomas Jefferson later extended the tax and medical benefits to Mississippi River boatmen.

In an earlier instance of misrepresentation of Madison's position on another matter, John Quincy Adams made an observation that applies with equal force to the AMA today: "If you appeal to Mr. Madison as authority, you must submit to his authority . . . the authority of Mr. Madison upon this question is against you; clearly and unequivocally against you."

Opportunity in BERLIN

by JAMES P. WARBURG

FIRMNESS in dealing with the recurrent Berlin crisis is essential. But firmness alone will not suffice. Without a new, constructive American initiative, mere resistance to whatever moves the Kremlin may make will lead only to a continuing series of crises provoked at its convenience by Soviet leadership. Any one of these crises, including the one we face now, can lead to catastrophic conflict. At best, a continuation of our past inflexible and unimaginative policy will lead to the slow attrition of an ultimately untenable position.

The United States must seize the initiative now—not wait and see what moves are made by the Kremlin. The choice is not between resistance and retreat. A new, constructive American proposal would not be a sign of weakness. It would be a demonstration of resourcefulness and strength, providing the kind of leadership for which an anxious world is waiting.

The stakes are great, for the problem of a divided Berlin situated in the heart of the East German Soviet satellite is now for the third time producing a crisis which threatens war.

The existence of this source of recurring tension is the result of an almost incredible series of errors of omission and commission reaching back to the wartime conferences of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Among these three great leaders, Churchill bears the least responsibility. The initial blunders were in large measure due to Stalin's ruthless power-hunger and to President Roosevelt's unwillingness to face and discuss the shape of the postwar world until victory had been achieved. It is not difficult to trace the series of tragic errors:

One—The United States and the United Kingdom pledged themselves in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 not to seek any territorial aggrandizement and not to countenance any territorial changes contrary to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. In January, 1942, the Soviet Union and other members of the anti-Axis coalition subscribed to these pledges. However, at Teheran (1943) and Yalta (1944), Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed to violate these undertakings by agreeing that the Soviet Union should annex eastern Poland and half of German East Prussia and that Poland should be compensated for its loss by being permitted to annex the remaining German territories east of the Oder-Neisse rivers.

Two—The decision was taken at Yalta to divide the rump of Germany into American, British, and Soviet zones of occupation, with an Allied Control Commission, located in Berlin, empowered to govern all of rump Germany as an economic and political entity. In reaching this decision the three leaders discarded a plan which

JAMES P. WARBURG, one of the nation's foremost analysts on foreign affairs, is the author of many books on the subject.

would have cut the German pie into three slices, each with the point of its wedge resting in Berlin. Instead, they adopted a plan which assigned Northwest Germany to Britain, Southwest Germany to the United States, and East Germany to the Soviet Union. (Later, at Anglo-French insistence, Stalin agreed to let the French occupy a zone carved out of the original American area of occupation and also to let the French have a seat on the Allied Control Council.)

This division left Berlin, the seat of four-power government, well within the Soviet zone, with the city divided into four sectors, each to be occupied by one of the four powers.

Having made this arrangement, the three Western powers made the almost incredible mistake of failing to obtain the Soviet signature to a document which would guarantee them free access at all times to the Western sectors of the German capital. This omission is all the more incomprehensible in view of the fact that the United States had insisted upon obtaining precisely such a document from the British, guaranteeing free access from the North German ports through the British zone to the American zone of occupation.

Three—In order to pursue an almost non-existent German army into what was thought to be a last-stand southern redoubt, General Eisenhower swung his armies southward after encircling the Ruhr, instead of driving straight on to Berlin, thus permitting the Russians to capture the German capital. This was against Churchill's advice, as was also the American decision to let the Soviet forces liberate Prague and the later decision by President Truman to withdraw from that part of the Soviet zone which the American forces had overrun without first making sure that Stalin would abide by his various agreements.

As a result, the American, British, and French forces actually had to obtain Soviet permission to enter Berlin. (The same thing was true of Vienna which had likewise been slated for four-power occupation.) When the arrangements for Western entry into Berlin were finally made, General Eisenhower's deputy, General Lucius D. Clay, again failed to obtain a written agreement guaranteeing free access from the Western zones to the Western sectors of Berlin.

Four—As I have stated, the French had been conceded a zone of occupation and a seat on the Allied Control Council. The Potsdam Agreement (August 1945) provided that the Council would operate on a basis of unanimity, which meant that each of the four powers had a right to veto any proposed action. But, for reasons yet to be explained, the French signature to the Potsdam Agreement was never obtained. Thus France, without being bound by the agreement, obtained a veto over its execution.

The results of this oversight were disastrous. The French took the not illogical position that if the no-annexation pledges were to go overboard and if there was to be a Russo-Polish land-grab in the East, then France should be entitled to annex German territory in the West. Failing to obtain the consent of the other three occupying powers, the French proceeded to veto in the Control Council every step leading to the four-power government of Germany as a political and economic entity. This obstructionism was carried to the point of vetoing the creation of nationwide political parties, labor organizations, and even the issuance of uniform postage stamps throughout the four zones.

Contrary to widely held belief, it was not the Russians but the French who originally sabotaged the Potsdam Agreement and caused the four zones to become in effect four foreign-ruled satrapies hermetically sealed off from each other. Subsequently, it is true that the Russians violated the agreement, especially with respect to reparations. Then the United States violated it and, by 1947, the Potsdam Agreement had become a dead letter.

Five—The Marshall Plan of June, 1947, if accepted by the Soviet Union as an all-European recovery program, might have healed the East-West breach and resulted in an all-German peace settlement. But the Marshall Plan had been preceded by the Truman Doctrine of global containment which had aroused Soviet suspicion and hostility. Soviet rejection of the unprecedented Marshall proposal rang down the Iron Curtain across Europe and across a divided Germany.

Once the division had become crystallized, it was logical for the Western powers to incorporate their German zones of occupation into what had now become a West European, instead of an all-European, recovery program. But here we come to another and far-reaching blunder. The Western powers decided not merely to treat their three zones as an economic entity but to combine them into a new, separate West German state.

I warned publicly before this step was taken that the creation of a West German state would result in two most undesirable consequences: (1) the creation by the Soviet Union of an East German Communist satellite, thus freezing the partition; and (2) a Soviet attempt to oust the Western powers from Berlin on the grounds that four-power government had ceased to exist. The latter attempt was eventually frustrated by the brilliantly improvised Berlin Airlift, but the Western enclave in the heart of the Soviet's East German satellite remained as a dangerously explosive cause of trouble in the years to come.

These are the five major blunders which, in my judgment, are chiefly responsible for the existence of a Berlin problem. Yet, this problem is actually inseparable from the larger problem posed by a partitioned Germany. It is, therefore, necessary to mention some of the factors which have kept Germany divided and have made its partition into a major threat to world peace.

If it was a mistake to create a West German state, thus provoking the formation of an East German Soviet satellite, *it was an even greater mistake to allow these two German states to be remilitarized.* The Russians began this folly. The West completed it. And this in spite of the fact that both sides feared the rearming of Germany and had pledged themselves to prevent it.

The Soviet decision to create so-called "alert-groups" in East Germany was probably taken more as a measure of asserting Communist control within the satellite than as a measure of defense against Western attack.

The Western decision to rearm the Federal Republic for purposes of defense came about in an unplanned, almost somnambulistic manner. The Soviet blockade of Berlin (1948-1949) and the Communist *coup d'etat* in Czechoslovakia (February, 1948) aroused Western fear of further Communist encroachment. This led, in March, 1948, to the Brussels Pact (in which Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg agreed upon mutual defense) and, a year later, to the North Atlantic Treaty in which the United States for the first time in its history committed itself unconditionally to the defense of Western Europe.

I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in favor of this treaty but warned against stretching it into a commitment to defend Western Europe at its easternmost frontier along the line of the Iron Curtain in Central Germany. There were a number of reasons for this warning.

The French government had been saying that it was not enough for the United States to avenge a Soviet attack; that France did not want once more to be liberated from enemy occupation. "Next time," Premier Queuille said, "you will be liberating a corpse." The French wanted an American guarantee to defend Western Europe against being overrun.

I pointed out to the Senate Committee that such a guarantee would commit the United States to a pre-announced strategy in the event of war, much as the French had fatally pre-committed themselves to the defense of the Maginot Line. Furthermore, I expressed the view that the desired guarantee would be unfulfillable unless two actions were taken, both of which Secretary of State Acheson had assured the Senate would in no circumstances be considered. These were: the permanent stationing in West Germany of a large American garrison, and the rearming of West Germany itself.

The *Congressional Record* of May 10, 1949, shows that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee affirmed that neither of these actions would be taken and that the treaty should not be stretched into a commitment to defend Western Europe at its frontier in Central Germany. The Committee approved the treaty with this understanding and, with this understanding, it was ratified by the Senate. Yet, within eighteen months the commitment was taken, an American garrison was sent to Germany where it has remained ever since, and—in September, 1950—Secretary Acheson demanded that West Germany be rearmed in order to participate in its own defense.

Mauldin in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

High Noon

This curious reversal of policy remains unexplained to this day. It has been alleged that the Korean War caused the change of heart with respect to remilitarizing Germany—an allegation which is demonstrably untrue. The decision to rearm West Germany had been quietly taken months before the North Korean attack; it was implicit in the decision to defend Europe at the line of the Iron Curtain. Korea merely provided a convenient rationalization.

I have always considered that the decision to rearm Germany was a disastrous mistake—a mistake which has increased rather than diminished the danger of war in Europe. This view is not generally shared in the United States. It has been my belief that the only way to defend Western Europe against Soviet attack would be to prevent the attack from taking place—that once a Soviet attack were launched, Western Europe could not be defended with or without a German participation in its defense—and that the rearming of Germany would be more likely to provoke than to deter Soviet attack.

The fact that there has been no Soviet attack cannot be attributed to the long-delayed addition of a few German divisions to the pitifully small ground and air forces put into the field by NATO during the twelve years of its existence. What has deterred a Soviet attack—assuming that such an adventure was ever contemplated—has been the fear of nuclear war.

Since 1957, the Russians have not been alone in fearing nuclear retaliation. The United States now lives under the same threat. Since 1957, Europe has been wondering to what extent it can rely upon American nuclear power as a deterrent.

Up to this point I have dealt with what might be called the physical errors of omission and commission which have contributed to the development of the present tense situation. To the extent that these were indeed errors of judgment on the part of the West, it must be said that the whole course of Western policy was in a sense dictated by Stalin's aggressive postwar policy, by his ruthless satellization of Eastern Europe, and by his promotion of Communist conspiracy in the countries of Western Europe. No one can say that Western policy in Europe has been aggressive, except perhaps for the brief interlude when John Foster Dulles was talking about a policy of liberating the Soviet satellites. But, if Western policy has been basically defensive, it has, in my judgment, also been far from wise, with the single notable exception of the Marshall Plan. The wisest sentence spoken in the whole postwar period by any Western statesman still remains the statement of George Catlett Marshall when, in launching his great proposal, he said:

"Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos."

Western political policy with respect to Germany has to a large extent been conditioned by the physical or strategic actions taken or left untaken. The original goal of American policy was to create a single, peaceful, democratic Germany. Partition into

three, four, or five German states had been discussed at Teheran in 1943 and discarded. The developments previously described then led to the abortive experiment in four-power government and the creation of two separate German states.

Once this had occurred, the aim of American policy became the reunification of the two German states through free all-German elections—a goal which Secretary of State Acheson and Chancellor Adenauer sought to achieve by a "policy of strength"—that is to say by making West Germany so strong and prosperous that it would irresistibly attract East German allegiance. This effort enjoyed somewhat half-hearted support from Britain and France and finally was doomed to failure by the decision to rearm West Germany as a partner in the NATO alliance.

The moment West Germany became a partner in the anti-Soviet alliance, reunification necessarily meant either that its NATO partnership would have to be renounced or else that a reunited Germany would inherit the partnership. No one in his right mind could assume that the Kremlin would agree to the latter alternative—that is, agree to reunification if it meant permitting East Germany to join the West German state as a member of the anti-Soviet NATO alliance. *Yet, for the past decade, the United States government has refused to recognize that it was pursuing two mutually exclusive objectives—that it could not achieve both the reunification of Germany and the preservation of a German military participation in the NATO alliance.*

This brings us down to the present. If we want to settle the German question, we must make up our minds as to which we want—reunification or the preservation of a West German participation in NATO. We cannot have both.

Either choice has its clear implications as to the future of Berlin.

If we seek reunification at the price of giving up a German military contribution to West European defense, then we have a good case for insisting upon the preservation of the status quo in Berlin pending the re-establishment of Berlin as the capital of a reunited German nation.

If we give up the hope of reunifying Germany for the sake of keeping West Germany in NATO, then we must recognize the existence of the East German state, accept the partition of Germany as more or less permanent, and reconcile ourselves to the fact that we cannot in the long run hope to maintain a Western enclave of freedom in the heart of a Communist state. This may not be the legal position, but such is the hard, common-sense reality.

For more than a decade, I have argued for the adoption of the first alternative, putting forward a number of specific proposals for its implementation. The advantages of this course would be that it would not only preserve the Western position in Berlin but that it would once and for all solve the larger problem of Germany. In addition, it would reduce cold war tensions by creating a militarily neutralized area between Russia and Western Europe.

The best opportunity to explore this type of approach was provided in 1957-1958, when Poland put forward the Rapacki Plan for the denuclearization of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two German states. This plan was endorsed by Moscow but rejected by the Eisenhower Administration. Somewhat similar proposals were made by Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labor Party, and by George F. Kennan, former United States ambassador to Moscow. I submitted an earlier proposal to General Eisenhower before he became President and another, which I prepared for the Arden House Disarmament Conference of December, 1956, was presented to President Eisenhower by two United States Senators—John Sparkman, Alabama Democrat, and Ralph Flanders, Vermont Republican. The first apparently was never considered. The latter was rejected by Mr. Eisenhower on the grounds that it would not please the West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer.



It is only a slight exaggeration to say that, from 1953 to 1961, American policy with respect to Germany was made in Bonn, rather than in Washington. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, were closely linked by past association to the leaders of German industry, and Dr. Adenauer exercised an almost mesmeric influence over Washington officialdom. Unfortunately, the venerable Chancellor had built his prestige at home and his magic abroad upon the delusion that Germany could be reunited *and* remain a partner in the NATO alliance. This delusive doctrine was originally rejected by the German Social Democratic opposition but has now been endorsed by West Berlin's mayor, Willi Brandt, who is the Chancellor's opponent in the approaching election. Thus, no matter what the outcome of the election, Germany will presumably remain stubbornly committed to a defense of an indefensible status quo.

For reasons of his own, President de Gaulle has supported West German intransigence, although he obviously has no desire to see Germany reunified. Britain has tended to take a more flexible position but, while the British distrust a rearmed partitioned Germany, they are also apprehensive of a demilitarized united Germany as a competitor. The United States holds the key to the future of Western policy.

From the Soviet-East German point of view, it must be recognized that the existence of a Western-controlled island of prosperity and freedom in the heart of the German Democratic Republic is intolerable— "a bone in the throat which must be removed." West Berlin is not only a Western showcase and propaganda center but an escape hatch through which some 200,000 of East Germany's most useful citizens annually make their way to freedom in the West.

In the face of Soviet determination to end this state of affairs, it is not enough for the Western powers to assert that they will, if necessary, fight to preserve their legal rights and the status quo. To do this and no more is to invite war or else to face the gradual attrition of an essentially untenable position. Nor is it sufficient to "wait and see" what Khrushchev will actually do during the coming months. The time has come for the West at long last to take the initiative away from the Kremlin.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana was magnificently right in recognizing the need for a new Western initiative. One may question whether his proposal to make all of Berlin into an internationally guaranteed free city meets the need—whether there can be any solution for the problem of Berlin except in the context of a solution to the problem of Germany. It is an interesting though discouraging fact that the Senator's proposal has been criticized, not on its merits, but on the ground that any new approach would constitute a sign of Western weakness. Surely, this is arrant nonsense. It amounts to saying that the West must forever remain on the defensive.

The simple truth is that, if the Western powers relinquish the aim of reunification for the sake of keeping West Germany in NATO, they will have to recognize the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic. They will have to deal with it as well as with Moscow concerning the future of Berlin. Even if a new agreement were to "guarantee" Western access, the escape hatch would almost certainly be closed, and the 2,250,000 West Berliners would inevitably become increasingly dependent upon their Communist surroundings. In the long run, their freedom would not be secure. This would be true even if all of Berlin were declared to be a free city.

The further fact is that West Berlin is strategically indefensible, that it is a burdensome economic liability, and that the Western powers have no rational interest in the physical possession of their sectors. The Western powers do have an interest in and a definite responsibility for West Berlin's sturdy inhabitants. If the Western powers abandon the aim of reunification, they will eventually be compelled to evacuate those of the 2,250,000 West Berliners who wish to live in freedom and to seek an exchange of the 185 square miles of West Berlin real estate for some piece of East German territory contiguous to the Federal Republic.

Justus in The Minneapolis Tribune

The Race over Berlin

I have opposed and continue to oppose this kind of solution, except as a last resort in the event that a serious effort to achieve reunification should fail. No such effort has ever been made. It should be made now. The West should propose:

One—The military neutralization of the two German states and, if still possible, of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps also Hungary and Denmark.

Two—The withdrawal of foreign troops from the area to be neutralized.

Three—East-West agreement to permit the two German states to find their own way toward reunification without outside interference of any sort.

Irrespective of whether it seems likely that the Kremlin would accept such a proposal as a basis for negotiation, it is imperative for the West to put it forward. Unless it is made absolutely clear to the Germans that, if their country remains partitioned, the sole responsibility will rest upon the Soviet Union, the foundation will have been laid for another Russo-German deal—a deal in which Germany turns its back upon the West and purchases its reunification and perhaps even some of the trans-Oder-Meisse, Polish-held territories at the price of a Soviet alliance.

No one knows better than Chancellor Adenauer that such an eventuality is no chimera. The Chancellor has all but said that his determined efforts to tie Germany to the West have been motivated in large measure by his distrust of his own politically immature people—by his fear of what might happen if some demagogue were to achieve power by blowing upon the by-no-means-extinguished embers of German nationalism.

The possibility of a Russo-German deal will exist so long as Germany remains partitioned, and so long as Moscow holds the trump card of being able to permit or deny its reunification. It is scarcely necessary to point out that the Kremlin is quite capable of shifting its alliances, turning friend into foe and foe into friend at its convenience. No one knows this better than the people of Poland.

On the other hand, a reunified Germany *could* remain firmly tied to the West in every sense other than that of a military alliance. It could remain in the Common Market and, eventually, become part of a strongly united Western Europe, contributing greatly to Western aid to worldwide economic development. But this could happen only in the broad context of an East-West disengagement which would tend toward reuniting all of Europe while, at the same time, constituting an important step toward regional disarmament.

To put forward such a proposal at the present time would be a sign of imaginative wisdom and strength on the part of the West. It would, for once, put the Soviet Union on the defensive.

On the other hand, a continuation of the ten-year-old, unimaginative, and inflexible Western policy with respect to Berlin and Germany will lead to the final folly of yielding to the West German demand for nuclear weapons. Once we succumb to that demand, we shall have passed the point of no return.

Waiting for Kennedy

by KARL E. MEYER

At Presidential news conferences, reporters read the face of John F. Kennedy with the care of connoisseurs studying a rare parchment. Of late, those who cover the White House have remarked on the creases of worry, the telltale signature of tension. After seven months in office, President Kennedy is not a notably relaxed man—and the anxiousness and occasional uncertainty on his face have also marked the appearance of his Administration.

The extraordinary pressure of events helps to account for the lines of care. In quick and cruel succession, Mr. Kennedy has faced crises in Laos, Cuba, and Berlin—not to speak of such lesser yet agonizing incidents as the French-Tunisian vendetta. There can be only compassion for a President who has inherited such a grievous legacy of problems from an outgoing Administration that specialized in avoiding decision.

Still, when all allowances are made, it is only candid to say that President Kennedy's first several months have been a disappointment. Perhaps because of his narrow election margin, or possibly because of the still touchy religious "issue," Mr. Kennedy has seemed to base his political strategy on an effort to conciliate contending factions, rather than to choose sides among them. He has often seemed aloof and remote, a mediator rather than a leader—the very political trait that he once so trenchantly criticized in his predecessor.

Reservations about the President's initial record, however, should not obscure the virtues of the New Frontier. Many would agree with James Reston's trial balance in the New York *Times* after the first six months—that the record has been "spotty but on the whole favorable." If the President has fallen short of the shining expectations many entertained, he has shown himself to be neither the feckless nor the reckless fellow of Republican oratory. It is precisely because men of good will have vested such high hopes in Kennedy's performance that his shortcomings have been the source of painful reflection.

There is the feeling that these first months have been crowded with so much bad luck that Mr. Kennedy has not yet hit his stride. Some of the criticisms of the President heard today echo those made of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, particularly the charge that the President is trying to appease those who are by definition his most implacable opponents. The turn of events brought about a drastic change in the 1930's, and may well do so again.

All this is by way of prelude to an inquiry into the Kennedy style as it has manifested itself in the first formative months. It is a style that has its strengths and weaknesses, and can be clinically classified under three rubrics—government by task force, the politics of the soft sell, and the diplomacy of collective leadership.

The phrase "task force" was first heard last November when Mr. Kennedy was preparing to take over the tenancy of the White House. At the time, the term carried an exhilarating suggestion of brisk executive leadership, and reporters watched with fascinated interest as the President-elect named task forces to consider reforms in everything from defense spending to policies for the American Indian.

Washington has come to learn that task force reports do not imply an Administration commitment. They function as trial balloons. If, as in the case of James M. Landis' recommendations for overhauling regulatory agencies, there is a burst of shrapnel on Capitol Hill, the balloon can sink swiftly out of sight. The White House recommendations to Congress fell considerably short of the fundamental reforms Landis urged.

Thus, the task force—an *ad hoc* group of qualified experts otherwise known as a "committee"—serves to fertilize the soil with new ideas. Most important, the diversity of recommendations is intended to give Mr. Kennedy a range of choice in framing new policy. Certainly the principle of the task force embodies one of the more admirable aspects of the new Administration—its open-door policy toward men with ideas.

At the same time, there is a negative aspect. The task force represents a technique of managed politics in which the sounding-board for controversy comes in committee reports rather than in the pronouncements of strong-minded high officials. Since the advisers on the task forces often have a nebulous relationship to the seat of power, their reports can be discreetly disowned.

It is instructive to compare the Kennedy technique with the more free-wheeling ways of F.D.R., so brilliantly described by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his book, *The Age of Roosevelt*. Roosevelt surrounded himself with high officials who were outspoken, obstreperous, willful. They were Roman candles in comparison to the cool night-lights that now illumine the New Frontier. Instead of task force reports, Roosevelt had an Ickes, a Morgenthau, a Wallace, a Hopkins, and a bumptious General Johnson. F.D.R. was not over-concerned when members of his official family feuded in public, or stepped a degree beyond the contemporary consensus.

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In the Kennedy circle, the two men most strongly identified with independent positions of their own are Adlai Stevenson, the Ambassador to the United Nations, and Chester Bowles, the Undersecretary of State. The recent strange episode involving Bowles has been read as a warning to those officials near the top who flirt with nonconformity. It is well known that Bowles has long been critical of the pieties of United States policy toward China; his doubts about the Cuban invasion have also been publicized; he has been under attack in Congress for dallying heretically with the idea of recognizing Outer Mongolia in order to open another listening post to Western ears.

Bowles has his detractors as well as his admirers, but it ought to be noted that his performance in office has been wholly consistent with the views he expressed before President Kennedy appointed him to his State Department post. As Undersecretary he has brought some first-rate men into our foreign embassies and he has operated within channels. When the attempt was made to ease Bowles into an ambassadorship to Chile, the inescapable interpretation was that a maverick was being punished for his views—there was even an uncomfortable parallel drawn with former Foreign Minister Molotov, who was shipped off by Nikita Khrushchev to Outer Mongolia. In this instance, Bowles' scalp was spared when his many friends among the press raised a rumpus in print. Perhaps the most suggestive report was in a Washington *Post* story which noted that although many White House aides shared Bowles' liberal convictions, "the President feels the more effective way of implementing these views is through men with less flamboyant reputation acting in a less publicized manner." One wonders what Harold Ickes might have said about that.

The same dread of flamboyance and excessive publicity characterizes the relationship of the Kennedy Administration to Congress, a relationship based on the tactics of the soft sell. The President has gained his main political experience in Congress, and he is wise to its ways. Considering that the 1960 elections reduced the Democratic majority, Kennedy has done well in getting some of his legislative requests approved by a cautious, conservative Congress.

But to some it seems as if Mr. Kennedy does not believe that politics should be an audience participation show. Despite—or perhaps because of—his rating in public opinion polls, the President has not used his personal prestige to marshal popular support for his program. He has been content instead to speak softly and let his legislative aides use the big stick of patronage and Federal favors.

With some exceptions, the President has backed away from those pledges in the Democratic platform which might warm the blood on Capitol Hill. His anti-recession measures have been largely a continuation of the moderate approach taken by the Eisenhower Administration. In the most explosive area—civil rights—the President requested no new legislation at all, despite the platform promises. While it is true that Mr. Kennedy, using his executive powers, has extended the boundaries of human rights, the failure to seek further legislation was taken as symptomatic of the President's dread of a public scrap.

Indeed, the biggest boost President Kennedy received for his program came not from the White House but from the Kremlin. It is quite frankly admitted that Soviet Premier Khrushchev's bluster on Berlin was perfectly timed, from the Administration's point of view, to soften up Congress on increased defense expenditures, the civil defense program, and foreign aid. Pope John's encyclical, which strongly commended foreign aid, did Kennedy's program no harm either. As any politician might, Mr. Kennedy exploited the assist from the other Mr. K for what it was worth.

But the mood of crisis cuts both ways. As soon as the call for an arms build-up came, Congressional conservatives were quick to renew their war on the welfare state. The real test for the President in Congress may not be to rouse support for missiles and manpower; rather, it may be to sustain an equal sense of urgency about the pressing needs at home—Federal aid to education, civil rights, tax reform, health care for the aged, and measures aimed at stepping up the rate of economic growth. It is in these areas that there are the greatest doubts about the efficacy of the soft sell.

Herblock in the Washington Post

"No—No Serious Disagreements"

The school bill is a special case in point. Mr. Kennedy has repeatedly stressed the urgency of a Federal aid program for our hard-pressed public school system. There are few items on the Administration agenda which have so direct a bearing on the future of the country than the proposal to help the states ease the desperate classroom shortage and increase teacher salaries. Yet few items have become so bogged down in political confusion.

Opponents of any Federal aid—ranging from Goldwater Republicans to the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, and other potent lobbies—have exploited the confusion to block the passage of an adequate aid bill for public schools. What the President can do more effectively than any of his aides is to help create a national consensus by explaining in a full-dress presentation to the country what the fight is all about. The tensions arising from the religious controversy furnish an additional reason for the President to use his White House forum to clarify and reassure. Yet for the most part the campaign for the schools has been waged as if it could be settled in the cloakrooms without establishing a popular consensus first.

After eight years of Eisenhowerism, many of Mr. Kennedy's most ardent supporters are spoiling for a purposeful fight on domestic issues; they want to take sides in a drama and not simply admire the technical efficiency of the White House legislative staff. They have been frankly disappointed by the lack of pepper in Democratic politics.

For example, the national party chairman by tradition is expected to upbraid, to exhort, to rally the troops to battle. Yet John Bailey, the present Democratic chairman, almost seems non-partisan, and the National Committee has ceased to be an important source of party ammunition. Those Democrats on Capitol Hill who are familiar with political logistics complain that the Republicans have been able to get by with damaging and misleading assertions without effective rebuttal. If the President himself chooses to stay aloof from the battle, this would seem to be all the more reason for the national chairman to provide the expected sauce.

Yet under Mr. Bailey, the National Committee has been reduced to a skeleton staff, and such projects as the *Democratic Digest* have been dropped. If the chairman's tepid speeches are valid examples, partisan thunder no longer emanates from the place where James Farley and Paul Butler used to work. Perhaps the reason is that Bailey has had his hands full preventing the warring factions in the New York Democratic Party from appealing to the United Nations for Mr. Hammarskjold's help.

In foreign affairs, President Kennedy has been facing cruel dilemmas with a coolness that commands respect. It is easy for the narrow partisan or the unthinking enthusiast to make facile assertions about what should be done. But if the details of the problems heaped on the President's desk are only cursorily examined, it is clear that Mr. Kennedy's range of choice is limited.

When the New Frontiersmen came into office, they hoped that the Soviet Union would be more tractable in dealing with a liberal Administration. It was even seriously contemplated that Khrushchev would give the new team a six-months reprieve from crisis in which to formulate new policies. From the outset, the President has been scrupulous in avoiding inflammatory language. At the same time. the Administration adopted a markedly more flexible stance on a whole range of problems, varying from neutralism to disarmament, from colonialism to economic aid.

The shocks came quickly. After the failure of the Cuban invasion, and the erosion of the Western position in Laos, Kennedy heard Khrushchev's harsh words in Vienna. During the last campaign, it was evident that the President was more at home in domestic politics than in foreign affairs—and yet before he had a chance to find his footing in the White House he was beset by crises in the very field where his competence was still untested.

As a result, a kind of collective diplomacy has come to prevail. The days when John Foster Dulles conducted our foreign affairs out of his traveling case seem far away. One of the most common complaints about Kennedy's foreign policy is the prevalence of cooks, each with a spoon in the soup. The President, seemingly unsure of his own judgment, has turned for advice to everyone from his younger brother to old soldiers like Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Sometimes, the advice is lamentably bad. The Cuban invasion was the result of collective misjudgment. It is said by those close to the President that Mr. Kennedy's own instincts were opposed to the Cuban adventure, but that he did not feel that he was equipped to second-guess the expert advice from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The outcome of the invasion made him far more skeptical of the wisdom which supposedly emanates from high rank.

Sometimes, a burst of creative vigor results. In no area has there been as much administrative confusion as in Latin American policy. The cast of characters for a period included the crusty Adolph A. Berle, Jr., head of a task force; the State Department, which was functioning without an Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs; and the White House, where two aides—Richard N. Goodwin and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.—kept the bureaucracy hopping. To compound the appearance of confusion, it seemed that not a jet plane headed South without a new mission from Washington; among those touring the hemisphere were Ambassador Stevenson, Food for Peace Administrator George McGovern, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Adolph A. Berle, Jr., and last but not least, young Theodore Kennedy. The hemisphere could no longer complain of neglect. Still, despite the Administrative confusion, and in contradiction to the bad press notices, United States policy began to move in a more imaginative direction. One of the bright aspects of the Kennedy record has been the better neighbor policy embodied in the Alliance for Progress; it has taken some of the sting out of the Cuban failure.

Sometimes, the verdict that emerges from his advisers is mixed. In his response to the Berlin crisis, Mr. Kennedy has relied on a diverse group of advisers, ranging from Secretary of State Rusk, General Maxwell Taylor, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, to his cadre of Harvard dons in the White House. In his address to the nation on Berlin, President Kennedy delivered a speech that seemed to be an amalgam of differing approaches. It had somewhat the sound of a committee report in which the patchwork is evident; it was the most discursive, the most poorly organized speech the President has made—it even contained one digression on an increase in postal rates that seemed a rambling irrelevance in a discussion of a possible nuclear Gotterdammerung.

Commendably, the President did not bluster or threaten; his tone was calm, and the speech did contain an opening for negotiation. Nevertheless, some listeners had the feeling that the speech was cold and impersonal, and that it was more persuasive to Americans who are already convinced of Russian perfidy than to millions elsewhere who do not want to become a cinder because of a quarrel between two giant powers with nuclear arms. The appeal for a shelter program may have had a chilling effect on those who feel that

neither Moscow nor Washington has a monopoly on virtue. Some of Mr. Kennedy's listeners regretted that the President did not dwell at greater length on the horrors of a nuclear war, and upon our determination to seek every honorable means of averting it.

There is no doubt that the President feels the awesome nature of his responsibility. One wishes that his own voice as a human being found more of an echo in his pronouncements of state. Since his eloquent inaugural address, that voice sometimes seems lost in the thicket of advisers.

When criticisms of the kind that have been made here are repeated to members of the Kennedy circle, a frequent response runs like this: People ought to accept the President as he is—it is simply not his style to become emotional, combative, or informally chatty.

Yet, during the campaign, candidate Kennedy displayed qualities that seem to be missing since he rose to the top. Those who recall his speech to the Protestant clergy in Houston, or his deeply-felt reaction to poverty in West Virginia, refuse to believe that the President is a passionless machine. They hope that the turn of events will rekindle the flame in Mr. Kennedy's leadership.

James Reston of the New York *Times*, no dewy-eyed Utopian, has remarked that the President's "most obvious failure has been on [the] point of stirring and directing the national will."

A whole range of issues seems to cry out for exposition by the man who leads the nation. When the question of national purpose came up a few years ago, President Eisenhower appointed a committee—but in this area, one hopes that Mr. Kennedy will not rely on a task force. His inaugural address was a magnificent beginning, but surely more needs to be said about our country and culture, our frailties and strengths, our old traditions and new aspirations. The country is aware of the need for more regiments of troops—but is it also aware of the need to practice more fully at home the democratic ways we urge on others abroad? The country is prepared to sacrifice for more missiles, but is it ready yet to make greater sacrifices for education and for foreign aid? In standing firm for freedom in Berlin, will we also stand firm for freedom in Mississippi?

More than anybody else, the President is in a position to shape the themes which dominate the times. But as yet Mr. Kennedy has only played a few notes on the keyboard—and he has still not given an adequate answer to those who say they want to help the government but are not sure what the President wants. The problem of giving a sense of community to a country that sometimes seems an aggregate of private appetites is one which might occupy the President as much as the details of his legislative program.

In his speech at the National Press Club which opened his campaign in 1960, Kennedy insisted that this decade "will demand that the President place himself in the very thick of the fight, that he care passionately about the fate of the people he leads, that he be willing to serve them at the risk of incurring their momentary displeasure."

The White House, candidate Kennedy declared, "is not only the center of political leadership, it must be the center of moral leadership . . . It is not enough to represent the prevailing sentiment; to follow McKinley's practice, as described by Joe Cannon, of 'keeping his ear so close to the ground he got it full of grasshoppers.'"

If Mr. Kennedy's first months in office are measured and found partly wanting, it is because the President himself has furnished an exacting yardstick. But the hope abides that the young man in the White House may yet fill his own measure of the Presidency.

Security through Disarmament

by ROBERT KASTENMEIER

FOR MORE than a month last year one of the world's most distinguished groups of experts on disarmament waited impatiently in Washington while United States officials frantically worked behind closed doors in a last-ditch attempt to set forth an American disarmament position.

Newspapers had hailed the arrival of this team of international statesmen. The group, which included David Ormsby-Gore, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Jules Moch, former French Defense Minister; Dr. Gaetano Martino, former Italian Foreign Minister, seemed excited as its members looked forward to their first high-level talks.

But behind the scenes in Washington a flustered group of U.S. diplomats, politicians, scientists, and generals was unable to agree upon an American disarmament position.

It would seem that this should have been a relatively easy task, since six months earlier President Dwight D. Eisenhower had set up a team of highly respected men, headed by Boston lawyer Charles A. Coolidge, to do the spadework for an American disarmament position. The Coolidge team, after laboring the full six months, completed its work but, either because of the ad hoc nature of the group or the limitations of its instructions, its policy paper and conclusions were totally inadequate.

ROBERT KASTENMEIER. Democratic Congressman from The Progressive's home district, is a leader of Congressional forces fighting for a more creative foreign policy.

Behind this story of waiting diplomats and half-hearted, hastily written proposals, is the vast American disarmament research gap.

In these times of increasing arms expenditures and threatening international clouds, it may seem to be a contradiction in terms to talk about disarmament research. The Pentagon argues quite cogently that talk of peace and of arms reduction tends to undermine the national military "posture." Spreading the possibility of settling international disputes and picturing the Russians as capable of rational negotiations tend to humanize an enemy that military men would prefer to paint only as an irrational devil. From the strictly military point of view, therefore, talk of disarmament *is* a contradiction.

But President John F. Kennedy has neatly characterized the irrationality of a purely military strategy: "No leader of any nation should rest content with the precarious equilibrium of terror. No nation should delude itself into thinking it has a strategy for the 1960's if that strategy is nothing more than the policies of the last two decades." In June the President moved to develop research for a better strategy by proposing a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security.

The word "security" in the title of this proposed agency is important. It stresses the fact that disarmament is not a contradiction but a powerful way to guarantee our security. The growth of military technology and nuclear power have outmoded war as a method of preserving security. If war comes, not only will our own security end, but the ideas and traditions we hold dear will also be wiped out. Even if war is not brought about by planned action, the chances of accidental war are greater with each passing day. An accident which can open the doomsday book with one resounding blast is now within the realm of possibility. So dangerous is the proliferation of nuclear weapons that the noted British expert, C. P. Snow, has calculated that there is a statistical certainty of accidental nuclear war within the next ten years.

In this context, the arms race becomes utter insecurity; other ways must be found to preserve American and world security.

Regretfully, to date we have not made a serious effort to study alternatives to the arms race. There has been no well coordinated, adequately financed, and fully authorized study of new approaches to arms controls and disarmament. We literally do not know what is feasible and what is possible. We know only, as President Eisenhower has said, that "there is no longer any alternative to peace."

A review of past disarmament conferences reveals this profound lack of preparation since the early days of the postwar period. From 1948 to 1952, for example, there were seldom more than four professionals in the entire State Department working on disarmament—speech writers often formulated policy. In 1955 when President Eisenhower offered his Open Skies proposal to the Geneva summit meeting, the Administration was divided until the last minute over the basic concepts of the proposal. Later, at the London disarmament talks, the U.S. position did not crystallize until months after the conference was launched. The shaky crystal soon shattered when Harold Stassen was unceremoniously dumped and the lack of a prepared and well-backed American position was exposed publicly.

In 1958 we proposed a conference on surprise attack, and when the Soviet Union accepted this proposal five months later, the United States still had not prepared its position, had not done its technical research, and had not selected its negotiators. Again, we were forced to resort to stop-gap measures in piecing together a position paper. The result was so disjointed and unfinished that U.S. scientists were unable to go beyond the most limited technical discussions in their negotiations.

On his return, our delegation chief, William C. Foster, revealed our lack of preparation by testifying before a Senate subcommittee: "I doubt that we have really given the intense study to the kind of measures which will make this [prevention of surprise attack] possible and which we would have to do before we go back into these further talks."

Notwithstanding this testimony, the mistake was repeated in 1959 at the nuclear test ban conference. We had proposed the conference a year earlier. When, after long delay, the Russians accepted our proposal, we once more were unprepared. At the conference itself, our delegates pored over slide rules and books after hours.

One of the weakest links in the chain of national security is this failure to do our disarmament homework. Not only are we obviously ignorant on disarmament; the fact that no body of enlightened official opinion on arms control and disarmament exists leaves the field wide open to agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department, which are recognized in Washington as the biggest and most powerful of the cold war lobbies. Sincere and dedicated to their cause, these huge government institutions make their views felt with incredible effectiveness. However, their primary responsibilities cannot and do not include the possibility of disarmament.

The sheer numbers of personnel who can master and mobilize facts, figures, and authorities to join ranks on the issue of the moment give added strength to the AEC-Defense position. When these agencies join hands with the giant corporations, the strength of the combined lobbies is almost irresistible. It is against the awesome power of what President Eisenhower called the "military-industrial complex" that he warned the American people and the incoming Administration as he was leaving office.

The war lobbyists extend their activities far beyond the presentation of ideas. They employ power press agent tactics on an extensive and effective scale. The Pentagon, for example, has announced armed forces cutbacks while the State Department was negotiating total disarmament positions. The timing has been such that Defense has been eminently successful in destroying State's bargaining position. In another instance, the Atomic Energy Commission announced the possibility of a new "clean" bomb which required testing

at a time when test ban talks were being held in London.

Even today, newspapers publish spectacular stories about the new neutron bomb which would "absolutely require" that the test ban be lifted. In reality, the neutron bomb is not a super-weapon and does not appear to offer its possessor any unique advantage, even if developed; but the AEC finds its glamor appeal useful at a moment when we are considering whether or not to end the moratorium on tests.

This unpreparedness with solid research for disarmament has, therefore, weakened us on two counts: Disarmament thinking is unprepared and ill-considered, and, accordingly, we are unable to negotiate from well-considered positions.

In the policy-making struggle, inadequately staffed disarmament teams have been fantastically outnumbered by rival groups within the government. The over-emphasis on armaments is reflected in the fact that we spend $50,000 on armaments for each dollar on disarmament.

The President's proposal for a U.S. Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security would seek to redress the balance both in disarmament policy-making and in international negotiations. His proposal for a research and negotiating agency follows on the heels of my National Peace Agency bill, which thirty other Congressmen joined in introducing, and it carries out the promise of the Democratic platform and the work of the Democratic Advisory Council's Science and Technology Committee. It is similiar to proposals offered earlier by Representative Charles Bennett, Florida Democrat, and Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Minnesota Democrat.

The Disarmament Agency would serve three primary functions:

¶ It would have permanent responsibility for doing a thorough job of disarmament research.

¶ It would handle all disarmament negotiations.

¶ It would act as a powerful council for peace within the executive branch of government.

Written into the President's proposal are a list of specific research topics, which encompass broad ranges of research. First among these are the technical and military questions: How do we actually detect a hidden missile site? How do we know if a tremor is an earthquake or a bomb? How can we use modern computors to give inspection teams rapid techniques of accumulating, sorting, and digesting arms control data from hundreds of diverse inspection sites?

Secondly, the Disarmament Agency would be charged with making studies of the political and foreign policy implications of various disarmament proposals. This would encompass not only such specific diplomatic questions as that of expected German reaction to the military neutralization of central Europe, but study of the fundamental question of how a secure peace can be built. It would stretch its research to studies of how the United Nations should be reorganized to guarantee world peace and security in a disarmed world.

Finally—and of utmost importance—it would make thorough studies of how the fruits of disarmament can best be managed and controlled. The agency would be given responsibility for making studies of how to adjust the American economy to a reduction in defense spending. Solid preparation, research, and foresight can prevent possible unemployment if "peace breaks out."

Adequate appropriations, coupled with full support of the executive branch of government, will in all likelihood enable U.S. disarmament officials to outline new approaches to disarmament for the first time. Knowing that the problem has been fully and carefully studied, the agency's proposals should carry new weight at the policy-making level and help the President make recommendations to the country with confidence that his proposals are sound.

The importance the President attaches to this new agency is best illustrated by the status conferred upon the director. He will have direct access to the President and have the rank of Undersecretary. This will guarantee him a great deal of independence. Having the President's ear will enable him to give a full account of himself and his agency in the internecine struggles with the Pentagon and the AEC that are liable to break out.

Justus in The Minneapolis Tribune

"Now Let's See—What Is Our Most Pressing Problem?"

The Administration's bill was drafted by John J. McCloy, the President's Special Adviser on Disarmament. The appointment of McCloy, an experienced military expert, a Wall Street banker, and a Republican, to the disarmament post was termed by Khrushchev "putting a goat in the cabbage patch." But McCloy not only has proved his ability and sincerity but has demonstrated that the United States may now be moving to a bipartisan disarmament policy to match its foreign and defense policies.

It is not overly optimistic to say that the new proposal for a Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security could well be the most important force for peace in this country.

Although the President's bill is all that one could reasonably ask to fill the disarmament research gap, it will mean nothing unless the agency's director is a man thoroughly prepared for his assignment and dedicated to the goal of disarmament as a realistic possibility.

We can be confident that if the President's bill breaks through the storm clouds hanging over Berlin and is passed in this session of Congress, and if a well qualified man is appointed director, there will be a new birth of life in disarmament thinking. If this happens, we may well be taking the first serious and thoughtful step on a trail marked "Security through Disarmament."

THE TOMB

by MILTON MAYER

THE NEXT best thing to eternal salvation is temporal salvation, and you can't blame a man in the prime of life, or a little past, for wondering what he might do for himself in case of nuclear war. I'd spent some time wondering lately, until I saw a headline in the local paper: "COUNTY MAN BUILDS A-BOMB SHELTER." The second paragraph of the story went like this:

"Eager to share his experience in building a shelter for protection from nuclear blast and fallout, yet reluctant to pinpoint the location of the shelter, its owner declined to be named. In event of nuclear attack, or even panic due to rumor, he does not wish his family shelter mobbed by persons less well prepared."

Within an hour-and-a-half—never mind how—I had the name and address of the man with the shelter. It was Henry T. Babcock, and he lived about two miles away from me. Professor Edward Teller, the "Father of the H-Bomb," says that there should be a shelter for everybody within ten minutes walk. (I used to be a miler, took a third for Englewood High in the City Meet in 1925, and there's nothing to keep a man of my age from getting back into trim.)

I tossed little Dicken into the car, got in myself, fastened the safety belt, and drove over to Babcock's without ceremony. Babcock and I were acquaintances, as people are in small towns; but just acquaintances. I knew he was scientifically trained and a successful, respected practitioner of his profession. Nice fellow. We didn't meet at the same parties, but, then, I don't get out much any more.

He was working in the garden, and he said he was glad to see me, and I said I was interested in his bomb shelter. "Everybody is," he said. "There doesn't seem to be any way to keep it quiet."

"I guess it's the only one in the County," I said.

"I guess so," said Babcock. "I've asked Civil Defense, but they don't know. They don't know anything. I've been trying to get a Geiger-counter from them for the past three years. I've got a ten-year-old counter, and I don't know if it's any good. Now that I think of it, I'd better put it down in the shelter. That's where you're supposed to keep it."

"You'd think other people would build shelters," I said.

"You would," said Babcock, "but you know how people are. They just don't want to think about it. But it stands to reason that there will be war. There always has been."

"I suppose the cost is a problem," I said.

"I suppose so," said Babcock. "It cost me four-thousand-some dollars, just for a hole in the ground."

"You could build a nice swimming pool for that," I said.

"You can say that again," said Babcock, but I didn't. I was beginning to think that Babcock wasn't completely happy about the whole thing, though I couldn't see why. Here was his family—nice fellow, nice wife, three nice children—nicely sheltered from nuclear attack. But it's as Babcock himself said: "It's like insurance. If you have it, you don't need it. If you need it, you don't have it."

"Well, you've got it," I said.

"Well, I guess so," said Babcock. "But there are problems, lots of problems."

"You bet there are," I said.

Babcock excused himself to get the old Geiger-counter and a pick, which he said he thought he might as well put down there because he had no use for it in the house and you're supposed to have some tools in the shelter. Dicken and I were left in the living room. The house was one of those new ranch style affairs with merging "areas" instead of rooms. There were no bookshelves visible, but the coffee table had a book on it, dealing with Babcock's profession, and several copies of *Life*, *Time*, and *Reader's Digest*. Our host returned with the pick and the Geiger-counter and said, "Well, let's go."

We followed him out of the house and across the yard in the rear.

"I should have built it under the house," said Babcock thoughtfully, as we crossed the yard.

"Did you build it yourself?" I said.

"No," said Babcock, "it was built by a contractor."

"But you designed it," I said.

"No," said Babcock, "we had the architect of the house design it."

The shelter was about forty feet from the house (which was made of wood) and ten feet from the wooden two-car garage. There were three protrusions from the ground, an air intake pipe (capped with a filter), an air exhaust pipe, and a tilted entrance hatch. The intake was about five feet from the wooden fence surrounding the house and garage, and the exhaust was surrounded by a large pile of kindling. "Well," said Babcock, "this is what it looks like from the outside. Here," pointing to the capped intake, "is where the air goes in. We draw it in with a blower in the shelter."

"What if the fence was on fire?" I said.

"What if what?"

"What if the fence was on fire, or the garage, or the kindling?"

"Oh," said Babcock. "Yes. That would be bad. We'd be drawing the smoke right down into the shelter. That would be bad."

"What's the kindling around the vent for?" I said.

"That's just our kindling pile," said Babcock. Then he said, "I suppose I ought to move it away, but there's so darned much to do all the time."

"Of course," I said, "if you had a real fire-storm above ground, with everything burning, I suppose the fire would suck the oxygen right out of the shelter. That's what happened in the ten-night raid on Hamburg." "Is it?" said Babcock. "Yes," I said. "The people in the shelters were asphyxiated." "That would be bad, all right," said Babcock.

We went over to the iron hatch-lid set in concrete. It took a lot of lifting. "Pretty sturdy," I said. "Yes," said Babcock, "pretty sturdy." The lid had a heavy hasp for a padlock on the outside, but there was no padlock. I asked if the hatch could be locked from the inside, and Babcock said it couldn't be. I thought about this and said. "Then the whole town could follow you into the shelter, couldn't it?"

"Well," said Babcock, "that's a problem, all right. Of course, there's an inside lock on the door at the bottom of the stairs. Once we got into the shelter itself, we could lock ourselves in."

"Then somebody might snap a lock on the hatch from the outside," I said, adding, "but nobody would do that."

"I hope not," said Babcock.

"Of course," I said, "you couldn't let *everyone* in."

"No," said Babcock, "there's just room for Nettie and me and the kids. It's not much more than a five-man shelter, really."

"I suppose you might have to stand off some of the people who wanted in," I said. "You know how people are," I added.

"Well, that's a problem," said Babcock. "Everybody would want to get in. I don't know what we'd do about that. One fellow said I'd need a gun."

"It might take a lot of shooting," I said. Babcock didn't say anything for a bit, and then he said, "The trouble is, you can't figure out everything."

"You can say that again," I said.

The inside of the hatch-lid was lined with sponge, and I asked Babcock why. "Well," he said, frowning, "theoretically it's to keep the lid from sweating. He emphasized the "theoretically." The wooden stairs to the floor of the shelter were steep, but the stairway had an iron handrail. I was surprised to learn that the roof of the shelter was covered by only three feet of earth, but Babcock explained that the deeper you dig the more it costs. With its seven-foot ceiling, and its foot-thick floor, the bottom of the hole was eleven feet nine inches deep. (The roof was nine inches thick.) The construction was all steel-reinforced concrete except for the hatch-lid, the stairs, and the door at the bottom of the stairs.

At the foot of the stairs was a 180 degree turn to the shelter door. Babcock said that that was the only idea he had ever been able to get from Civil Defense, and that every time he ever tried to find out anything from Civil Defense he ran into a stone wall of red tape. Whatever else made him unhappy, there was no doubt about Civil Defense. But there seemed to be something more than Civil Defense weighing on him. The local paper had described him as eager to share his experience; I found him willing rather than eager. His manner was that of a real estate agent showing a property he'd just as soon the client didn't buy.

"What was Civil Defense's idea about the 180 degree turn?" I said. "Well," he said, "the radioactivity is supposed to travel in straight lines, so it can't turn the corner. I suppose that's so," he added. I thought that was interesting, and said so. Babcock said nothing.

The door of the shelter itself was made of wood, with steel trim. I opened and closed it a few times and asked if it was airtight. "I don't know," said Babcock. "It's snug, but I guess you wouldn't call it airtight." "I was just wondering," I said. I was just wondering about poison gas, and whether bacteria, once you took them off the leash, would turn 180 degree corners.

I don't know why, but I had thought that the shelter would consist of two or three rooms, at least. It consisted of one clammy concrete bunker eight by ten feet. Very clammy. My host began mopping up the dew with small bags scattered around the floor. "They're filled with chemicals," he said. "They're supposed to absorb the moisture, and then you bake them out in the oven." I said they didn't seem to work too well, and he said, No, they didn't. He'd heard there were some cans of stuff that worked better, but he didn't know what it was called or where you got it.

The decor of the shelter was simplicity itself. There was one naked light, shelves of tinned and packaged food, a bunk spring (without legs) leaning upright against the wall, a plastic garbage can, a slender cylinder of oxygen about two feet tall and six inches in diameter, and one metal cleat in the ceiling. And, of course, the Geiger-counter and the pick. Nothing else. No furniture of any kind, no hooks or hangers (or clothes to put on them), no copies of *Life* or *Time* or the *Reader's Digest*.

I asked Babcock how long he figured they might be down there. "You mean," he said, "in case of—?" "Yes," I said, "in case of—." "There doesn't seem to be any way to find out. Some people say weeks, and some say months, so you don't really know. It's a problem." I agreed that it was and asked him how the family planned to occupy itself in the shelter in case of—. Babcock said they hadn't really thought about that.

I asked him how he'd know when to come out. "You mean—afterward?" he said. "Yes—afterward," I said. "Well," said Babcock, "we've got a plug-in here for a portable radio, if we remember to bring it down when we come, and an antenna up through the vent." "So, then," I said, "you'd find out over the radio." "If we remember to bring it down," he said again, and then,

"I guess we'd find out that way, unless—." "Unless—?" I said.

"Well," he said, "unless the station is knocked out, or the current goes off. Of course," he added, "we've got this old Geiger-counter, if it works, but we'd have to go outside to use it, so I don't know what we'd do about that. I guess it isn't much use, when you come to think of it."

"And where," I said, "is the Gents' Room?" "There," said Babcock, indicating the plastic garbage can, which was four feet tall. "And the garbage can?" I said. "There," said Babcock, indicating the plastic garbage can. I thought that the place ought to be pretty spicy after a week or so, and Babcock said, "The CD literature says to have a chemical toilet, but I can't find out where to buy one or how to build one. And I'm afraid to use chlorine, in case the fumes are poisonous. So we got this plastic garbage can. But we haven't been able to figure out—."

By way of changing the subject, I asked him what the single cleat in the ceiling was for. He said, "We thought we could get those cleats into the walls, to hang the bunks on, but for some reason we couldn't," and he pointed to the pockmarks in the concrete. "This is the only one we could get to stay in, so we haven't been able to put up the bunks." I said that the concrete must be pretty hard, and he said that I could say that again.

I asked him about the food, and he said that that was a problem. "The trouble is," he said, "that it spoils. Rust. I guess it's the damp, or something. I opened a can of tomato juice a while back, and it was spoiled. Somebody said you should rotate the food every two years." "Every year," said his little boy, who was with us. "Every year," said Babcock. "Here," he said, to his little boy, handing him a can, "take this spaghetti up to the house and we'll have it for lunch." "Every year," said the little boy, going out with the spaghetti.

Besides the canned and packaged foods, there were twenty-four beer-sized cans of water for a family of five. I asked Babcock if he thought it was enough. "I guess not," he said. "I ought to get some more. Of course it depends on how long—. "But," he went on, "we have some other stuff to drink," and he pointed to maybe a dozen cans in all of ginger ale, root beer, and juices, and two bottles each of king-size Coca-Cola and Seven-Up. He said they had instant coffee, too, and he thought they had a hot plate somewhere. "I guess we'd have to drink it cold, if the current went off," he said.

I asked him what they would do for light if the current went off. "Well," he said, "I don't know, exactly. If the current goes off, we've got this flashlight, of course." He showed me the flashlight, of the sort that burns out in a night. I asked him about candles. "I don't think they'd do," he said, "they'd use up the oxygen." "But you'd be getting fresh air through the blower," I said, "so you'd be all right."

"Well," said Babcock, "that's the biggest problem, I guess you might say. As long as the current is on, it works fine." He turned it on. It worked fine, but it roared. "It's a little noisy," said Babcock, "on account of the concrete, I suppose. But you can see for yourself, it works fine. The trouble is, it might be drawing the radioactive particles right in through the filter from outside. I haven't been able to find out if the filter would keep them out. Another thing is that you're supposed to change the filter, but you'd have to go outside to do that." At this point, he seemed to become thoughtful, and so did I.

"And if the current goes off?" I asked.

"Oh," said Babcock, brightening, "you can operate the blower with the hand crank. Here, try it." I tried it, for twenty to thirty seconds, and it nearly broke my arm. "It goes a little hard," said Babcock. "I guess we'd have to do it in shifts if we were going to do it all the time. Of course it depends on how long—." "And," I said, "on whether the filter was drawing radioactive particles in, or napalm, or gas. They"—I meant the Russians—"might use napalm, or gas."

"Gas," said Babcock, without any tone or emphasis. "If they use gas and we use the air pump, I guess we've had it." Neither of us said anything, and then Babcock said, "You know, I guess the pump isn't really much use, except the blower part, to circulate the air you've already got." Neither of us said anything again, and then Babcock said, "We might be better off to depend entirely on the oxygen tank," and we walked over to the tank, which was, as I've said, a cylinder about six inches in circumference and two feet tall.

"How much oxygen is there in it?" I said, thinking of his scientific training. He looked at the tag on the cylinder. "I don't really know," he said. "They give you a formula to calculate—by the cubic feet and number of persons and so on—but I haven't had a chance to calculate the formula, there's so darned much to do. The darned thing's on my desk in the house. It's pretty complicated."

I asked him what it said on the tag. "It says two thousand pounds pressure," he said, "but I don't know what that means. If I knew the *weight*," and he turned the tag over. It was blank. I asked him if he had any idea how long it would last in case—. He shook his head and said, "Several days, maybe. I don't really know. I ought to calculate that formula." He shook his head slowly and said, "My wife's a chain smoker. I guess that affects it, too."

It wasn't getting any warmer in the shelter, and I asked Babcock what they'd do for heat in case—. Babcock said that would be a problem, he guessed, but an old Navy man told him that with enough bodies down there it would be warm enough. I said, "Of course, there's such as thing as too much heat in a

MOVING?

Please send us your old address as well as your new one.

shelter. The people in those deep shelters in Hamburg died of asphyxiation, but their bodies were charred from the heat above the ground."

Babcock was frowning, and there didn't seem to be anything more to say or to see, and we went on up and out into the summer day. "It's nice outside," said Babcock. "It will be nice to come out after—," I said. "I don't know," said Babcock, "I just don't know. It's a problem."

"*It's* a problem?" I said.

Babcock nodded. "Food and water," he said, "what if they're contaminated?" "And air," I said. "Air," said Babcock. "And people," I said. "I suppose," I went on, "that you'll have to keep away from contaminated people." Babcock nodded and said, "But maybe they won't keep away from you." "Well," I said, in a tone with which I might have slapped another man on the back, "keeping away from contaminated people has always been a problem, socially." He was still frowning.

If I had to put an adjective to Babcock, I suppose it would be "apathetic." He had certainly lost interest in the shelter. (Had he ever had any?) But there was something more than apathy there. I seemed to be making him actually miserable by asking him the questions that anyone would ask about it. He had done his duty by showing me the shelter; he had done his duty by building it; but doing his duty appeared to have touched him with a deep melancholy. Even when he said, "It's nice outside," he said it without much zest.

We stood there in the summer day and said good-bye, and he said, "If there's anything else you'd like to—," and I was still trying to figure out how he felt. Babcock's trouble is that he doesn't want to die and he knows he's going to die and where he's going to die and where he's going to be buried.

I put Dicken into the car and got in myself and fastened my safety belt, and we started home. Now Dicken may not think a lot—it's hard to tell—but he doesn't say much. He didn't say much on the way home. He didn't say anything until I asked him what he thought about it, and then he said, "It's a tomb, if you ask me."

"You can say that again," I said, and Dicken said, "It's a tomb, if you ask me."

Old Economics on the New Frontier

by LEON KEYSERLING

JUST PRIOR to the election last November, I voiced in *The Progressive* my firm belief that, on the economic front, Senator John F. Kennedy was endowed with qualities which would help to "lift the concept of a great national purpose under freedom from a pretentious generality into a splendid performance."

To what extent has this expectation been vindicated? Viewing the urgent domestic and imperative worldwide tasks which depend so substantially upon economic performance, there is cause for some concern. Even though seven months under a new Administration is too short a time to enter definitive judgment, it is significant that unemployment now is practically as high as in January, with little prospect of much reduction in the near future. Giving full weight to those aspects of the President's "Berlin crisis" speech of July 25 which dealt with economic problems, some economists still suggest with a sigh that small programs are being commissioned to do big jobs.

In defense of the Administration, it is argued that there has not been time enough; that the composition of the Congress is inimical; that the margin of the President's popular victory was narrow; and that the American people are not ready and willing to espouse the bigger things which need to be done. Consequently, they insist that the Administration has been demonstrating the art of the practical, which is the essence of statecraft.

To understand the core economic challenge which confronted the President when he assumed office, it will be helpful to review briefly the period since the termination of the Korean hostilities removed the galvanizing effects of wartime.

From mid-1953 to mid-1957, the economy underwent, first, a period of "recession," marked by absolute declines in employment and production; then a period of "boom," or rather sharp upturn, during which employment and production increased at a substantial rate, but not fast enough nor long enough to reduce idle manpower and plant to as low a level as before the immediately preceding "recession"; and, finally, a period of "stagnation," during which employment and production moved upward at a much reduced rate, insufficient to absorb the growing labor force and growing productivity. Idle manpower and plant increased even though the economy was slowly creeping upward in absolute terms. From mid-1957 to late 1960, the economy repeated these three successive periods of "recession," "boom," and "stagnation." And the "recession" prevailing when the new Administration took over was in its essential characteristics, in my view, the start of a third "cycle" in this same pattern.

For the period 1953-1960, I estimate that this long-term retreat from maximum employment and production caused us to forfeit more than 260 billion dollars in total national production (measured in uniform 1959 dollars), to forfeit about 18.5

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million man-years of employment opportunity, and to forego enormous potential gains in the liquidation of poverty and the servicing of public needs. This long-term retreat produced an average annual overall growth rate of only 2.5 per cent, when the growth rate needed to be somewhere between four and five per cent to absorb the increase in the size of the labor force and in improved productivity, and thus prevent the chronic increase in idle manpower and plant.

The best way to examine how all this happened is to survey how each short-lived "boom" was succeeded by "stagnation" and then "recession." In each "boom" period, and even after the advent of the immediately succeeding "stagnation" period, private investment in the means of expanding production grew much more rapidly than expansion of demand for ultimate products in the form of public outlays and private consumer expenditures combined. For example, during the period 1954-1956, investment in plant and equipment grew about eight times as fast as ultimate demand, and about five times as fast during the period 1958-1960. When the resultant "overcapacity" became sufficiently pronounced, business investment was cut back sharply, and this, together with the longer-term deficiencies in ultimate demand, brought on "recession."

During these "recessionary" periods, the automatic "stabilizers" in the economy (such as the progressive tax system and unemployment insurance), plus some new stimulatory policies injected by the government, helped to keep ultimate demand fairly stable or even somewhat on the rise. Then, as "overcapacity" in acute form was worked down, another "boom" or upturn set in, subject to the self-defeating ingredients already described.

According to my estimates, the 1953-1960 deficiency of 260 billion dollars in total national production was composed of a deficiency of about 30 billion dollars in public outlays, about 170 billion in private consumer outlays, and about 60 billion in total private investment.

The deficiency in public outlays was entirely attributable to the restrictive budget policies of the Federal government; the states and localities, on the contrary, have been expanding their outlays rapidly, pushing hard against the limits of their ability to raise revenues and borrow money.

The deficiency in private consumer outlays was caused by the slow pace of advances in total real wages (consumer income advances, during the "boom" periods, lagged far behind an "equilibrium" ratio to profits and investment in producers' facilities); by vast deflation of farm income; by increasingly regressive tendencies in income distribution, which placed too large a part of consumer income in the hands of those at the top of the income structure, and too small a part in the hands of those in the lower-middle-income and low-income groups who spend a larger percentage of their incomes and save less; by only nominal expansion (measured against need) of Federal programs which increase private consumption, such as Social Security programs and minimum wage laws; and by the generally restrictive and regressive private-income effects of the tight Federal budget policy and the rising interest rates inherent in the tight-money policy.

The deficiency in total private investment (which occurred during the 1953-1960 period as a whole, but not during the "boom" periods) was not the result of public policies inimical to business profits or "confidence," but rather to the deficient expansion of public outlays and private consumption which led into "stagnation" and "recession." And during the "boom" periods, the tax and monetary policies and the negative government attitude toward wage increases, as well as special tax incentives to business investment, conspired to generate the relatively excessive profit and investment binges already mentioned.

The quantitative deficiencies in public economic programs during the Eisenhower Administration had some pervasive qualitative overtones: unwillingness to develop any overall perspective or program under the Employment Act of 1946; failure to diagnose the real causes of the chronic economic trouble; persistently regressive efforts to water the economic tree at the top rather than at the base; constitutional aversion to the full use of our abundance, made manifest in a scarcity philosophy which took direct action to abort each "recovery" period long before it became complete; and repeated "inflation" scares, used to justify these other wayward policies, and to give us still more inflation—of a highly "selective" nature—by feeding the fat and starving the lean.

Against all of this, the Democratic candidate for President in 1960 spoke with great emphasis and conviction. But what has taken place since last fall, and where do we stand today? First, let us probe the economic outlook now. This probing takes into account the increased defense outlays generated by the "Berlin crisis"; it cannot take account of future drastic changes in the international situation beyond the realm of forecasting.

Some recent forecasts, with which I agree, indicate that full-time unemployment at the end of 1962 may be between five and six per cent of the civilian labor force. This level of unemployment at the end of 1962, near the peak of the current "boom" (if it lasts that long), might be much higher than during the previous "boom" year 1959, thus representing continuation rather than reversal of the "long-term retreat." And there are some economists close to the Administration who expect that about 1963, in the absence of much more vigorous and sweeping economic efforts than any now apparently under consideration, we shall slide into what is euphemistically called another "inventory recession."

My own disturbing appraisal is that, without these far more vigorous and sweeping economic efforts, the American economy during the period 1961-1965 may average an overall economic growth rate not appreciably higher than during the period 1953-1960. And it should be made clear that the economy now is in some respects more vulnerable than in early 1953. Many of the so-called "backlogs" of civilian demand—resulting from the great depression and two wars—are no longer so insistent. The automatic stabilizers in the economy, while improved absolutely in some respects, are much smaller relative to the size of the economy than in

1953, and this is also true of the Federal budget and the immensely important Social Security programs. The regressive income trends are still continuing, and the tight-money policy has not been modified much.

If I should turn out to be correct in my estimate of very low economic growth in the future—in the absence of much more strenuous programs—we would forfeit during the period 1961-1965 about 390 billion dollars worth of total national production (measured in uniform 1959 dollars); about 20 million man-years of employment opportunity; about 225 billion dollars worth of private consumer spending, which could be used to reduce poverty and to lift living standards in general; and about 95 billion dollars of public revenues at all levels, which could be used to increase vastly our essential domestic and international undertakings. In 1965 alone, assuming a low 1961-1965 growth rate, we might be suffering full-time unemployment in the neighborhood of seven million. This would mean a true level of unemployment (taking into account the full-time equivalent of part-time unemployment) close to nine million, contrasted with about 6.3 million during the first quarter of 1961.

These dismal comments are based upon a comparison of the Administration's short-range and long-range economic programs, including those still under consideration by the Congress, with the programs which I estimate to be needed to restore maximum employment and production by the end of 1962 (a modest goal), and to establish a sound foundation for maintaining these conditions thereafter.

The first and most direct way to expand economic activity is to enlarge the public outlays in the Federal budget. The Administration's proposals for aid to education, housing, assistance to depressed areas, foreign economic assistance, and national defense commendably blaze new trails. But for the two calendar years 1961-1962, the Administration's spending program (including the "Berlin crisis" program) involves increases several billion dollars short of the needed amount, especially in view of the deficiencies in other programs set forth below. It may be a shock to those who have heard so much about the primacy of our public needs to learn that total domestic outlays in the fiscal 1961 Federal budget are a smaller percentage of estimated total national production than during at least one year of the Eisenhower Administration.

Improvements in programs to enlarge private consumption directly, such as Social Security, unemployment compensation, and minimum wages, have been much too small. Exhortations to labor to be careful about wage increases, while pleasing to a general public which has been subjected to much erroneous propaganda, do not arise from any realistic analysis. And at currently proposed levels of expenditures, the firm stand against tax cuts to expand consumption will result in an undesirable budget surplus long before restoration of anywhere near maximum utilization of manpower and plant.

In view of the new technology, moving forward so rapidly in factory, farming, and office work, home construction for the ill-housed and urban renewal afford the largest single opportunity to restore and maintain maximum employment and production. Yet I estimate that the new housing program recently approved by the Congress would provide, over a period of more than a year, only a little more than one-ninth the volume of new home construction for lower-middle-income families, and only about one-third the volume of new homes for low-income families, which we should average each year between now and 1965.

In monetary policy, the changes thus far do not sufficiently liberalize credit nor sufficiently reduce interest rates; the citadel of excessive Federal Reserve Board power has not been challenged by the Administration.

As a consequence of these shortcomings, I estimate that the growth rate in 1961 and 1962 will not much exceed half that required to restore maximum employment by the end of 1962.



These deficiencies in the Kennedy Administration's program to date spring substantially from some shortcomings in the economic thinking which is being pressed upon a President properly absorbed in other matters. There is still much evidence of neo-classical theories untested by empirical scrutiny of the economy in operation; short-term improvisations not fitted into longer-term perspectives, preoccupation with monetary and financial and price movements rather than with the real production and usages which are the true wealth of nations; defensive and discrete measures (designed to combat inflation and deflation) which seemed advanced in the Thirties but not now, rather than an overall view and positive and specific goal-setting meshed with thoroughly coordinated policies under the Employment Act of 1946.

These weaknesses do much to explain the Kennedy push for tax concessions to promote private investment, which now competes with the Republican obsession on this score and neglects the compelling evidence that the road to a sustainably high rate of investment is not through tax bonanzas but rather through developing adequate markets for ultimate products. The same weaknesses explain the Administration's relatively dim view of expansion of private consumption, sometimes rationalized on the ground that we need public education more than tail-fins, and that we should therefore shift production from private to public use. But this attitude slights the massive poverty still in our midst, and ignores the central fact that the new technology and automation require large increases in public outlays and enormous expansion of private consumption to avoid chronically rising unemployment of manpower and plant.

The President's speech on the "Berlin crisis" was moving in its appeal to steadfastness and honor. But it missed a tremendous opportunity to empha-

size that the current idleness of manpower and plant—representing a gap of at least seventy-five billion dollars between actual national production and reasonably full production—plus a burgeoning technology and a rapidly growing labor force, can be called upon for even larger defense exertions than proposed, while simultaneously permitting and indeed requiring large additions to strength-building domestic programs, both public and private.

Instead, this crucial speech intimated some adherence to the "budget-balancing" and "prudent finance" tenets of conservative economics and bookkeeper criteria. The President said that tax rate increases would be requested next year, if the economy did not grow rapidly enough to provide additional revenue compensation at existing tax rates for the proposed expenditure increases. This is tantamout to arguing the untenable proposition that tax rates should be relatively higher if a disappointingly slow rate of economic growth yields a large economic slack than if a more rewarding economic growth rate yields less economic slack. And it is significant that the speech looked upon the rate of growth expected as a mere "forecast" which may turn out to be wrong, instead of projecting an intensified economic effort at least comparable to the growing tensions on other fronts and treating the growth rate in the future as something to be defined and achieved.

If the current approach is designed to appease conservative opposition, it already seems more liable to result in the fortification of that opposition's resistance to needed domestic spending. Come next year, the President may find himself caught in the trap of the analyses which his economists have furnished, to the point where it will be increasingly hard for him to resist either tax increases or sharp cuts in domestic outlays to compensate for increased defense outlays. Either course would further retard an economy still far from its full strength and therefore would jeopardize our international position.

And if the economic approach now being urged upon the President is designed merely to achieve strength through "sacrifice," it is hard to see how we shall become stronger by deficient economic policies. The American people will respond rationally to more effective economic proposals reasonably explained.

While the President certainly believes that he is receiving liberal and modern economic advice, this is not yet entirely the case. There is still a cultural lag even among some of the "liberal" academicians, and this unwittingly reinforces the more conservative spokesmen who are also in the Administration.

To be sure, wise national and world leadership in crucial times does involve questions of domestic "political" exigency. But the extent of the "political" risks which the President should take by "proposing too much" depends upon his evaluation of the competing risks which arise when his substantive economic proposals are scaled far below real needs. This is a delicate balance; nobody can substitute his own judgment for that of the President in the choice between alternative risks. Yet for the President to make these choices wisely, his advisers in the economic field (as well as elsewhere) must furnish him with the best feasible guides as to the relative risks involved. If this were done, I believe that the President would decide upon much stronger economic measures.

THE PROFIT IN PILLS

by SELIG GREENBERG

THE PROFIT-SWOLLEN pharmaceutical industry has good reason for concern over recent proposals in Congress and the signs of greater vigilance by Federal regulatory agencies regarding the manufacture and sale of drugs. For the consumer, on the other hand, these developments are good news indeed, offering hope for more stringent quality controls and some relief from a mounting drain on his pocketbook.

The drug manufacturers, aided by organized medicine, are sure to put up a bitter battle against tighter government regulation of the manner in which they make and merchandise their products. But remedial action in the public interest appears equally certain, even though it will probably come only piecemeal, in view of the clear record of profiteering by the big drug companies and the flagrant abuses in their promotion and marketing practices. Pressure for such action is constantly growing as the cost of drugs becomes a major issue in the debate of how medical care can best be organized and paid for. So sharp has been the jump in the price of drugs and in their use that any consideration of the economics of health care must increasingly take into account the large proportion of the bill now being spent for prescription medicines.

Annual sales of pharmaceutical firms in the United States have climbed in the past twenty years from 300 million dollars to more than 2.5 billion dollars. Accounting for this spectacular phenomenon are a variety of factors, including the development of the so-called wonder drugs, a steady increase in the per capita consumption of medications, and the trebling of the cost of the average prescription.

The pharmacopoeia has been completely revolutionized in the past few decades with the emergence of the

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antibiotics, the sulfonamides, the tranquilizers, the antihistamines, a variety of hormones, a multiplicity of combinations of vitamins, agents for the treatment of high blood pressure, and a galaxy of other new products. The extent of this revolution may best be judged from the fact that fully ninety per cent of the drugs now being prescribed were non-existent twenty years ago, and about forty per cent were unknown as recently as 1954. Many of the new drugs have contributed enormously to better health and longer life. They also have been a bonanza for the drug business, which has grown from a minor offshoot of chemical manufacturing into a major and booming industry with a striking profit record. The drug industry's rate of return on investment, after taxes, has in recent years amounted to more than twenty per cent, or nearly double that for all manufacturing.

As many new and more potent medications have become available an increase in the rate of their utilization was inevitable. But serious questions have been raised by competent authorities about the justification for the sweeping extent of the rise in the per capita use of drugs. One study has shown that in the five-year period between 1953 and 1958, per capita drug consumption jumped by nearly seventy-five per cent. There is good reason to believe that much of this increase has resulted not so much from clearly demonstrated medical need as from the effects of frenetic drug company promotion upon busy and gullible physicians. One pharmacological expert has said that probably no more than six of some 400 new compounds coming out every year are "really new drugs of material assistance in treatment." But doctors who commonly see between twenty and thirty patients a day are only too eager to use the short cut of medication and to prescribe fancy and expensive variations of old products.

The combination of rising drug prices and broadening utilization has significantly altered the relative standing of the major components of the medical care dollar. The biggest change has been in the portion going for drugs. In the period from 1953 to 1958, the share of the medical care dollar spent for hospitalization increased from 19.6 to 23.4 cents, that for physicians' services declined from 37.3 to 33 cents, and the portion for drugs went up from 14.7 to 20.2 cents. Not only are drugs beginning to approach hospital charges in importance but they represent the largest out-of-pocket item in the nation's health budget, since they are not covered by insurance.

Already jittery over the searching examination of its high profits and huge promotional expenditures by the Senate anti-monopoly subcommittee headed by Senator Estes Kefauver, the drug industry can draw no comfort from President Kennedy's choice for the chairmanship of the Federal Trade Commission. Prior to his appointment as the new head of the FTC, the agency charged with policing advertising practices, Paul Rand Dixon was chief counsel of the Kefauver anti-trust and monopoly subcommittee. The FTC's legal powers over drug advertising are limited. But its operations are now being streamlined under a Presidential reorganization plan recently approved by Congress, and the new chairman has promised to use his authority to the utmost to curb some of the excesses of drug promotion.

One of the reasons for the high costs of drugs, Dixon has told a House committee, is that about twenty-four cents out of every dollar that drug manufacturers get for prescription medicines go for promotion and other sales expenditures. He reported that the drug manufacturers are now spending about 750 million dollars a year for promotion of their products, a rate averaging about $5,000 annually for each of our 150,000 practicing physicians.

"The pharmaceutical industry is unique in that it can make exploitation appear a noble purpose," the Kefauver subcommittee has been told by Dr. Dale Console, former medical director for E. R. Squibb & Sons, a major drug firm. Much of the voluminous testimony before the subcommittee has amply supported this comment. Among other things, it has been shown that one hormone preparation which costs the manufacturer $1.57 for a bottle of 100 tablets is sold to retail druggists for $17.90 and by them to the consumer for $29.83. "Few, if any, industries in the American economy," says the latest report of the Kefauver group, "spend as small a proportion of their sales receipts to produce the goods they sell as does the pharmaceutical industry."

As a direct result of the disclosures at the Kefauver subcomittee hearings, legislation to clamp stiff new curbs on the drug industry has been introduced jointly by the Tennessee Senator and Representative Emanuel Celler of New York. Their bill would require Federal licensing of pharmaceutical manufacturers, authorize the Food and Drug Administration to test all new prescription drugs for effectiveness as well as safety before they could be marketed, strengthen inspection of manufacturing plants and relax patent rights on certain products, thereby making manufacturing know-how more readily available to competing firms and paving the way for material price reductions.

In the meantime, the FDA itself has been stung into more vigorous administrative action. It has issued new regulations requiring drug manufacturers to provide a more precise description of their products, including potential hazards and conditions under which the medications should not be used, in their promotional literature and on labels. These stricter requirements, which went into effect in January, have put a crimp into some of the more sweeping advertising claims and played hob with a good deal of advertising copy contracted for in advance for the first quarter of 1961. Much of this advertising was so out of line, it is reported, that it had to be canceled to comply with the new rules.

Mounting resentment against high drug prices has led thirteen New York labor unions with a combined membership of 350,000 to organize a non-profit corporation to run a chain of cut-rate drug stores in the metropolitan area. The project, to be fi-

nanced by payments of one dollar a year for every member of the participating unions, has two basic objectives. One is to furnish the union members and their families with drugs at prices expected to be at least thirty per cent below what they now pay. The other is to use the stores as a pilot enterprise for a contemplated drug insurance scheme. Backers of the new Medstore Plan report than many other unions have expressed an interest in the program and predict that within a year it will cover more than a million persons in the New York area. Among the methods by which Medstore plans to cut costs are mass purchasing, more economical packaging and dispensing, and elimination of duplication by keeping inventories to a minimum.

The present general practice of prescribing drugs by specific trade names instead of generic or chemical names often means that the consumer is forced to pay more for a product which is no better than available cheaper substitutes. An outstanding example is one variety of reserpine, a drug used for the treatment of high blood pressure and as a tranquilizer. As a brand-name item, this drug now retails at $6.75 for 100 pills. The same medication can be bought on a generic basis from small manufacturers at prices ranging from thirty cents to $1.23 for 100.

According to the *New England Journal of Medicine,* the most respected medical publication in the United States, prescription by copyrighted trade names is responsible for an unnecessary and confusing proliferation of products which are for the most part chemically identical. The practice, the *Journal* has said, "has no merit other than to increase the profits of the manufacturer" and "the cost of drugs to the consumer." This is precisely the purpose of the huge outlay going annually into heavy medical journal advertising, a lavish distribution of free samples, a steady barrage of gaudy promotional literature, and an army of some 15,000 traveling salesmen, known as detail men, whose job is to high pressure doctors into accepting new drugs and specifying proprietary names in prescriptions.

A crucial point to bear in mind in considering the economics of the drug industry is that the consumer of its products has no choice and no influence over their price and quality. While the patient foots the bill, the sole target of the strident promotion of the so-called ethical drugs are the doctors. Drug advertising carefully avoids any mention of price. The average physician is often unaware of the price of the medication he prescribes and in any event is unlikely to worry about cost if he is convinced that the drug is indicated.

But the trouble is that medicine has become so complex and the volume of professional literature so vast that overworked doctors are rarely able to evaluate the sweeping claims made for the hundreds of new drugs pouring into the market every year. The inevitable effect of the incessant drumfire of flamboyant commercials is confusion. "The bewildered physician," Dr. Harry F. Dowling of the University of Illinois School of Medicine, a noted authority on pharmacology, has said, "prescribes by suggestion and not from information." In criticizing the indiscriminate use of antibiotics in conditions where these medications are not only worthless but can be harmful, the *New England Journal of Medicine* has commented that the "siren song of the purveyors of pills helps to lull the hurried and harried physician into a tranquilized state."

The average doctor now gets annually about 5,000 pieces of drug mail advertising, much of it trash disguised as science. While a lot of this propaganda winds up unread in the wastebasket, its effects nevertheless are reported to be considerable on many physicians who lack the time to follow carefully the scientific literature on new drugs. In a survey made not long ago by the American Medical Association, about two-thirds of the doctors questioned admitted that they depend on detail men as their chief source of information on new drugs. The pharmaceutical companies themselves have boasted that their promotional efforts constitute a valuable form of "postgraduate education" for busy doctors. But is it really in the public interest to entrust the postgraduate education of the medical profession to salesmen?

The manner in which ethical drugs are promoted has other disturbing implications. Since these drugs can be sold only on a doctor's prescription, their advertising is confined to medical journals. With the steady rise in drug company advertising budgets, the publications of national and state medical societies have increasingly come to depend on such revenue. Nearly fifty-three per cent of the AMA's income in 1959 came from advertising in its publications and an additional 2.7 per cent from exhibits at its meetings, also largely paid for by drug companies. The AMA's operating budget now amounts to $16,500,000 a year. About $9,000,000 of this comes from drug promotion.

It is ironic, if nothing else, that while the code of medical ethics sternly forbids physicians to advertise, medical societies now generally find themselves in the advertising business up to their necks. This has led some observers to question whether organized medicine can be expected to maintain a truly objective attitude toward the business from which it derives its principal support. Nor is the financial tie-up between the drug industry and medical societies always limited to journal advertising. It is reported to be not uncommon for drug firms to subsidize medical society meetings through elaborate exhibits and by other means. Cocktail parties and dinners given by pharmaceutical houses for their friends and clients are a usual feature of many medical conventions.

It is difficult to say to what extent advertising revenue and drug company largesse are responsible for the generally cool attitude of organized medicine toward criticism of the pharmaceutical industry. Probably as important is the fact that censure of the drug makers carries the connotation that not all doctors are well trained enough to be impervious to sales ballyhoo. But pecuniary pressures sometimes figure in the picture. According to as respectable an authority as the AMA *Archives of Internal Medicine,* there have been occasions where medical journals have refused to publish articles criticizing particular drugs for fear of offending advertisers and where some medical societies have turned down

papers scheduled for delivery at their meetings because they were critical of products of exhibitors.

Above all, there is the factor of a common interest by organized medicine and the drug manufacturers in the preservation of the status quo. Both would be directly affected by any reorganization of the existing system of health services. Many hospitals and clinics already insist on dispensing drugs on a generic basis. Further expansion of medical services in hospital outpatient departments and group practice clinics inevitably would impinge greatly upon the present system of drug manufacture and distribution.

The close alliance between organized medicine and the pharmaceutical industry, often in brazen disregard of the interests of the consumers, has again been demonstrated in recent weeks at the Senate hearings on the Kefauver-Celler legislation for tighter Federal policing of the manufacture and sale of drugs.

The AMA has solidly lined up against the proposal to give the FDA authority to pass on whether new drugs live up to the claims made for them by the manufacturers. Despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, AMA spokesmen have maintained that the organized profession itself can best do the job of telling its members which of the new drugs are truly effective. This argument has been forcefully refuted by a long procession of prominent physicians, most of them connected with medical schools, who told the Senate subcommittee that doctors are increasingly confused and misled by high-pressure promotion, that many of the new drugs are worthless and sometimes dangerous and that drug prices are higher than they should be. Among the most outspoken witnesses were two members of the AMA's Council on Drugs, who testified that their group was not even consulted on the organization's stand against the proposed legislation.

Rising revulsion is clearly developing within the medical profession against the drug industry's damn-the-consumer attitude and the threat it represents not only to the patient's pocketbook but to the practice of medicine itself. It is an issue in which all of us have not only a financial but also a life-conserving stake.

The View from inside the Peace Corps

by EDWIN R. BAYLEY

IN THE MINDS of many people, both in the United States and abroad, the Peace Corps is the New Frontier.

The idea of the Peace Corps, the idea of individual service to individuals in other countries, is a simple, strong, appealing one, easily understood. To a young person, it offers purpose and a sense of adventure, elements too often lacking in contemporary life. As a secular missionary program, it appeals to the strong American tradition of unselfish service, which persists even in the absence of denominational religious motivation. Its reliance upon individual enterprise and its relatively low cost make it a less objectionable form of foreign aid to conservatives. To other critics of foreign aid, it is a welcome change in the direction of the kind of help advocated in *The Ugly American*, a book which has influenced many attitudes in this area of government activity.

Again, the Peace Corps idea is attractive because it involves people rather than dollars or machinery or even food, and, as newspaper editors especially know, people are interested in people.

Perhaps the most important cause of the popularity of the Peace Corps is that its concept is hopeful. In a world where idealists apologize, where hard-headedness seems the supreme qualification for those who govern, and where military strategists speak calmly of the loss of fifty million lives in an exchange of nuclear bombs, the Peace Corps touches our desire for a world in which one can live in peace and friendship with his neighbor and where personal relationships, homely virtues, and good works count for something.

This is, of course, wishful thinking, but the wish is real even though the Peace Corps is not going to change the world overnight. As critics point out, church groups and private agencies and universities and dedicated individuals have been doing this kind of thing for decades and centuries, and the world is still a mess. The expenditure of billions in technical aid to underdeveloped nations has failed to win much affection.

But the Peace Corps is important far beyond its numbers or its material effect because of its symbolism; in these days the repositories of hope are few.

The appeal of the New Frontier is a call to action, a challenge to the ordinary citizen to do something for his country and the world. Thus the identification of the Peace Corps with the New Frontier follows naturally for it is the most direct avenue of personal involvement that has been opened by President John F. Kennedy.

Neither we in Peace Corps headquarters nor the men and women who have been volunteering for service abroad see the Peace Corps as a panacea for the world's ills. The statements of the volunteers who have been selected for training have been astonishingly moderate; they are idealists, but they are practical. Neither the staff nor the volunteers count on saving the world, but the Peace Corps program might *help*

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save it, along with a lot of other things.

President Kennedy set the "practical" tone for the Peace Corps in his special message to Congress March 1 when he called for sending *trained* men and women abroad to meet needs for *skilled manpower*. This has been our emphasis since then, and it is both the strength and the limitation of the program. But those who qualify after completing the training courses now in progress will have skills that are needed where they are going. That much is certain.

A man or woman who wants to serve in the Peace Corps fills out a questionnaire which asks chiefly about education and work experience. Next, the applicant is invited to take an examination, either for general service or for special kinds of teaching. If he is selected, he is assigned to a training center at a university with which the Peace Corps has a training contract.

Projects are based upon requests from foreign governments, requests which might be channeled through an embassy, a United States overseas mission, or a private agency. Peace Corps program developers work out details with foreign ministries.

The Peace Corps list of those who have taken examinations then is combed by an IBM machine to see whether there are people with the qualifications to do the kind of work sought by the foreign governments. So far, there have been enough with the right skills.

The requests vary, but the most numerous have been for teachers, agricultural extension workers, health and sanitation experts, and for those with engineering and construction skills. The Peace Corps offers to meet only what its director calls "middle manpower" needs; it assumes that the furnishing of highly qualified technical experts is the job of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), which has done this for many years. The usual Peace Corps volunteer might be a college graduate, perhaps with a few years work experience, or a high school graduate with greater practical experience.

Of the first 224 volunteers to be selected for training, sixty per cent are in the twenty-two to twenty-four age group; eighty-six per cent are between twenty and twenty-six. The youngest is nineteen and the oldest thirty-five. About seventy-two per cent are college graduates; one-fifth of these have done graduate work. Of those who were employed full time, the largest number were teachers and engineers. These volunteers come from thirty-eight states, with the largest groups from California, New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Michigan, and Texas.

Overseas, the volunteers will receive allowances that will enable them to live on a modest scale in close association with the nationals of the other country. They will receive medical care and annual leave. In addition, a payment of $75 a month will accrue in the United States, to be paid upon separation and intended to tide over the volunteer until he resumes a regular career.

These arrangements have been criticized both as being too lavish and too little. For many of the volunteers this scale of pay will approximate what they might earn and save during the same two years in the United States; however, as it has turned out, it will mean a severe financial sacrifice for many in the first groups of trainees.

When the President issued his executive order establishing the Peace Corps on a pilot basis, it consisted of a handful of men and women without organization, policies, or even office space. Some of these were rebels from the bureaucracy; others were from outside government, attracted by the Peace Corps idea and recruited by telephone calls from the persuasive Sargent Shriver, who is serving as director of the Corps without pay.

The response to President Kennedy's action was tremendous; the Peace Corps office was jammed with volunteers, job seekers, well-wishers, reporters, and television men. Great stacks of mail piled up as 20,000 letters poured in, mostly from would-be applicants. In the midst of this turmoil, Shriver and his little staff struggled to hammer out the policies of the Peace Corps and to create an organization that could put these policies into operation.

One month later—a month of seven day weeks and eighteen hour days—the basic policies of the Peace Corps had been established and the staff was beginning to carry out its newly created functions.

There was an urgency about this organizational drive that reflected not only the urgency that has marked the entire Kennedy Administration but also the personalities of Shriver and the men he recruited to work with him. Shriver, who is President Kennedy's brother-in-law, runs the Peace Corps as if it were in the last stage of a political campaign. Everything has to be done instantly. His directives, even those addressed to senior officials in the older, slower, established agencies, carry deadlines.

Jack Young, a management expert loaned by another agency to help set up the Peace Corps, congratulated Shriver and the staff one night during that month. "You guys had a good day today," he said cheerfully. "You broke fourteen laws. But keep it up, we're making progress."

Much of the bureaucratic wreckage has yet to be cleared away, but progress, four months later, is clearly visible. Recruitment and selection systems have been devised and put into operation; projects are being developed in about twenty countries; about 350 volunteers are in training for assignment to Tanganyika, Colombia, and Ghana, and others will soon begin training for projects in Nigeria, Burma, Chile, India, St. Lucia, Malaya, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Peace Corps legislation has made some progress through the Congress. There is a pool of more than 6,000 volunteers who have taken the intensive examinations required by the Peace Corps, from which selectees can be drawn to fill all of the present year's needs for manpower.

Despite this progress, and perhaps because of it, there remains some uncertainty, at this writing, about the fate of legislation to give permanent status to the Peace Corps now being operated under executive order. The pressure of public support has fallen off since March; one Congressman recently ascribed this to the belief on the part of constituents that the program is functioning and that no leg-

islation is needed. There is some grumbling about executive action as the means of starting the program. Some Congressmen believe that the Peace Corps ought to be part of the foreign aid program. There are differing opinions about the Corps' relationships with religiously-motivated service agencies. And, inevitably, there is partisan opposition; the more popular the program, the less enthusiastic are President Kennedy's political opponents.

One of the Peace Corps advocates in Congress summed it up by saying: "If the bill gets to the floor, it will breeze right through. You can't oppose it; it's like being against Home and Mother. But they may try to bottle it up in committee." If this should happen and no legislation is passed, the Peace Corps would have to be dissolved January 1, 1962—less than a year after its formation—according to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Recently there have been newspaper and magazine stories sounding the theme that the Peace Corps was a wild idea at the start but it has now calmed down, and that its policymakers are becoming cautious and careful. In reality, the concept of the Peace Corps has changed very little since its inception; the approach has always been careful.

The most commonly voiced criticism is that the Corps intends to send abroad callow, starry-eyed, impressionable, unskilled youths who will be chewed up by Communists, an idea nourished by the writings of a few hostile newspaper columnists. The Peace Corps does not intend to do this, and the first volunteers selected for training certainly do not fit this description. So far, they fit the stated purpose of the Corps, which is to send abroad mature, skilled, balanced men and women who know the country to which they are assigned.

Road building will be the job of the forty surveyors, geologists, and civil engineers who are in training at Texas Western College in El Paso. The chief functon of the Peace Corps men will be to lay out farm-to-market roads, a vital need in the effort to improve agriculture in Tanganyika. In the rainy season, they will teach surveying and engineering to Tanganyikans.

Mauldin in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

In Ghana and Nigeria, two key nations in West Africa, the volunteers will teach English, mathematics, chemistry, history, physics, or biology in secondary schools. Both of these African countries are making great efforts to extend educational opportunities, and while there are other needs in these new nations, education holds the top priority. The Ghana volunteers are training at the University of California at Berkeley, and the Nigerian group at Harvard University. There are about sixty in each group.

Rural community development, an activity which embraces irrigation, road building, school construction, sanitation, home economics, and improvement of agricultural methods, will be the function of the volunteers headed for Colombia and Chile. About eighty volunteers are in training at Rutgers University for the Colombia project, which is to be administered through contract with the CARE organization. Of these, sixty-five will go abroad. The Chile project is administered by the Associated Colleges of Indiana, and the fifty volunteers are training at Notre Dame University.

Soon to enter training are agricultural teams headed for St. Lucia, in the Windward Islands, and for India; a group of 150 who will teach English as a second language in the Philippine elementary schools; widely varied teams covering work in education, vocational instruction, road building, health, and industrial development, for two countries in Southeast Asia, and another with similar variety for Pakistan.

The demand for agricultural workers and advisers threatens to outrun the supply available to the Peace Corps. Most of the newly developing nations have food shortages, and officials are eager to improve farming methods and production. At the same time, they believe that highly trained and experienced persons are necessary for this work, and the Peace Corps intends to launch a special recruiting program this fall to induce farm technicians to volunteer.

The quality, skill, and stability of the volunteers who have appeared for training has changed estimates of manpower needs and put to rest many fears. It was first thought that twenty applicants would be needed for each volunteer selected, and that twice as many should be placed in training as were needed for a project.

The experience of selection for the first few projects showed that the first ratio need be only ten to one, and that only a few more than are needed for the project must be placed in training. Generally, the volunteers are well educated. Many of them worked their way through college and have a surprisingly solid backlog of practical experience. Many held highly responsible jobs. The Tanganyika group includes one who was earning $10,000, several who earned from $5,000 to $7,500, and one who was an alderman.

Typical of those in training are:

Richard E. Van Loenen, twenty-three years old; a geologist training for Tanganyika, a graduate of Kansas State University who has worked as a carpenter, plumber, electrician, and surveyor.

Ruth Ann Whitney, twenty-three, of Quincy, Illinois, who majored in mathematics at Marquette University and has taught algebra and English in the ninth grade at a Kenosha, Wisconsin, high school the past year. She is in training for teaching in Ghana.

Mathew M. DeForest, thirty-one, of Chicago, a truck and tractor driver and mechanic. A high school gradu-

ate, he will work on construction projects in Colombia.

A husband and wife team, Mr. and Mrs. Stanley Berman, of Louisville, Kentucky, headed for Nigeria. Stanley graduated from Amherst College, majoring in government, in 1958, and has just received his law degree from Harvard. He is twenty-five. His wife, Clarice, twenty-two, is a Smith College graduate in English.

Peace Corps staff officers were warned, early in the game, to avoid making unrealistic claims as to what the Peace Corps might accomplish. The purpose of this directive was to prevent the buildup of too much enthusiasm, either here or overseas. The Peace Corps, to be effective, must work quietly and steadily; it is a long range program. It should not promise more than it can produce, nor has it done so.

To accomplish the aims of the Peace Corps, there must be sustained enthusiasm on the part of potential volunteers. The pool from which selectees are drawn must be larger next year, and still larger the year after that. It seems likely that there will be an adequate number, but there is some fear that there will be too few in certain fields of skill that are badly needed by most newly developing countries. To some extent, these foreign needs match our own needs for manpower; those technicians with the greatest job opportunities here are those most acutely needed abroad.

But the enthusiasm should last, and should increase as understanding of the program and its opportunities grows. Those who choose to become Peace Corps volunteers will discover that their service will bring great rewards in the form of new experience and in the growth of understanding and character. Instead of being a sacrifice, Peace Corps service represents an exceptional, unprecedented opportunity.

The Peace Corps is an effort in the right direction; of that we are convinced. Our doubts are those that gather on a day when the Berlin crisis or another crisis darkens the skies, and the Peace Corps seems almost academic and remote. But we live day by day, and we make friends one by one. That is the way the Peace Corps will work, doing what it can in the service of man, as long as there is hope.

An Evening at The John Birch Society

by GENE GROVE

IN AN AGED building at 156 Fifth Avenue, an equivocal location midway between the charm of New York's Washington Square and the splendor of midtown Manhattan, Chapter Twenty-six of the John Birch Society meets on the second Tuesday of every month.

The location is as unfortunate as it is unfashionable. The meetings are held in the building's Suite 1100, the office of the National Economic Council, and the chapter leader is Merwin K. Hart, long-time head of the NEC. A House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities once described the techniques of the ultra-conservative Council as being "to disparage those who oppose its objectives by appeals to religious prejudice, often an ill-concealed anti-Semitism."

Chapter Twenty-six is the oldest chapter of the John Birch Society in Manhattan and one of the oldest in the country. Founded in 1959, it is dominated by Hart's subordinates in the NEC: his executive vice president, Mrs. Constance G. Dall, is assistant chapter leader, and another vice president, retired Vice Admiral Charles S. Freeman, is treasurer.

Admiral Freeman was my sponsor at a recent meeting of Chapter Twenty-six. Newspaper reports had drawn the broad outlines of the John Birch Society; a reading of the society's publications had offered an insight into founder Robert Welch's The-Conspiracy-Is-Everywhere philosophy; but the chapter meetings are the heartbeat of the society and the final expression of Welch's beliefs. Winning Admiral Freeman was not difficult. "I'm concerned about the collectivist trend in Washington," I told him. "I want to belong to a group that does something. Our schools in Long Island are overrun with New Dealers." He invited me to the meeting.

At the door to Suite 1100 one woman, equally muffled by her mink stole and her Southern drawl, told Mrs. Dall—who sat at a desk checking each of the thirty persons who entered—that she was a life member of the Home Chapter, a sort of select membership-at-large; that is one of the status symbols within the John Birch Society. The woman's name and address were recorded on a pad of yellow legal paper and, with the deference due the $1,000 it costs to become a life member, she was ushered to the inner room where, in five minutes, Merwin K. Hart was to open the meeting. Not more than ten of the thirty people in the room were less than fifty years old. More than half were men.

The lady in mink seated herself next to me, said to no one in particular that she "might have to leave early," and draped her stole carefully across the back of the chair.

"I've never been to a meeting of this chapter," she told me. "I'm a life member of the Home Chapter. I'm a great admirer of Mr. Welch. Aren't you?" I mumbled an answer but it didn't matter because the lady kept on talking between fitful glances at other minks and other pillbox hats.

"You know, Mr. Welch said three years ago that Castro was a Communist. I gave a report on that at a

GENE GROVE made a special study of the John Birch Society for the New York Post. His pocket book, "Inside the John Birch Society," has just been published by Gold Medal Books.

DAR meeting and they laughed at me. Everyone thought I was crazy, but they don't any more."

The lady was quite right. Robert Welch decided long before Fidel Castro came to power that the Cuban leader was a Communist. This early, now accepted estimate causes many of his followers to look with greater favor upon Welch's similar charges against Dwight Eisenhower, Jawaharlal Nehru, and others, while opponents feel this foresight was strongly reinforced by Welch's whole-hearted admiration for the regime of Fulgencio Batista.

Hart rapped on his desk and brought the meeting to order. "Mr. Welch just went through his speaking tour which took him from coast to coast with excellent results," the eighty-year-old chapter leader told his followers. "However, more attacks will be made in the future. An attack may be made the day after tomorrow. Perhaps some of you are familiar with that."

Hart's nose supports a pair of silver-framed glasses which, in turn, support a pair of clip-on sunglasses. When nervous, Hart fiddles constantly with the glasses, removing the sunglasses, then the glasses, replacing the glasses, clipping on the sunglasses, going through the cycle again. He was nervous as he outlined the expected attack.

"It seems that the Communist Party has gotten a member into a John Birch meeting and they qualified him and he was accepted at face value and he went out and organized a chapter of his own . . ."

A chorus of groans circled the room. Sighing himself, Hart went on: ". . . consisting of men who thought as he did and then that was reported to the Columbia Broadcasting Company and they intended to put that on their hour-long program which they have, I think, every Thursday night."

Hart paused, then brightened, and gave the members better news.

"Now the latest indication is that they're afraid of it because it is so libelous, that what they did in planting that microphone is so serious, that they may be scared off. That's their hour-long program, which you can readily find from the program schedule."

As had been announced several days before the meeting of Chapter Twenty-six, the Columbia Broadcasting System's "CBS Report" on the following Thursday was on the subject of "Censorship and the Movies." It did not mention the John Birch Society.

Such alarums and excursions, however, are a standard part of the Birch Society's meetings and bulletins. Every month members are alerted to imminent attack from the constantly menacing other-world of Communists and liberals and "Comsymps"—a word coined by Robert Welch and of which he is fond because "you don't have to tell how much they are Communists and how much they are sympathizers."

"That's the way it goes when anybody stands in their way," Hart said, his voice taking on a note of defiance. "But I think we are going to be surprised how they turn and run, and I think we're going to see quite a bit of evidence of that in the future."

Having dealt with the clear and present dangers to the John Birch Society, Hart got down to business. A projector had been set up in Hart's office and after the familiar delays—the threading of the film, the adjustment of the sound, the focusing—a motion picture was presented for review. The film, entitled *Yanqui No,* was one of a series of "Closeup" programs produced by Time, Inc., sponsored by Bell & Howell, manufacturers of photographic equipment, and shown on the American Broadcasting Company's television network. The film, complete with commercials, is distributed by Bell & Howell as a public service.

The film opens with the 1960 meeting of the Organization of American States at which the United States sought a condemnation of Cuba, shows the opposition to the resolution by the Venezuelan delegation, then takes the viewer to Venezuela to show the conditions in that country which have generated a substantial sympathy for Fidel Castro. About twenty minutes into the hour-long film, an investigation had begun of the tawdry slums which ring the Venezuelan capital, Caracas. Hart ordered a halt.

"That's the stuff," he said, "with which the people on the other side, the Communists, the internationalists, are trying to overcome this country and reduce this country and its people to Communist slavery."

One recalcitrant member demurred. "I'd like to see more of it," he said. "I'm not convinced as thoroughly as you are that this is a Communist film."

Grudgingly, Hart signaled for a resumption of the film. Abruptly, ten minutes later, he waved an end to it. "I think we can all see," he said, "that this is out-and-out Communist propaganda, an attempt to lay the blame for South American poverty on the better classes in Venezuela and a plea for more foreign aid from the United States." This time there was no objection. Bell & Howell, Time, Inc., and the American Broadcasting Company stood condemned by Chapter Twenty-six.

Hart yielded the floor to a busy, soft-voiced woman who introduced herself to the new members as Mrs. Mark Byron for a report on the progress of a John Birch Society-sponsored program in support of Major General Edwin A. Walker, who last spring was relieved of his command of the Twenty-fourth Division in Germany after a privately-owned newspaper, *Overseas Weekly,* accused him of using Army facilities to promote the programs of the John Birch Society among his troops.

Brandishing a handful of photostats from the *Overseas Weekly,* Mrs.

Byron reported with a simper, "I have here some copies of the *'Oversexed'*—I mean *Overseas—Weekly*. I would pass them around, but I am sure this is not the kind of thing you would like to see. I will pass around just one photostat to show you what kind of a thing we are fighting."

A blown-up picture of a girl in a negligent bikini passed from hand to hand to the accompaniment of tongue-cluckings. One man remarked that Mrs. Byron had better watch to see that no one kept it, and everyone laughed.

"Our letter-writing campaign is going magnificently," Mrs. Byron said. "And Major Roberts is doing a wonderful job—his whole career would be in danger if the Army knew how he's working with us. But be sure to use your own names, the names of other groups to which you may belong, operate through other organizations. We must be sure not to associate the campaign with the John Birch Society. There's a group in the Pentagon, Major Roberts told me this himself, on the look-out for us, just waiting for a chance to connect the letter-writing to the John Birch Society, to smear us and ruin General Walker."

Major Arch Roberts at the Army Information Office in Manhattan admitted that he had written the first draft of the "pro-Blue" troop information program for which General Walker was suspended. He had refused to say whether or not he was a member of the society, but said he had had no contact with members of Chapter Twenty-six. "I never associated with these people," he said. "I don't know how they got my name and I have no control over what they say. They don't seem to really know what they're about."

The Army subsequently attempted to pacify everyone and succeeded in pacifying no one. It punished General Walker by publicly rebuking him "for taking injudicious actions and for making derogatory statements about prominent Americans"—he was reported to have called an assortment of people, including Walter Lippmann, Edward R. Murrow, Eric Sevareid, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Harry Truman, "pinks" or worse—and for participating in certain controversial activities. Walker's previously announced assignment to command the Eighth Corps in Texas was canceled. On the other hand, the Army accepted Walker's contention that there was no connection between his "pro-Blue" program—widely believed to have been named after Welch's *Blue Book*—and the John Birch Society, despite the society's campaign in his behalf. At the same time, the Army announced that Welch's book *The Life of John Birch* was being withdrawn from the troop information program with which the John Birch Society had nothing to do and that Welch's magazine, *American Opinion*, was being banned from the division's newsstands.

Mrs. Byron, at the time of the meeting still unconfused by the Army, meanwhile was moving to the attack. "Now the *Overseas Weekly*, we're investigating it now. We don't want to begin the counterattack prematurely. The [New York] *Daily News* has been very cooperative. They're very close now— they're doing a very thorough investigation—to getting a line on Communists working for the *Overseas Weekly*. I think you'll see the beginnings of our efforts show up very soon. Both the *Daily News* and George Sokolsky will be in the fight soon. You may see the Sokolsky column this week."

(Mrs. Byron's predictions were partially fulfilled. It was *two* weeks later, on May 16, that columnist Sokolsky—who a month earlier had said of the Birch Society that "it is not sound to believe that everyone who disagrees in 1961, after two world wars and a universal depression, with the economics of Mark Hanna, is a Communist"—devoted an entire column to the defense of General Walker and an attack on the *Overseas Weekly*. "Who has set this newspaper up as an agency to monitor the thinking and expression of thought of officers in the American Army?" Sokolsky asked. "Surely this episode calls for an investigation by a Congressional committee to discover what really happened in the Walker incident. Was the general committing an offense or was he persecuted for loyalty?" The promised *Daily News* investigation evidently failed to turn up anything fit to print.)

To a smattering of applause, Mrs. Byron sat down and Hart turned the discussion to *Operation Abolition*, the House Un-American Activities Committee's film of the San Francisco student riots. Although it was less than a week since Robert J. Meisenbach had been found not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon in a San Francisco trial, the jury's finding was not mentioned.

The core of the film's postion on the student demonstrations against the Committee is J. Edgar Hoover's report that a mob "instigated by Communists who had maneuvered themselves into strategic positions" charged the Committee's hearing room, forcing the San Francisco police to defend themselves. "One of the demonstrators," Hoover said, "provided the spark that touched off the flame of violence. Leaping a barricade that had been erected, he grabbed an officer's nightstick and began beating the officer over the head." But a jury of Meisenbach's peers decided that no such incident had occurred, and his attorney, a former assistant district attorney, said that "this knocks *Operation Abolition* into the creek."

Not for members of Chapter Twenty-six, however. One elderly woman said that there would be a showing of *Operation Abolition* at Marble Collegiate Church a week later "at the regular prayer-meeting time. There was a great deal of pressure brought, I understand, but Dr. Peale resisted and it will be shown. Dr. Peale has been so smeared that I think it takes a great deal of courage, but it was announced from the pulpit last Sunday." Dr. Norman Vincent Peale's resistance evidently was vigorous, since the film was shown as promised.

Another woman, younger, attractive, dressed in green, had been inserting vigorous asides and exclamations in each discussion. Finally, she got the floor. She had, she said, seen a showing of the film sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union—"and you know what *that* means"—which had been skillfully "doctored." There were, she said, three versions of the film in circula-

tion. "You have to be careful where you get the picture from. You should be sure that you are seeing the right version."

A gentleman with a pronounced Southern accent had attended that day's session of the annual convention of the Episcopal Diocese of New York and reported the attack of Bishop Horace Donegan on the John Birch Society.

The society and other groups with "equally dangerous" programs, the bishop had said, "endeavor to reverse our American tradition of democratic opportunities and civil rights, to paralyze our Federal government in its promotion of the general welfare, and in other ways to turn back the clock in defiance of our national history and experience. Such programs are dangerously subversive in the true meaning of that word and we warn all church people to avoid becoming involved in their activities."

The gentleman reported the attack with an air of resignation, adding, "I think the Methodists and the Presbyterians also have attacked the society." A puzzled murmur followed this advice. "There was also a motion," he said, "to support the state and national Episcopal councils and the National and World Council of Churches."

"What about the universe?" asked chapter leader Hart. "Isn't there a council for that now?"

"No," was the answer, " 'World' is still singular."

An appreciative round of guffaws followed this sally into the world of religion, where fundamentalist Welch shares the view of some of the more rabid fundamentalist sects that the Protestant councils of churches offer aid and comfort to the Communist conspiracy.

The meeting, as with most meetings conducted by amateurs, was becoming fragmented. The film and the reports were over, a few members had left early, Hart was no longer directing the discussion, and the garrulous had not yet had their say.

One woman digressed from Bishop Donegan's criticism of the society to rumors that an investigation was impending (it never occurred) to determine how many members of Congress were members of the John Birch Society. "If they start an investigation of Congress," she said, "they'll be sorry, because they'll find fifty Communists or Communist sympathizers in the Congress." Startled at the attention she had drawn, she paused, looked anxiously around the room and said, "I don't know if it's true, but that's what they say."

Herblock in The Washington Post

"He Does Seem to Be Out of Uniform—or Something"

Hart, stirred by the mention of Congress, began to talk again. "Yes," he said, "and they're getting further into our national life every day. Look at this minimum wage law they just passed. I know personally a man who must raise his wages to apprentices from forty cents to fifty cents an hour because of this bill. This will cause unemployment. It is estimated that this new minimum wage law will cause the unemployment of 600,000 to 700,000 people in the United States. And this with our unemployment already at its highest in twenty years."

(It was not unique for Hart to be against an action of Congress: he has spent the major portion of his eighty years being against. Among many other things, he has opposed the income tax, the St. Lawrence Seaway, the forty-hour week, voting by persons on relief, Lend-Lease, anti-discrimination laws, the United Nations, and child labor laws.)

When he had ended his peroration on the minimum wage law, Hart adjourned the meeting. Most of the members stayed to talk. In one corner, one of the members was telling his listeners that the most persistently invidious force pushing collectivism in the United States was the Canadian whiskey interests.

Mrs. Byron explained to me that "I was serving as a volunteer coordinator but I couldn't do it all and I kind of faded out of the picture and we're waiting for a full-time coordinator now. We had about a dozen chapters forming in Long Island but none of them are meeting yet. There will be one in Forest Hills very shortly." A "coordinator," a euphemism of the John Birch Society, is a paid organizer.

Mrs. Dall said that "I think there are about ten chapters in New York now. Mr. Hart has been in this for a long time. He's got a real background." Hart was standing by his desk talking to some of his followers. People were drifting out the door and as they left Hart urged them to take material from the piles on his desk. One was a petition calling for a Congressional investigation of the State Department, which Hart has described as the "enemy of the American people." Another was the latest issue of Hart's Economic Council letter. It said:

"We certainly hold no brief for Hitler. He became a monster toward the end, as shown by the savage killing of more than 4,000 Germans for alleged involvement in the attempted assassination of himself in 1944, as well as in the killing of many Jews and non-Jews.

"But the Zionists of the United States, Britain, and elsewhere in the world became largely responsible for Hitler's going berserk, when Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca in 1944 demanded unconditional surrender by the Germans. No more savage or senseless decision was ever reached by an American President . . .

"But to return to the Eichmann case. If there were six million Jews within reach of Hitler, which number is widely questioned, and if they have all disappeared, where are they?

"It is of interest that in recent years the United States government abolished the rule that any alien applying for citizenship or any person reported in the census, must state his religion or race. We know no evi-

dence that the abolishing of any such rule was ever even discussed before.

"Then in May, 1953, Representative Francis Walter in the *Reader's Digest* stated that there were then from three to five million aliens in the United States illegally.

"Is it not likely that many of these six million, claimed to have been killed by Hitler and Eichmann, are right here in the United States and are now joining in the agitation for more and more support of the State of Israel—even if the American Republic goes down?

"How can we Americans expect to preserve our country and its liberties if we permit Zionist influence to flout some of the vital principles on which the United States was founded?

"Meanwhile most of the American press has been trying Eichmann in various columns, news dispatches, special articles, etc. Nearly every piece printed mentions 'six million Jews.' The publicity has been well-nigh nauseating to Americans who are deeply concerned with the Communist and economic threat to their own country.

"There are probably three objectives of this publicity campaign. First to humiliate and antagonize the German people and to alienate Germany—one of the staunchest allies we have anywhere; second to impress the world with the might of Israel and third to distract the attention of the American people while our one-worlders advance their plans."

It was after seven p.m., more than two hours since Hart had opened the meeting, when the attractive woman in green stood by the doors to 156 Fifth Avenue—the exit from the building had been locked and a gallant was searching for a janitor—and told the others that she had attended a recent meeting of a Henry George economic study group. "A bunch of Communists," she called them.

I ventured the suggestion that, since economist George had advocated a single tax on property that must, necessarily, presuppose private ownership of property, it would be rather difficult for his followers to be Communists.

The lady in green fixed me with a suspicious stare. "Bunch of Communists," she repeated firmly, her lips drawn tight.

MEXICO in the MIDDLE

by DAVID L. GRAHAM

Mexico City

Is Mexico next on the Communists' Latin American list? The chances are slim, but recent events in Cuba made some observers think so. After the collapse of the abortive April invasion, Mexicans were asking each other, in jest, "Where are you going when the Communists come?" But beneath the jest there were slivers of history which, when magnified and distorted out of all proportion by the shock of the Cuban invasion, gave the jest a serious undertone.

Latin America is rife with open animosity and repressed admiration for the United States. Everybody had enjoyed sticking pins into Uncle Sam, but when suddenly he seemed to have been overthrown, even if it was only his prestige which was wounded, people were scared. To be brought up on tales of an omnipotent gringo goblin, a colossus of the north, and then to see him lying in the dust was a rude shock. As soon as Castro had snuffed out the invasion with a few squirts of his people's militia, Mexican Communists and their hangers-on set up a shout of jubilation, not unmixed with anticipation of bigger things to come.

A man as far to the right as Bernardo Ponce, a columnist with Mexico's leading daily, *Excelsior*, might be expected to write: "The next and ardently desired object of international Communism is Mexico." Agreeing with him from the left, however, was Carlo Coccioli, a regular contributor to the weekly magazine, *Siempre*, and hitherto an enthusiastic champion of the Cuban revolution. Wrote Coccioli, confounding his leftist colleagues: "Castro is, today, a tool; his strength has become the tool of a political plan of enormous portent and incalculable consequences—the plan of Soviet imperialism. . . . In Cuba I saw European and Asiatic Communists, cold, cultivated men, and super-Marxists, who spoke of Mexico and Latin America as theirs, and of Mexico as the next step." An unknown angel put flames to the fuel by paying to have the article reprinted in Mexico City's largest newspapers.

Besides giving Castro a mighty boost in Cuba, restoring to full power a man who was obviously slipping, the invasion fiasco had a smashing impact on Mexico. Mexicans from the political center to the extreme left were outraged by the support President Kennedy gave to the interventionists, and even the minority who would have cheered an outright take-over by the marines were disgusted with us for the invasion's ignominious flop. It brought the Communists out of their caves cheering; it shocked and dismayed our friends, including the most important one, President Lopez Mateos.

The Mexican President, now midway through his third year of a six-year term, has been a firm believer in Mexican-American friendship and cooperation, if only for reasons of *Realpolitik*. Twice he was host to President Eisenhower in Mexico and on one occasion visited Washington. His friendship means a great deal, too, because of the great power, rela-

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tively, a Mexican president wields. For the Mexican government is more centralized than ours, with state and even local governments pretty much under the thumb of the chief executive. By his election the president automatically becomes de facto head of PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), the party from which all successful presidential candidates come and the party which always has absolute control of both houses of the Mexican Congress. For the latter to oppose a serious wish of the president would be not merely unthinkable, it would be impossible.

Ever since Castro began his histrionics about a year ago, following the exclusion of Cuban sugar from the U.S. diet, the task of Mexico's President has been difficult enough. On the one side, a small but revitalized and vocal Communist claque, headed by David Alfaro Siqueiros, the world-renowned painter, had been howling that the Mexican revolution was being betrayed. (Siqueiros has since joined the rest of the Communist leadership in jail.)

Revolution is not a dirty word here, but, on the contrary, a sacred symbol as well as a social blueprint through embodiment in the Mexican Constitution, to which all factions render obeisance. This revolution, which broke out in 1910 with the ousting of dictator Porfirio Diaz, wrote its Constitution seven years later under the presidency of Venustiano Carranza, and finally achieved stability under President Lazaro Cardenas, who served the single term permitted under Mexican law from 1934 to 1940.

The Mexican revolution was neither a colonial revolution like ours—the country won its independence from Spain in 1821—nor a Marxian revolution like Russia's. It was a blending of progressive tendencies strictly Mexican in character, more political than military—although there was plenty of fighting, more social than political.

The Mexican revolution of 1910-1917 was a struggle to end *financial* colonialism; foreign interests had a stranglehold on the national economy. It was also aimed at the feudalistic, land-holding few, including the Church, that, acting in concert with foreign capital, prevented Mexico from entering the industrial age. The national wealth was being mined, not developed.

Just as it is said that in Mexico even the atheists are Catholics, so the arch-conservatives are revolutionaries—to the extent that they pay lip-service to the revolution. No political speech gets started without dipping its colors to the revolution. Hence, for the Communists to charge that the revolution was being betrayed was sure-fire politics; there was always the hope at least that the President's popular support could thus be chipped away, his program thrown into confusion.

Meanwhile, with Castro's hot winds of oratory beating on their ears, church and business leaders had stepped up their complaints that the President's policies, such as the gathering of more and more industries into government hands, was throwing the country to the Communists. But with the attempted invasion of Cuba by rebels trained and financed by U.S. government agencies, Mexico divided sharply three ways. The fragmented left pulled itself together in a miracle of united indignation; the frightened right reared itself up as it had not done in forty years; and in the middle was the administration, performing its eternal balancing act.

Mexico's rightest elements, headed by such extremists as the fascist Sinarquistas and PAN, a reactionary church party, went into frantic activity. Anti-Communist sodalities began breaking out all over Mexico, along with anti-Communist demonstrations, as if the conservatives, impressed by the leftist agitation inspired by the Cuban invasion, wanted to show that they, too, could agitate. What they really want, liberals here believe, is to turn back the clock to 1910, when the Church all but ruled Mexico besides owning a large part of it.

It is with these backward-looking forces, unhappily, that the United States is said to be allied—for the threadbare reason that they are anti-Communist. And it is probably so, for in one of those naive blunders to which American diplomacy seems to be prone, the U.S. embassy released a bulletin to the Mexican press in May announcing an anti-Communist, anti-Castro rally held by Catholic Action—thus, in effect, sponsoring it. This gaffe was pounced upon with glee by the Communists, of course, both as an indication of which way the wind was blowing and an example of American meddling in Mexican affairs. Mexicans may be Catholics, but they are not clericalists; in no small measure their revolution was fought to get the Church out of politics.

In the center, and by far the most powerful of Mexico's three main political groupings, are Lopez Mateos and his supporters. They are varied in their political slants; some are card-carrying bankers and others far to the left, but they are Mexicans first—united in their desire for a strong government under the Constitution. With respect to the crucial Cuban question, they have managed to navigate the difficult middle course of sympathizing openly with the Cuban revolution, yet without either helping Castro, as former President Cardenas and the Communists urge, or breaking off relations with him, as the United States would like. Receiving prominent Mexican intellectuals who had come to applaud his non-intervention stand on Cuba, President Mateos said: "Three times my government has come out in defense of the sister republic of Cuba [against intervention] . . . This posture will not change."

Fiercely pro-Castro are the Communists in Mexico, assorted leftists, and Cardenas, a figure of almost mystical reverence to millions of Mexicans, including many intellectuals. During his presidency Cardenas distributed some forty-two million acres of expropriated estates to the landless and nationalized the petroleum industry by expropriating the properties of such international giants as Standard Oil and Shell. Anti-imperialism, meaning anti-Ameri-

canism, is this group's strongest bond. In last spring's Peace Conference in Mexico City, which was organized by Cardenas and captured by the Communists, the delegates from twenty-one Latin American countries howled down the very idea of United States aid, military *or* economic, solemnly resolving that "North American imperialism is the chief obstacle to Latin American progress."

As Cardenas veered closer and closer to the Communist line, but without ever toeing it, people thought he would join the Communists, or form a leftist party of his own. When asked point-blank if he was a Communist, he replied: "Can one oppose a theory which tries to solve the problems of the masses?" His enemies thought they had him, only to have him declare later: "I am not a member of the PRI or any other political party."

Since leaving office, Cardenas has spent the years going about the country, espousing noble causes. He is as idealistic as Eleanor Roosevelt and as politically astute as Sam Rayburn. No man would have a better chance of unifying the Mexican left, or of galvanizing the right into terrified solidarity. In a country where "Mexicanization" is the thing, however, it is difficult to carry national socialism gracefully on one shoulder and international socialism on the other. Of late Cardenas seems to have squandered a good deal of his prestige in indiscreet association with Communist causes—the foremost of which is a violent anti-Americanism.

Here is a great man who, during the Franklin D. Roosevelt era, was a firm friend of the United States. How did we lose him? Through a fatal McCarthyism, a McCarthyism toward individuals—after Roosevelt's death Cardenas and his followers went down in the State Department's blacklist—and McCarthyism in international relations, notably in Guatemala. The type of CIA-handled maneuver that failed in Cuba, succeeded seven years earlier in Guatemala—to the great indignation of Cardenas, who denounced the United States scathingly. Yet when an American invited the Mexican hero's son to New York, hoping to mollify Cardenas, the State Department would not give him a visa.

Months before the Cuban invasion, *Fidelismo* and the spirit of the times had been nudging Mexico to the left. Aged politicians who once rode with such revolutionaries as Villa and Zapata, but who had since become addicted to Cadillacs, were again hitting the revolutionary trail —at least verbally. Meanwhile, Lopez Mateos, a leader as sensitive to the winds of change as Roosevelt, has nationalized petrochemicals, divided up more land holdings among the landless, and taken over the movie distribution monopoly and about ninety-five per cent of the electric power industry—all through legal, business-like operations.

Thus the "Mexicanization" of the national economy, as they prefer to call it, has proceeded briskly. (Railroads, like the petroleum industry, were taken over years ago.) Mexico, in short, is living under a mixed economy. The great majority of Mexicans are, by our standards, leftists; far from worrying about "creeping socialism," they take pride in their government's accomplishments, though there is justified grousing about the inefficiency and corruption of all too many bureaus.

To date the government has acquired about 360 companies that produce perhaps twenty per cent of the gross national product—not because the government is hell-bent on socialization, its leaders say, but because private capital can not do the job. There is a scarcity of private capital in Latin America; necessity, rather than choice, has been the mother of Mexico's industrial development.

For one thing, the average income, though climbing, is little more than $250 a year. The distribution of wealth among the various sectors of the population is most uneven, with rural workers getting but a pitiful share. Furthermore, the population is on the increase at the thundering rate of nearly 3.5 per cent a year. Mexico had to expand, industrially and agriculturally, or explode.

Upon this comparatively tranquil scene of government-in-business-as-usual descended the thunderbolt which the Communists had been predicting—American intervention in Cuba. Shades of Guatemala—shades of more than thirty "police actions" in the Caribbean! Protests and demonstrations followed, with student uproar from Argentina to Mexico, and especially in Mexico, where our intervention and conquest in 1847 still rankles.

America had dealt her friends in Latin America a blow from which some of them—Betancourt in Venezuela, for one—may never recover. So to him first Adlai Stevenson sped, bearing help. Wisely Stevenson did not include Mexico in his itinerary, for nowhere has Castro more friends. Less wisely Stevenson *did* include Paraguay, where Latin America's most case-hardened dictator, General Stroessner, still rules. But such *faux pas* are in step with our aid to the Somoza brothers, who Trujillo-ized Nicaragua. One of them boasted that he never had any trouble getting a suspect to talk: "Just give me a lighted match and the bare sole of his foot." How can one explain to a Mexican, or to anyone else, U.S. aid and friendship for these cruel tyrants?

Accordingly, President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress got a pretty tepid reception in Mexico when announced last March, and the reception has been getting even cooler with the march of events. From one angle, the Mexicans see it as just another handout, and handouts are not for the proud, touchy Mexicans. Trade agreements and long-term loans Mexico needs and wants, but alms, no.

Many Latin Americans, moreover, interpret the Alliance for Progress as a sort of subtle, arm-twisting operation: You reform your land tenure system and your tax laws and we'll reward you with dollars. Intervention again. These systems and laws may need reforming; the tax structure in Mexico, for instance, is loaded in favor of the rich to stimulate investment, it is said. But it is one thing to effect one's own reforms, and quite another to have them imposed from abroad. There are plenty of politicians in Latin America who could use U.S. money, but these are the ones least likely to disperse it to good purpose.

On June 7 President Lopez Mateos

decided that the time had come to put an end to the discord between right and left that was scaring off the vital tourist trade, drying up investments, and alarming the general public. In a speech to the press, the strongest and most decisive speech he has uttered, the President made two main points:

One—"We will permit no backward steps that might harm the national dignity or heritage, its laws or its right, no matter what the pressure from foreign interests or domestic factions."

Two—"My government will repress excesses attempting to disrupt the national life and violate the Constitution from either the right or the left."

The public, as if longing to hear his words, reacted with overwhelming enthusiasm and relief. They knew he meant what he said; the President's smiling manner is the white glove on a fist of steel. Individuals and groups from all over Mexico buried the national palace with letters and telegrams of support. Of course, no one ever *attacks* the Mexican president—it just isn't done; but the right seemed especially fulsome in its praise, as if pricked by a guilty conscience; and only the cave-dwelling left, as the Communists are called, withheld comment.

Two little-noted events that occurred at about the same time were of great significance in clarifying Mexico's attitude toward Cuba and toward Communism. One was the failure of Mexico as a member of the Organization of American States to take part in the recent investigation of the Dominican Republic. The Mexican representative on the team just did not go, explaining lamely that he had another engagement. The real reason for his absence was Mexico's abhorrence of intervention, of even the hint of meddling in the internal affairs of another nation. "Because," as Lopez Mateos reiterated in his now famous speech, "intervention attacks at its very foundations the national sovereignty which is the inalienable right of independent states." Or as former President Cardenas put it: "To defend the sovereignty of Cuba is to defend the sovereignty of Mexico."

An equally significant lapse was Mexico's failure to send her President, as invited, to the conclave of "neutral" states recently convened in Cairo. Once again the excuse was flimsy: a Mexican president cannot leave the country without the permission of Congress—as if that could not have been arranged—and because Mexico was furnished no advance list of the participating nations nor agenda.

Yet the decisive reason for Mexico's absence from Cairo was the fact that Mexico is not a "neutral" nation like Yugoslavia or the United Arab Republic, however much the Communist left would like it to be. Isidro Fabela, Mexico's great international jurist and an intimate of the President, has bitterly attacked American intervention in Cuba. Nevertheless, in his book on Cuba, *El Caso de Cuba*, he referred to the "danger of a war between the free world and a Communism bent on dominating the five continents," and continued, "Needless to say, I am absolutely with the West"—which is precisely the Mexican position, obscure it as we will with our outrageous bungling in Cuba.

But can Lopez Mateos and his political gradualists control the extremists of the left, who have tasted blood, and the extremists of the right, whom Castro's successes have terrified? All present indications are that they can. Fortunately for Mexico, and fortunately for the United States, Lopez Mateos is both a strong leader and a realistic politician. His government may be resentful of U.S. pressure, but it is equally hostile to Communist pressure. Though far from perfect, his is a government run by shrewd and reasonable men who know that Mexico has progressed too far to risk all in a Castro-like convulsion. They realize that the destinies of Mexico and the United States are inextricably entwined.

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THE EXCLUDED

by SENATOR HARRISON A. WILLIAMS

EVEN AS LATE as 1939, when Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., investigated farm labor conditions in California, many Americans still cherished the belief that small, independent farmers gave us most of the food and fiber we needed for ourselves and for foreign trade. But LaFollette helped dramatize the fact that "factories in the field" were very much at work, not only in grain country, but in truck farm regions, too. Slow-moving machines, big and black on the horizon, appeared to be masters of the soil and its products.

All was not changed, however, by tractors, automatic seeders, weeders, and harvesters. Though automation enabled the farmer to plant and harvest on a scale impossible on the small family farm, the grower discovered that machines could not do every job. For many fruits and vegetables, there was no substitute for human judgment or human hands. On many a farm today, there is still no substitute.

To "chop" cotton, for instance, the most efficient device seems to be a worker who can weed out surplus plants with a hoe. Vineyards and orchards must have specialists who know how to prune and pick. On tobacco fields, workers stoop to thin plants. Under the summer or early autumn sun, other workers help grow or harvest berries, nuts, celery, lettuce—the produce we later see so neatly packaged in plastic bags at supermarkets.

To work these and other crops, great numbers of laborers are needed, but usually for only a few weeks or so at a time. As crops mature, these workers travel in their buses, trucks, or automobiles south to north across the slopes, valleys, and plains of our nation. They are the migratory farm workers of the United States. They are citizens, wanderers in their own country: southern Negroes, Texas-Mexicans, some white workers, and Puerto Ricans.

These workers help produce and process crops worth billions of dollars yearly (a single county, Fresno in California, boasts $1 million reaped daily from farm production). And yet, though the migrants have helped to create much wealth, they have not shared in it. They have been called "the excluded," "the forgotten," "the voiceless."

A supervisor for migrant education for the Florida Christian Ministry for Migrants seemed to sum it all up one hot day last year when the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor stopped at Belle Glade, Florida. There, at a twenty-year-old camp, entire families live in one-room huts, but they feel they are fortunate. This is a "good" camp. One of the reasons it *is* good is the Ministry's recreation center, a homely, barnlike structure where a worker can go at nightfall instead of staying in his hut. Women come to use sewing machines. Youngsters play hide-and-seek on the bare wooden floor. The hours pass. Those youngsters, said the supervisor, lag years behind their non-migrant fellows in schools. She has even found homes where parents refused to send their children to school because they didn't have the necessary clothing. Why such deprivation? "The reason," she told us, "is that they have lost out along the road."

They *have* lost out. Not only do they lack what other citizens call the necessities of life; they have been shut out of practically every great social reform that other Americans take for granted.

¶ Though the migrants work in the nation's third most dangerous industry (only mining and construction trades cause more mishaps than agriculture), they have the protection of workmen's compensation in only seventeen states. In some of those states the employer may elect to—or not to—let them sign up for it.

¶ Though he has no real certainty of income in his old age, the migrant receives only spotty social security coverage.

¶ Often at the mercy of labor contractors who act as middlemen between farmer and worker, the migrant is protected by contractor registration laws in fewer than a dozen states.

¶ There is no Federal minimum wage for the agricultural worker and no minimum age for his child's labor outside school hours.

¶ His diet is poor; he and his family endure more disease and ill health than any other Americans; and his children receive less education than anyone else in the nation.

As one reporter wrote about the migrants after covering two days of Subcommittee hearings, "You name it, and they don't have it."

As many as two million Americans—the workers, their wives, and their youngsters—live this kind of life in the United States today. It is imperative that their wretched existence be understood by the other millions of citizens who do not have to face want or despair. If we are to succeed in taking effective action against this national disgrace, Americans everywhere will have to take a part in ending it. We need a lobby to speak for the excluded.

This "lobby"—which would simply be an informed American public determined to put overdue laws on

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our Federal books—would speak for the poorest Americans in the nation—Americans who for forty years have been politically powerless to help themselves.

Since August, 1959, the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, on our travels through the nation, has found out how poor the migrant really is, how desperate his life has become. For instance:

¶ The migrant earned an annual average of $710 from farm work in 1959, plus another $201 for non-farm labor. Often forced by bad weather to move on or to stand idle, he worked an average of only 119 days in 1959. Sometimes the average is even lower. A witness in Wisconsin told us that "most families do not have more than $500 left after their nine months of work." Some migrants end the season in debt to the labor contractor. Occasionally there are reports of workers who make $200 a week or thereabouts on highly specialized work—as sorters in packing sheds, for example. But these "highs" are considered in the overall average. For every peak wage, there is a "low."

¶ There are many more migrants on the road than most people realize. As they travel north from Florida as far as New England, or from Texas to groves and fields near the Great Lakes, or from Southern California to Oregon and Washington, the migrants stop off at forty-seven states some time every year. Twenty-eight states have 5,000 or more at peak; three states absorb 40,000 or more. About one-third of all counties in the nation—943 out of about 3,000—have 100 or more domestic agricultural migrants at one time or another every year. This count, of course, does not include the foreign workers—the third of a million Mexican braceros, for instance. The ironic fact is that these imported wage earners, who work under separate international agreements, often have more security and certainty of employment than our domestic workers.

¶ However brief their stay might be, the domestic workers leave their mark on communities and entire counties. Infant mortality is higher and sickness more common among the migrants than among other citizens. They are more liable, therefore, to need hospital services, even if they don't have the money to pay for them. A Minnesota clergyman told us that a small community hospital there had to write off $3,554 as bad debts in two summers. This amounted to fifty-one per cent of medical bills owed by the migrants in that period. There was some danger that the hospital would be unable to meet its deficit.

¶ Children suffer most of all in the migratory way of life. Where there are schools, classes are usually hopelessly overcrowded. Where there are no schools, children stay home during the day or work out in the fields. (Even in the nine states that have minimum wages for child labor outside of school hours, officials often do not have the supervisors they need for adequate inspection.) There have been reports of children locked in cars or cabins during work hours, and there have been other reports of untended children who perished in drainage ditches or on highways near the fields where their parents worked. Playtime can be perilous for the migrant boy or girl. At a California camp, the Subcommittee saw children jumping up and down inside the only play facility in sight: an abandoned, battered automobile. The youngsters' feet were bare. Broken glass littered the floor.

¶ Without fixed residence, few migrants can meet local requirements for welfare, maternity, and other benefits, though they need these services more than anyone else. Even where they may be legally qualified, difficulties arise. The Childen's Bureau of the Federal Social Security Administration explains: "While services under the maternal and child health, and crippled children's programs are for the most part available to migrant families, a number of obstacles limit their use—such as language barriers, distances to clinics, insufficient health department staffs to meet the many problems of a large temporary population."

Much more could be said about present inequities. Much *has* already been said in television documentaries and in newspaper or magazine articles. The big question is, what can be done to overcome this national problem? Perhaps an even more compelling question is: when will we do it?

ANOTHER STRUGGLE

Another issue of crucial importance to migrant farm workers is now before the Senate—the extension of Public Law 78, which provides for the importation of Mexican farm laborers under international agreement. These braceros—more than 300,000 last year—work for fifty cents an hour or less, and the effect of the program is to depress sharply the wages of American migrants, adding greatly to their misery. Efforts are being made to amend the law in ways that would set stricter limits on the importation of braceros and gradually raise wages to the prevailing state or national level.

Early this year, the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor began its consideration of an eleven-point legislative program to attack specific and general problems affecting the migrant. This package of bills was the result of more than eighteen months of travel, study, drafting, and redrafting. We had taken many suggestions from witnesses at hearings; we are still taking them. These are some of the provisions of that program:

¶ To help migrants make a decent living wage, we are asking for a seventy-five-cent minimum which would be raised in four annual stages until it reached the industrial minimum level.

¶ We are seeking a practical minimum age for agricultural child labor. Our bill, when revisions are completed, will probably also restrict dangerous work for those under eighteen years of age.

¶ We would give Federal grants to states and municipalities to help them meet seasonal demands on schools and staff members. But what about education for the adults, too? Many growers told the Subcommittee that the migrants had no idea at all of what to do with showers, toilets, screen doors, and other facilities found in some camps. And so we offered a bill to give practical training to those

who want to learn how to live better lives.

¶ We had the farmer in mind, too, when we offered a new draft of a bill to give low-cost loans for construction of better housing. Many growers had told us that they could not afford to pay for good housing that would be used for only a few weeks at a time. If Federal help could be given, however, they might find it possible to build decent quarters.

¶ Federal grants would help develop local health programs and day-care centers for migratory children. We have also offered a program to improve recruitment, transportation, and distribution of domestic agricultural workers (a program similar to that already in operation for braceros and other imported workers).

¶ Two other bills were offered, one to apply collective bargaining rights to agriculture, and another to establish a National Citizens Council to keep the public and President informed and concerned about the migratory worker.

We have added up the cost of this program: it would require $6.8 million annually in Federal funds. This hardly seems an excessive amount for a nation in which two and one-half times as much was appropriated during the last fiscal year for the care, protection, and habitat improvement of migratory birds.

Opponents of even this modest program may claim that individual states have already taken steps against some of the worst conditions endured by the migratory worker. They could say, too, that church groups and private organizations are often effective during the growing season and during emergencies, such as the freeze that left thousands of migrants jobless and hungry in Florida last year.

No matter what has already been accomplished, however, the fact remains that, in states where the greatest progress has been made, officials and responsible citizens were the first to tell the Subcommittee that much more must yet be done.

For a national program is needed—one that will work with the states, the counties, the municipalities, the individuals already at work. We citizens who join the lobby for the excluded recognize that all is not affluence in the United States, and that the migratory worker needs more than eloquent commiseration.

America discovers FEININGER

by ALFRED WERNER

A DECADE ago, I saw a hale, lank, old gentleman sailing miniature boats on the pond in Manhattan's Central Park. Learning that he was the painter, Lyonel Feininger, I had an urge to walk up to him and say, "I have been an admirer of your work for many, many years . . ." But a feeling of awe stopped me, and I am glad it did. For Feininger, subsequently, has been described to me as a shy, uncommunicative person, who never mixed with people, never went to parties, rarely spoke to anyone outside his family circle. This reserve was, in part, responsible for his being relatively unknown in the United States. Another fact that militated against him was the rise of non-objective art. Though his work indulges in abstraction—he never refrained from abridging and summarizing for the sake of better and stronger design—Feininger always consulted nature, always regarded art as a controlled interplay between the visible stimuli offered by life and nature and the creative processes of the unconscious mind.

Unfortunately, during the last decade of Feininger's life, America was seized by a mania for raw, hot color thickly splashed or casually dripped on canvas. It is significant that Jackson Pollock's death in 1956 caused a much greater stir than Feininger's death the same year. Most of those who have idolized Pollock and his associates for their spontaneity in handling paint have been unable to love the precision and clarity in Feininger's drawings, watercolors, and oils. In the non-objective age people had little use for vistas of Gothic churches, the Baltic shoreline, or the skyscrapers of New York. In the past five years, however, the stature of Feininger has grown so much in the public mind that no one would now dare to exclude him from a list of the dozen foremost American painters.

An extensive Feininger exhibition toured the United States in 1959 and 1960 and went to England and finally to Germany, where Feininger spent two-thirds of his long life. Moreover, in small, but carefully arranged memorial shows, New York's Willard Gallery has, year after year, demonstrated its unshakable faith in a man whose works, physically small and restrained, are easily overshadowed by flashier artists. And now we have the first substantial book about him in English, *Lyonel Feininger*, by Hans Hess (Harry N. Abrams), which is valuable not only for the author's remarkably deep penetration into the character of the artist's work, but also for the *oeuvre* catalogue, recording more than five hundred oil paintings, and a comprehensive bibliography.

Feininger's story is a most touching one, for it was relatively late in life that he managed to embark on the spiritually rewarding, but economically hazardous, career of a painter. He was born in New York in 1871. His parents, of German origin, were musicians and insisted that their son follow in their footsteps, although "Charles Leonell," as the child was baptized, soon revealed an unusual

ALFRED WERNER, a leading art critic, has written and lectured widely in the United States and Europe. He has edited a number of art books, and his articles have appeared in Commentary, The American Scholar, and Arts.

talent for drawing and an insatiable appetite for the sights of New York, such as the Second Avenue "El," the forest of masts on the Hudson and the East River, and the canyons of downtown Manhattan.

When Feininger was sixteen, he was sent to Germany to study music. Though he loved music, and subsequently achieved some recognition as a composer of organ music, he knew from the outset that he was destined to become a painter. In 1888 he wrote to a friend that he was "so determined" as to his future profession "that life would seem not worth struggling through if I could not follow this calling." He obtained permission to study art, first in Hamburg, then in Berlin, and spent a fruitful half-year in Paris, where he became acquainted with the newer trends. But to support his family (he married in 1901 and soon became a father), he had to earn his living as a cartoonist. While he became known for his contribution to satirical papers in Germany and to the Chicago *Tribune*, life as a caricaturist did not satisfy him. His more personal drawings were often rejected in favor of his less original work. He felt that his creative gifts were not used sufficiently, and he finally decided to abandon pictorial journalism and to try to make a living as a free artist.

Hence, "at thirty-six, as a cheerful old man," he started to paint "with a locomotive-like passion eight or ten hours daily." He was close to forty and still dissatisfied with what he had produced when he wrote: "I search in vain for *a single work* of mine which could last," and, "My paintings are the battlefield on which I try to find clarification for myself." He did not live what is called a colorful life (often a euphemistic term for a self-destructive mode of living). His sole concern, next to that for his family, was for his art. His biography is brief. Before World War I, he was affiliated with Germany's advanced Blue Rider group. After the war, he was among the progressive artists who founded an *Arbeitsrat fuer Kunst*, an artists' committee to "re-establish the unity of the disrupted arts." Associated with the Bauhaus Academy in Weimar, he was among the first artists to be attacked as a modernist by the Nazis when, years before Hitler's seizure of power, his works, along with those of Barlach and Klee, were removed from an exhibition in Weimar. From 1933 on, he was among the artists whose works were held up to ridicule by the Nazis' *Entartete Kunst* (Degenerate Art) exhibitions. Ostracized by the Third Reich, he lived long enough to see the victory of sanity, and he was honored with several exhibitions in Germany during the decade preceding his death.

While he learned to speak and write German perfectly, English was of course his native tongue. Upon his return to America in 1936, he fell in love with the geometry of Manhattan's grid of straight streets, with the mystery of its sharp-angled towers looming towards the sky. To the average German he was always a Yankee. Nevertheless, in his art he was more of an early Nineteenth Century German Romanticist than of a machine-obsessed modern New Yorker. Traces of the old *Maerchen* element can be seen in his early works, especially in the playful, whimsical cartoons. They are near in spirit to the disarmingly naive illustrations of German fairy tales which I (like every child reared in Central Europe) devoured in my youth. He began German Gothic drawings and paintings after terminating his contracts with newspapers and magazines. Like a medieval German mystic, he wrote to his wife, "What we see has to go through the process of transformation and crystallization," and "I have to destroy nature before I can begin to build her up again in my paintings."

Feininger, the quiet, withdrawn, solitary artist, became the target of controversy: whether he ought to be considered a German or an American artist. Apparently, even the lofty realm of art is not free of the champions of nationalism. In the 1920's, a German critic pronounced Feininger *"urdeutsch"* and dismissed the fact that he was born in New York as a mere caprice of fate, yet the Hitlerites attacked the artist as an "alien" producing "degenerate" paintings. Ironically, in 1929, when New York's Museum of Modern Art exhibited him among *Nineteen Living Americans*, protests were heard here against the inclusion of this "foreigner" working in a "foreign idiom." However, when Feininger left Nazi Germany for America, all critics here, forgetting this incident, generously hastened to assure him that no one had ever considered him anything but an American artist. Feininger himself wanted no part of a controversy that seemed utterly senseless to him: "What is the artist, if not connected with the universe?" To use the title of one of his water colors, he was a "Ship with Sails of No Nation Whatever."

He would not have denied, though, that there are national inspirations and influences that, high above imperialism and chauvinism, penetrate to the core of a creative personality. As sensitive an individual as Feininger could not spend fifty of his eighty-seven years in Germany with-

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out sending roots deep into the country's cultural soil. His life is interwoven with the fabric of German civilization from 1888 to the advent of Hitlerism. To characterize his mature work, I must pay tribute to the Nineteenth Century German painter, Caspar David Friedrich who, long before Feininger was born, anticipated the later man's rejection of the materialistic civilization he witnessed around him. In the two men, there was the same yearning to reach the "soul" of things, a longing for the incomprehensive and infinite, a metaphysical thirst not to be restrained by limited horizons.

Hence, if he can be pigeon-holed at all, one might place him among the German Romanticists, for this strange man who grew up among locomotives, steamships, and "Els," was spiritually at home in the age of stage coaches and sailing vessels. Among his contemporaries, Feininger was, perhaps, closest to his colleague Franz Marc, an associate of the *Blaue Reiter* artists' group to which Feininger belonged for a short time. Marc once wrote: "The world is full of suffocation . . . What can one do to attain happiness except give up everything and escape?" It might be pointed out that the name of this group—Blue Rider—unmistakably linked them with the miracle-producing blue flower which, according to a German fairy tale, the shepherd, unaware of its magic powers, pins to his shirt, to be led by it to discover a hidden treasure.

Feininger plucked this flower, and it led him into the world of fantasy. He discovered Pomerania, that austere fog-ridden strip of land bordered by the Baltic where he spent many summers sailing and working. He loved the harbors and dunes in the faint light of the moon and the towers and narrow streets of old towns. His sense of magic helped him create his most celebrated canvases—those showing small figures on the shore looking across wide spaces, sometimes dotted with ships, the distant horizons conjuring up the infinity of space, the great unknown lying beyond.

If an enormous life-work can be summarized in a few words, Feininger created order in a world lacking order; he made his object grow outward as a crystal grows; he distilled the significant from an appearance. Superficially, the Cubists did the same thing. But Feininger did not follow them in their destruction of material objects to the logical end. Whereas the Cubists would completely dissolve the actual elements of a scene in the design, Feininger, with all his angular simplifications, retained enough of a reflection of the eternal world so that a Caspar David Friedrich, returned to life, might recognize the North German churches by their soaring height, gigantic shafts, and ribbed vaultings and flying buttresses. Feininger "transfigurated" and "de-materialized" a scene without ever sacrificing the point of departure. He never followed his friends Klee, Kandinsky, or Albers into complete abstraction. Feininger's art is as abstract as classical music in which a simple straight melody is always audible. Among his writings is a significant passage where he compares his work to the most rigorous of all arts:

"My lines are the equivalents of notes . . . each in its exact place. Music has gone far ahead of painting in its organization and discipline . . . I always hear music. I want an equally disciplined art."

Feininger believed that coolness of mind and color, as well as geometry corresponding to the strict architectural pattern of a fugue, would channelize rapturous self-intoxication and the overflow of passionate enthusiasm. The stillness, the peace and quiet produced by the harmonious equilibrium between horizontal and vertical, tend to conceal an emotional intensity gradually tamed, yet never attenuated in a life-long struggle into which only his spontaneously written letters have given us a rare insight. Here is an early one, written from Paris in 1906 (when the painter was only thirty-five): "The artist should be an experimenter, seek out logical and constructive solutions—create synthetically pure forms." Half a century later he was still searching for new solutions, for in his last recorded letter (dated January 3, 1956), he wrote: "During the summer I have consciously confined myself to new experiments and prepared for fresh . . . activity in painting . . ." He was fated to die ten days later.

Those who went to see New York's latest Feininger show last spring could not help admiring the admirable balance in his art, a firmness that is rare today as one artist after another seeks "freedom" in unrestrained abandon. For Feininger knew what so many younger men and women have conveniently forgotten: that the degree of control distinguishes painting as an art from mere pigment-obsession which leaves out the spiritual in man.

Yet while Feininger's innate *noblesse* prevented him from draining off his emotion in wild ecstasy, his drawings, paintings, and prints are far from cold. Their warmth is not the quick fire that brightens without providing comfort, but rather the glowing of coals that burn eternally and give never-ending delight. They incite dreams—to finish with the soul what the artist had begun with his inadequate tools. They do not give complete images—everything is in flux, though the direction is maintained and the movement circumscribed.

I do not know whether the late British critic, Roger Fry, was acquainted with Feininger's work. He bestowed his praise upon artists who "do not seek to imitate form, but to create form, not to imitate life, but to find an equivalent for life." He praised those artists who "make images which by the clearness of their logical structure, and by their closely-knit unity of texture . . . appeal to our disinterested and contemplative imagination with something of the same vividness as the things of actual life appeal to our practical activities."

Those words apply perfectly to the philosophical Expressionist, the American Feininger, whose genius is, at last, being recognized in his native country. They would characterize superbly his paintings that are midway between reality and abstraction, precision and dream, giving us, as it were, the astral bodies of things rather than the perishable entities. Or, as Feininger put it in his disarming modesty, "I don't paint objects, but rather the space around objects." His works are halos drawn around breathing reality.

THE PEOPLE'S FORUM

Fog Over Berlin

Dear Sirs:

A good index or barometer of the brainwashing that goes on in this country is the Gallup Poll.

In July it reported that the peak of President Kennedy's popularity came right after the Cuban invasion. We had failed; to have succeeded would have been even worse—and, as Karl E. Meyer pointed out in the July *Progressive*, we had violated our "national, hemispheric, and international laws."

Yet so partial and slanted was the reporting that most Americans did not realize that we had made scraps of paper of our treaties and had behaved in a way that appeared immoral and irresponsible to those outside our fog of propaganda.

Now comes a Gallup Poll, reported in the July 30 Seattle *Times*. To the question, "Do you think we should keep American forces in Berlin—along with British and French forces—even at the risk of war?", the replies were: yes, eighty-two per cent; no, seven per cent; no opinion, eleven per cent. To the question, "If Communist East Germany closes all roads to Berlin and does not permit planes to land in Berlin, do you think the United States and its allies should or should not try to fight their way into Berlin?", the answers were: should fight, seventy-one per cent; should not, fifteen per cent; no opinion, fourteen per cent.

Gleams of enlightenment do break through our surrounding fog. For example, the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* published, on July 20, a speech Khrushchev made on the Berlin situation; its editorials inform its readers of the possibilities of disengagement.

Most of our citizens, however, have no alternative but to accept gross misrepresentation of Khrushchev's statements; and they labor under the misapprehension that we must choose between a frozen policy of preserving the exact status quo and a supine policy of craven submission.

People are encouraged to believe that a war in Central Europe could be kept limited and conventional. However, Khrushchev's statement that 200 million might die in a war over Berlin is conservative. Early in 1957 Val Peterson, then Civil Defense Administrator, estimated that a surprise attack would kill fifty per cent of all Americans, regardless of whether we had bomb shelters. In August, 1958, a Congressional committee released a RAND Corporation estimate that a 20,000 megaton attack on the United States would result in 160 million Americans dead—even if we had six hours warning. Lower estimates are either based upon an assumption (usually unmentioned) of an unrealistically low megatonage, or else they are based solely upon a desire to deceive.

In view of this outlook and the low Gallup Poll barometric reading presaging far-flung fire storms, it behooves us *Progressive* readers to transmit actively through the fog the enlightenment we receive. Let us communicate constantly and as effectively as possible with those about us, our officials, and our press, for the sake of those most important and related values: truth and peace.

ALICE FRANKLIN BRYANT
Seattle, Washington

Soviet Patent Pact

Dear Sirs:

On July 7 the Associated Press released the news that an American company had signed a licensing agreement for more than fifty Soviet patents for which the company will pay from fifty to one hundred million dollars a year. All the patents are for highly developed technical devices; one was even cited as being "useful in missilery." Others were for things like medical instruments, machine tools, a new method of casting iron, and diffusion welding.

The news of the agreement was not suppressed. It appeared in the public press where every American citizen could read it, if he read the paper thoroughly enough. This astounding bit of news, the first such Soviet-American agreement in history, was tucked away in an obscure corner. It should be front-page, headline news.

In the same paper the headlines screamed the threats of Soviet war preparation. Every time the Soviets do or say anything inimical to our interests, it not only makes the front page with significant headlines, but the editorial page of almost every newspaper in the country follows up with a tirade about the danger of Soviet aggression.

We know well enough that there is a real danger of Soviet aggression. We have reason to be fearful of the Soviet military might. But the Russians have just as much reason to fear our military might. If this world is going to escape a third world war, then we and the Soviets are going to have to live together on this old world in a spirit of mutual trust and confidence. When our press plays up every war-like utterance, every instance of saber-rattling by the Soviets, labels every friendly utterance as not made in good faith, and fails to give publicity to a really friendly gesture, we are not doing our share to bring about more harmonious relations between the two countries.

In the dispatch released by the Associated Press, Jerome I. Feldman, president of the National Patent Development Corporation, is reported as saying that he did not know why the Soviets had released the patent information and rights, but that the one to be used in missile manufacture was something that the West had been wanting for a long time. Probably nobody outside the Soviet Union knows why it released such valuable information. But to the thoughtful observer such action looks like a peaceful gesture, something that should be heralded as a slight amelioration of the cold war. To a jittery, war-weary world any softening of the cold war is news—big news, good news. Let us give it the publicity it deserves.

JAMES MAYFIELD
Halstead, Kansas

Love and Evil

Dear Sirs:

I don't believe that most of those who have written letters criticizing Milton Mayer's "Eichmann in Israel" really understand what he was trying to say. Mayer was not defending Eichmann. Certainly anyone familiar with his sensitivity toward human life and feeling would know that Mayer would be as disturbed as anyone at Eichmann's part in the Nazi massacre of the Jews.

The point of Mayer's dialogue is obviously the meaning of forgiveness and love. Love of a friend, as Jesus pointed out, is a simple matter in comparison to love of an enemy. Love of an enemy does not mean condoning; it doesn't even mean excusing or leaving alone. It does mean forgiving, helping, being aware of a common humanity, continuing to be a presence to another which he can receive if he is willing.

It may well be that Eichmann requires the isolation from society that other criminals often require. What Eichmann does not require is retribution, being used as an example, bitterness, hate. It is these, as Mayer wisely pointed out, that are among the components of evil whenever and wherever it exists.

MRS. ROSS L. SNYDER, JR.
Portland, Oregon

Mankind on Trial

Dear Sirs:

If the Eichmann trial is to be of any value at all, and if the six million victims are not to have died in vain, we who are alive must work constantly to prevent such a breakdown of moral responsibility in the future. We feel confident that no such catastrophe can ever happen again. Yet the early symptoms seemed minor: a small flame of anti-Semitic feeling in a few individuals, fanned by the fire of a huge propaganda machine.

The little beginnings are everywhere in

the world, and so are the vast propaganda machines. As Goebbels convinced us that the destruction of the Jews was in the German interest, so are we being convinced today that the production of nuclear warheads is being carried out in our own national interest. Possibly nothing identical to the mass murder of the Jews is likely to recur, but does it differ from the mass murder of other human beings?

Not alone is Eichmann the defendant. All mankind is on trial—some of us for having permitted Eichmann to happen while looking the other way, or refusing to protest; others for not coming to terms with their own prejudices; most of us for readily accepting propaganda without making an attempt to investigate the facts; again most of us for paying for, without protest, even without moral indignation, and accepting as necessity the production of instruments of mass murder, yet condemning Eichmann and preaching the worth of the individual, without recognizing this discrepancy; those of us who have survived bombs and trenches, yet are building bombs and digging trenches again; those who fight cancer but encourage the testing of bombs; all of us who condemn the system that brought Eichmann about, yet cannot see the parallel between the type of murder which he committed, and the type of murder which we are all too willing to commit.

MARGARETE HOFMANN
Austin, Texas

Israeli Justice

Dear Sirs:

I would like to say a few words about the message that I think Milton Mayer tried to convey to his readers in "Eichmann in Israel."

When I first read the article, I was impressed by the style; Mayer's style is always a bit abstract and inlaid with overtones and undertones and must be read carefully. I approve of his stand on Eichmann and philosophically and morally believe Israel to be wrong. I do not think the Israelis are meting out justice in the best interest of the concept of justice and the teaching of an impartial and objective method of right and wrong to our children. I think they have committed a grave error in the eyes of children learning "fair play" no matter what impression they hoped to create in the German children. Is the price worth it? Long after we today are dead and gone, what will the history books say? Even after the German children have questioned their parents, what will the children in Israel ask theirs?

We, living in a sheltered, unbombed, unmassacred land since 1865, can sit back and afford the luxury of viewing this trial and condemn it, because we cannot feel what the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Russians, and other peoples feel who were slain en masse by the German nation. The Jews were not the only sufferers; how do other Europeans feel about Germany? Let me quote something from *I. F. Stone's Weekly* by Lord Boothby of Great Britain and then, let us recognize that there are *two* sides to every question.

"Not to put too fine a point upon it, the Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians fear and hate the Germans to an extent which we cannot even begin to comprehend in this country. And the Russians, who suffered less but only relatively, at the hands of the Germans, are not far behind.

". . . Warsaw and Budapest were destroyed by Hitler's orders . . . In all four of the countries we visited the Germans killed and killed and killed for five interminable years. The killing was not confined to the Jews; and it is not forgotten."

MARILYN LEVINE
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Berlin Mess

Dear Sirs:

I am a mailman who loves to read. I have found, too, that my half hour for lunch is generally more than sufficient to read such as *Life* and *Time*. At first, I thought, too, that I could make as quick work with *The Progressive*. Alas, it was too meaty, and I was forced to subscribe some time ago in order to read at leisure each issue as I should.

I especially appreciate your recent realistic explanation of the Berlin mess. With the world—and our own lives—at stake, we could do worse than see—and negotiate—all sides of the issue.

I have long felt that the less official control Russia has over her satellites, and the more we court them, the better chance we have to break up the Soviet empire. And if a government exists, we are worse than blind not to recognize it, whether it be the government of Cuba, China, or East Germany, North Korea, North Vietnam.

Alas, our policy *forces* satellites to become —and remain—dependent upon Russia.

WILLIAM L. MOORE
Binghamton, New York

'Teacher's Millstones'

Dear Sirs:

Coercion in the name of teachers' associations and "professionalism" is but one of the "Teacher's Millstones." Judith Stiehm, in her July issue article, apparently approves of another millstone, which to me is the hardest burden for a teacher to bear: lack of academic freedom, which derives from the belief that "An educational objective must be approved by society." This is at least a questionable value judgment and is based on philosophical assumptions hardly shared by all teachers, but Judith Stiehm passes it off as "not necessarily base" and "the way things must be done."

Is a teacher merely to transmit old accepted bigotry? Is he to laud old community ugliness as beautiful? If a student is not made to judge for himself, hear the contrary of old platitudes, see controversy, and begin to create his own world-view from a compound of old values and new intellectual discomfort, is he really being educated?

Learning is a *change* in thought or behavior, not the mere parroting of community prejudices. (Besides, in America one of our highest "agreed-upon" values is individual inquiry after truth, questioning old ways.) Perhaps a teacher should "stimulate" rather than "transmit."

Other "millstones" as crushing as professionalism are community censorship of the teacher's private lives, lack of variety in reading materials for the students ("tied to the textbook"), classes too large for effective teaching, and the conformity in curriculum enforced by standardized tests.

Our schools look like factories, and our educational system seeks to force teachers and students into a mass production mold. Give me personal and academic freedom and funds for a variety of materials, and I'll gladly subsist at wages below those of a factory worker.

JOHN ROEMER, III
Westminster, Maryland

Raise Teachers' Salaries

Dear Sirs:

While Judith Stiehm ("The Teacher's Millstone," July) has attempted to point out the differences between the professional man and the teacher, she has overlooked some basic differences between the teacher and the laborer. The laborer, in serving himself and the public, must organize to fight the profit-motivated employer, whereas the teacher serves the public but is, in most instances, also employed by it.

There seems to me to be only one way for the teacher to receive an increase in salary without fighting against the very group he attempts to serve: the public must serve itself by desiring to increase teachers' salaries. Since we are beginning to think more in terms of the national public instead of the local public, it is proper for the Federal government to take care of this. If the public is to develop culturally and intellectually, this is one essential step to be taken immediately.

JOHN L. HODGE
Lawrence, Kansas

Northwest Disappointment

Dear Sirs:

The greatest problem of our Northwest is the lack of development of natural resources, and that lack hinges on cheap power in large quantities. Much of the area has no coal, oil, or gas. Our only potential source of cheap power is in the hydroelectric possibilities of our swift running streams, and in the development of hydroelectric power we have just experienced an eight year drought under the Eisenhower Administration. We had substantial hope that conditions would be remedied under President Kennedy, but in his last appointment to the Federal Power Commission President Kennedy seems to have sold us down the river.

During his campaign he said, "No Federal appointee to any public regulatory agency shall represent any view other than the public interest. Appointment to such agencies shall be made with the advice of those

knowledgeable in the field, but shall not be dictated by those with vested interest in the appointment." His first two appointments to the FPC were in line with that commitment; they are able men dedicated to the welfare of the public, but the third appointment neutralizes the first two and, in effect, turns the control of the commission back to the Eisenhower clique of abject tools of the private power monopoly.

Mr. Kennedy can not help but know that Laurence J. O'Connor is a former vice-president of the Goldstone Oil Corporation and was an Eisenhower appointee, in charge of oil imports, in the Interior Department. If he did not know how bitterly the people of the Northwest would resent this appointment he could have easily found out by consulting either of the Oregon Senators or two of the Congressmen of this state. We are faced with a serious unemployment problem and vitally need the development of our abundant natural resources.

D. Ivan Fritts
Ontario, Oregon

U.S. Needs 'Pro' Policy

Dear Sirs:

As a regular reader of your magazine for the past four years, I feel compelled to write you this letter of appreciation. Your June issue on Latin America is excellent, as was an earlier issue on the Soviet Union.

The United States is known only as an anti-Communist country. Anything "anti" is a negative attitude and the ignorance of adhering to it has cost the United States much. It is time to switch over to a positive attitude, to a "pro" policy—pro-democracy. Pro-democracy will pay long range, higher dividends. If Communism is tyranny for the minority of vested interests in the upper strata, despotic autocracy is tyranny for the majority of millions kept indefinitely in dire poverty throughout the ages. The United States should make us understand by her *deeds* that she despises *both*. Help to despots by the United States has meant, indirectly, help to stave off democratic revolutions in many countries.

Will your kind subscribers introduce your magazines to the libraries and colleges in India? Your magazine is far better than those made available by U.S.I.S. and by other publishers.

R. Bhaskaran
Madras State, India

Defending Criminals

Dear Sirs:

In 1958, Professor Fred E. Inbau and his assistant, Claude R. Sowle, of Northwestern University School of Law, conducted the first annual course for defense lawyers in criminal cases. This course was made possible by a gift from the Ford Foundation. The lecture staff which was assembled included some of the outstanding trial men of the nation, as well as experts in the fields of legal medicine and allied sciences. The lawyer-students and the lecture staff organized the National Association of Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases at a meeting in Chicago.

The Association was formed for the purpose of enlarging the skills of the members, and, more importantly, to bring together the lawyers who share a common belief in the absolutes of the Bill of Rights and who have devoted their lives to obeying the command of the Sixth Amendment:

> "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."

There is a pressing need to increase public respect for the trial lawyer, who is the only one on the criminal side of the court who can give effect to the Bill of Rights—and it is only on the criminal side that those guarantees mean anything.

Dan H. McCullough
Toledo, Ohio

'Last Best Hope'

Dear Sirs:

Thank you for the genuine public service you have performed in reprinting the dissent of Mr. Justice Black in *Communist Party of U.S. v. S.A.C.B.*

So few of our newspapers took the trouble to mull this decision over in their small minds and weep the tears demanded by its sense of justice and decency.

As a journalist I feel that any individual who does not believe in the "last best hope" provided for in the Bill of Rights has no business sitting before a typewriter.

Robert N. Parker
Los Angeles, California

Breath of Fresh Air

Dear Sirs:

The Progressive brings a breath of fresh air to magazine writing. I enjoy each issue fully. Keep up the good fight for sound, sober liberalism.

Elliot L. Gross
Rochester, N.Y.

Guidebook for Liberals

Dear Sirs:

I am interested in compiling a guidebook to the United States for liberals. All suggestions from readers as to organizations and periodicals that should be included or excluded, local headquarters and shrines, possible categories, possible publishers, and any other information will be welcomed. Please include full addresses.

Berenice Ellman Coan
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BOOKS

Labor's Past and Present

by JACK BARBASH

THIS SAMPLING of seven current books ranges from the unions' antiquity to the union problems of the present; from the bitter struggle for survival to full-fledged participation in industrial society. Since the labor movement's antiquity is in point of time close to its present, the contrast with "only yesterday" is striking.

Somewhere I recall John R. Commons observing that all of the elements in the American environment seemed to be engaged in a conspiracy to frustrate the emergence of effective unionism. The ingredients of this "conspiracy" are to be found in general in Irving Bernstein's *The Lean Years* (Houghton Mifflin. $7), and in specific in the steel industry in David Brody's *Steelworkers in America, The Non-union Era* (Harvard University Press. $5).

Brody's book goes farther back into time than Bernstein's and begins with the origins of steel unionism in the immediate post-Civil War period and ends with the virtual destruction of steel unionism in the aftermath of the great steel strike in 1919. The factors working on steel unionism represent a microcosm of the economic and social forces that transformed industrial America in the post-Civil War period: "trustification," eastern European immigration, rapid technological change, business control of the political process, the systematic repression of unionism, and the romantic, self-indulging, threadbare ideologies which the business hosts fabricated to justify the state of affairs.

Nor were the forces destructive to permanent unions to be found only in the external environment. The Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, at first an important union in the developing labor movement, applied a narrow craft-consciousness and an equally constricting anti-ethnic policy in the face of a technology and a changing labor force that demanded industrial unionism and a policy of ethnic assimilation, if the union was to survive. This contour of events comes to life in Brody's engrossing, objective, and scholarly performance. There is a tragic quality in this chapter of American labor history.

Irving Bernstein concerns himself with the plight of the American as worker and as unionist from the early Twenties to the Great Depression. *The Lean Years* covers a broader territory over a narrower time span than Brody's book, but the ingredients remain the same. This time the background is provided by an economy on the brink of collapse. The interaction of economics and people produces the same hostility to an effective labor movement: the strikes of desperation, the labor injunction, the insensitivity of *laissez-faire* ideology to human suffering, the bumbling efforts of a labor movement cowed by circumstances which it did not understand into a posture of supplication.

Both in the steel story and in "the lean years" it is likely that even a braver and bolder labor movement would have come to the same end.

The legal protection of labor's right to organize provided the leverage for the revolutionary transformation which industrial relations have undergone since the initiation of the New Deal. From varying vantage points the detail of the transformation is filled in by a trio of works. The most important is *The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management* (Brookings Institution. $8.75) by a trio of authors. The senior author is the late Sumner H. Slichter, and his colleagues James J. Healy and E. Robert Livernash, all of Harvard. This monumental enterprise in size and conception undertakes with considerable success, I think, to lay out the collective bargaining basis for the union exercise of power in industry as that power relates to the job rights of workers and management.

From the struggle for survival the unions have moved into a sytem of shared authority rooted in collective bargaining. The facts relating to apprenticeship, hiring, seniority, work rules, health, welfare, and pensions, work standards, methods of payment, discipline, grievances, and arbitration all convey something of the complexity and ingenuity of the network of rules by which the relationship of the worker to management is governed. Withal the inference is unmistakable that the union is not a co-manager of industry; that its role is limited to defense against absolute power, and that in general the collective bargaining relationship has worked to the advantage of all relevant interests, including the public interest. Slichter and his colleagues lay out the details of an extraordinary achievement in the evolution of democratic industrial government.

Morris Horowitz (*The New York Hotel Industry—A Labor Relations Study*. Harvard University Press. $6) and Father Theodore V. Purcell (*Blue Collar Man—Patterns of Dual Allegiance in Industry*. Harvard University Press. $6) investigate two widely different case situations from rather different perspectives. Horowitz examines how a diversity of unions and a diversity of employers organized themselves to develop a viable collective bargaining relationship. The capacity of human beings

to work out creative concepts and mechanisms in the interest of civilized order is fully revealed here. As Horowitz points out, the problems of internal accommodation within the unions and within management have been more demanding perhaps than the accommodation between the union and management.

Father Purcell studies the attitudes of workers and management in three packinghouse situations involving three separate unions: the Amalgamated Meat Cutters, the United Packinghouse Workers, and the unaffiliated Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers. Father Purcell is a sociologist and his angle of vision is the extent of "dual allegiance" by the worker—that is, the worker's capacity to demonstrate degrees of attachment both to the management which employs him and to the union of which he is a part. In varying degrees and in varying combinations of allegiances Father Purcell seeks to demonstrate that across-the-board class struggle is not and need not be an intrinsic part of the employer-employee relationship.

The method of comparative labor movement analysis is the perspective utilized by Walter Galenson (*Trade Union Democracy in Western Europe*. University of California Press. $2.25) and by Arthur M. Ross and Paul G. Hartman (*Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict*. John Wiley. $6.50). Galenson undertakes to illuminate the problem of union democracy in the United States by examining union democracy in other national contexts. He is particularly concerned with the effects of union rivalry on the quality of union democracy. Ross and Hartman seek to document the trend toward the "withering away of the strike" in modern industrial society, whether the industry is of the advanced kind as in Northern Europe and in the United States and Canada, or of the underdeveloped kind or not-so-developed kind in Asia and in the Mediterranean.

Some of these books are more important for their valuable fact content than they are for the conclusions and inferences which are drawn from the facts. Father Purcell makes too much of the dual allegiance concept. What is involved here is that a worker can like both his employer and his union. The use of the term "allegiance" upgrades this fact into a rather more significant concept than, I think, is warranted. More important than the "dual allegiance" concept in *Blue Collar Man* is Father Purcell's sensitive ear and human feeling. The insight which emerges constitutes indispensable raw material for an understanding of trade unionism in the life of a plant community.

Galenson (*Trade Union Democracy in Western Europe*) also rides a hobby horse. He is an informed observer with a capacity to capsulize important tendencies in a variety of national labor movements, but nowhere in this useful investigation could I find any factual justification in the experience of other countries which would support Galenson's suggestion for a governmental policy in the United States to foster union rivalry. To be sure, he advances it gingerly, but I cannot discover in reading his work why he has any hope for it at all.

Ross and Hartman (*Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict*) strain a little too hard for my taste in developing the "withering away of the strike" in the United States. Here again, their conclusions are prudently qualified, but I do not believe that they prove their case, at least for the United States—which is the only one of their cases which I feel qualified to comment on.

In all of these works the quality of the underlying scholarship is high; you can take or leave the authors' theories without affecting your respect for their research. The collection incidentally is interesting for what it suggests about the study of labor as an academic interest. The economist is still the most numerous of the investigators, but his place in the study of labor is being challenged by the historian (Brody), by the sociologist (Purcell), and by the economic historian (Bernstein). In an earlier generation of labor studies the University of Wisconsin, Johns Hopkins, and Columbia were the prime movers. The present collection of works is an outgrowth of the Harvard-California research axis. All of the books' authors, in varying combination, were trained or sponsored by Harvard or California.

Thesis and Message

THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, by William Appleman Williams. World. 513 pp. $7.50.

Reviewed by

William L. Neumann

HISTORY, Charles Beard once said, is philosophy open at both ends. No scholar can say much about the beginning of human existence nor be well-informed about the Day of Judgment. The period in between offers ample scope for philosophizing. Few historians like to admit it, but this is basically what the best interpretive writers have done—developing "concepts," "trends," or "processes" which seem to give some meaning to man's collective behavior.

The Contours of American History is one of the best of the relatively few attempts to interpret the American past. Pragmatism, faith in national "destiny," and the desiccating influences of graduate school training have combined to discourage American scholars from thinking "big" about their national experience as Arnold Toynbee has tried to do about many nations. Most American historical writing is limited to seeing development in the clash of "good" and "bad" men or, in modern terms, between "liberals" and "conservatives."

Williams, a professor of American history at the University of Wisconsin who acknowledges his indebtedness to Beard, has ranged beyond these conventional limitations. He discovers his "contours" in three stages of eco-


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nomic thought and institutions. The first, titled the "Age of Mercantilism," is dated 1740-1828; the second is the "Age of Laissez Nous Faire" (sic!) from 1819 to 1896, and finally the "Age of Corporation Capitalism," which began in 1882 and persists to the present. In each of these periods he analyzes the conflict between the existing order and the movement towards the new age. By taking individuals like Mark Hanna, conventionally damned by liberal historians as "reactionaries," and finding that they were proponents of the Rising rather than the Passing Order, he produces some interesting fresh interpretations.

The New Deal is dismissed from its conventional ranking as a new approach to economic problems and seen as a convergence and consolidation of elements to be found in the older Progressive movement. Roosevelt is described as "the last and certainly one of the most conservative representatives of the American feudal gentry to hold the Presidency." New Dealers are found to share in what has been a blight on the whole era, the quest for Utopia through the conquest of new frontiers of overseas commercial expansion. In a manner which will delight some readers and appall others, Williams manages to align Christ, Marx, and Freud in a front against new frontiers.

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This is a book not only with a thesis, but also a strong message. Beginning with the use of Spain in 1898, Americans have found the source of their troubles outside their borders; today, in Moscow, Laos, and Berlin. Williams suggests instead that the source may be at home and that the cure can be found in recreating a sense of community, a democratic, socialist commonwealth.

To many readers this solution will seem only a resurgence of Beard's continentalism, or pre-World War II liberal isolationism, a point of view which disregards America's "responsibilities" for a world-wide defense of peace, parliamentary democracy, and the remnants of capitalism. But the long overdue "agonizing reappraisal" may still come as an alternative to thermonuclear disaster. If Khrushchev calls Kennedy's bluff over Berlin—and it turns out to be only a bluff—this product of the University of Wisconsin may win the White House consideration previously given to the work of Harvard scholars like Kissinger, Rostow, and Schlesinger.

Freedom at Stake

FREEDOM AND COMMUNICATIONS, by Dan Lacy. University of Illinois Press. 93 pp. $3.

CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT, 1957-1960, by C. Herman Pritchett. University of Minnesota Press. 168 pp. $3.75.

THE PRESIDENCY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, by Richard P. Longaker. Cornell University Press. 239 pp. $4.50.

A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS, by William O. Douglas. Doubleday. 72 pp. $1.50.

Reviewed by
David Fellman

AMONG RECENT books dealing with civil liberties, Dan Lacy's essays, *Freedom and Communications,* delivered at the University of Illinois as the 1959 Windsor Lectures in Librarianship, stand out as an important analysis of current American mass media. Managing director of the American Book Publishers Council since 1953, Lacy is one of the nation's most astute students of the freedom to communicate. He combines great technical knowledge with a direct and vigorous manner of expression and a profound understanding of the fundamental principles of the American political and cultural creed.

It is tempting to quote from Lacy's book. Perhaps one quotation will suffice to illustrate his style. Referring to the widely discussed fact that the Twentieth Century resources—films, radio, and television—are so preoccupied with sex and violence, Lacy suggests that he does not think the issue is really over sex and violence in themselves. For, he writes, *"The Gunfight at the O.K. Corral* has nothing on the final scene of *Hamlet* for violence, and *Hamlet* has incest, insanity, poisoning, and treason thrown in for good measure. Many of the greatest masterpieces of literature and drama confront the sexual passions and tragedies of man more nakedly than any film or tawdry publication today. It is rather that sex and violence are dissociated from the human realities that give them meaning and made gimmicks to spice up an advertisement or catch attention at a newsstand."

Lacy spells out many of the ingredients of the current dissatisfaction with the state of the American communications system—"the banality and emptiness of most broadcasts and films," the failure to distribute adequately our rapidly growing stock of knowledge among the people, the "slickness" of magazines, the preoccupation of television with entertainment, the absence of significant social criticism in broadcast drama, the political bias of magazines and newspapers, "the cultural and political bias of magazines and newspapers," "the cultural and political conformity of the mass media," the emphasis upon violence and sex, and the tendency of the mass media to oversimplify ideas and problems. Most illuminating is Lacy's explanation of how these qualities relate to the economy of the mass media. Thus the search for the lowest common denominator is inherent in television's appeal to the largest possible number of viewers.

Finally, Lacy makes a number of positive proposals. He thinks it would help if we increased the number of independent local television stations. He favors more adequate support of educational radio and

television stations. He thinks pay television would open up a whole new range of broadcasting opportunities. He also makes a number of sensible though modest suggestions regarding the printed media, books, magazines, and newspapers. The improvement of public libraries is high on his list.

Longaker's scholarly book, *The Presidency and Individual Liberties,* is a most timely subject, since the American President is bound to have an important role in defining the meaning and status of our liberties. His inactivity, as well as positive action, has consequences, and one of the principal examples of executive inactivity is reflected in the eight years of the Eisenhower stewardship, which are analyzed in considerable detail.

Longaker points out that both security and individual liberty are on the conscience of the nation, and the President is confronted with the great dilemma that he is obliged to protect both. Much of the book is devoted to a sophisticated exploration of the powers and instruments of persuasion, education, and moral leadership which are available to any President who chooses to make use of them. And the author makes it clear that it is not enough for the President to reaffirm the general principles of American liberty. In addition, "he must fight with equal vigor the explosion of bigotry, the pressures for conformity, or disrespect for constitutional rights which are also a part of the American tradition."

The President is many things: our chief legislator, our chief administrator, our chief executive, leader of his party, the nation's chief morale officer, the manager of its foreign relations, and the supervisor of its economy. The country needs his leadership in the field of constitutional rights, and if he is willing to assume the responsibilities of this leadership, there is much he can do. In fact, there is much that no one else can do.

An equally timely book is C. Herman Pritchett's survey of the efforts made in Congress between 1957 and 1960 to curb the Supreme Court, a campaign which was triggered mainly by decisions in the area of constitutional rights. *Congress Versus the Supreme Court, 1957-60* describes the various attacks upon the Court, both in and out of Congress. The great issues which were at stake in the disputed decisions are analyzed in successive chapters. These issues relate to legislative investigations, the Smith Act preemption, passports, loyalty-security problems, and state limitations on employment.

Though a great many powerful attacks upon the Court were launched in the 85th and 86th Congresses, and the vote on some proposals to reduce the Court's powers was close, no anti-Court legislation was actually adopted. Pritchett ascribes this fact partly to the wide public respect which the Court enjoys, partly to the character and motives of some of the attackers, who were mainly trying to retaliate for the Court's segregation ruling, partly to the exaggerations inherent in the charges made against the Court, and partly to the Court's own moderation in some of its decisions, particularly after the attacks began.

Justice Douglas's little book, *A Living Bill of Rights,* was written to inform the high school student about his civil rights. He discusses in simple terms the importance of freedom in America, the meaning of the Bill of Rights, the content of our basic freedoms, and some current civil rights problems. While one finds in this book a characteristically felicitous statement of faith in American freedom, unfortunately the discussion is much too sketchy, even for high school students. I doubt whether they have to be talked down to at all, and certainly not in this measure. Furthermore, Justice Douglas does not always distinguish between what the law is today, and what he thinks it ought to be. For example, he states flatly that investigations "to punish by adverse publicity, those who held opinions with which the investigators did not agree," are "not permissible." One could wish that this were so, but unhappily it isn't.

Novel and Tract

Midcentury, by John Dos Passos. Houghton Mifflin. 496 pp. $5.95.

Reviewed by

Melvin J. Friedman

John Dos Passos has been almost unique among novelists in his uncanny ability to remain politically committed without compromising his devotion to fiction. Like Malraux he has managed the complete *volte-face* from extreme left to extreme right; unlike him he has continued writing novels even after he has deserted his leftist phase.

This latest Dos Passos is built on the same large lines as *U.S.A.* and the *District of Columbia* trilogy, but it seems uncomfortably documentary even in the longer narrative sections. The accomplished story-teller and delineator of character hides behind the chronicler, the social historian. The most compelling sections of *Midcentury* are probably the profiles of distinguished Americans: Eleanor Roosevelt, Douglas MacArthur, Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., Robert Oppenheimer. The portraits of Terry Bryant, Blackie Bowman, Lorna Hubbard, Jasper Milliron, and Stan Goodspeed, which offer the uneasy literary basis for the novel, pale before their historical counterparts. (Dos Passos skillfully parallels the careers of his fictional creatures with those of celebrated contemporaries; he is especially successful with the Stan Goodspeed-James Dean juxtaposition.)

In method, *Midcentury* does not differ essentially from *U.S.A.* The narrative is made to weave in and out of the documentary with a labyrinthine complexity. The reader is expected to reconstruct the fact-fiction interplay into an aesthetic whole. The sections in *Midcentury* entitled "Documentary" recall the tone of the "Newsreels" in *U.S.A.* The profiles regularly alternate with the narrative and reinforce its direction. But conspicuously absent from *Midcentury* are the ingenious "Camera Eye" notations of the earlier trilogy. With their absence of punctuation,

THE REVIEWERS

JACK BARBASH is professor of labor education at the University of Wisconsin. His new book, "Labor's Grass Roots," will be published this fall. WILLIAM L. NEUMANN teaches American history at Goucher College. DAVID FELLMAN, a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, wrote "The Defendant's Rights." MELVIN J. FRIEDMAN teaches modern literature at the University of Wisconsin. JULIA WHEDON is a free lance writer.

A TEST CASE FOR UNION DEMOCRACY

an appeal by

Norman Thomas & Clyde Summers

The legal foundations of union democracy are up for review in a precedent-setting test of the Bill of Rights sections of the Labor-Management Act of 1959.

In June, 1959, **The Progressive** reported that A. J. Hayes had ordered two tool and die makers expelled from International Association of Machinists (I.A.M.) Lodge 113 in Chicago. The two men, Irwin Rappaport and Marion Ciepley, had been leaders of a reform movement which ousted a corrupt local officialdom in 1956. Later, while their local was under trusteeship for three years, they led a rank and file movement for autonomy. They issued handbills; appealed for Public Review Boards; circulated petitions; met in caucus. The exercise of these rights finally resulted in their expulsion.

In September, 1960, the I.A.M. convention, in perfunctory fashion, rejected their appeal for reinstatement and the expulsions thereupon became final. In November, suit was filed in Federal District Court. Together with the late John A. Lapp, we founded the Ciepley-Rappaport Legal Fund to help finance the case. In our appeal we said:

> **We call attention to this case precisely because it occurs within OUR world, in our labor movement. . . . The labor movement is one of the great forces for decency and democracy in society. In appealing for aid to these men, we aim to encourage that basic potential."**

On December 4, the New York Times editorialized:

> **"The case is important for the future of American labor unions . . . it illustrates the need for impartial boards of appeal to review disciplinary actions taken by union officials against members who attack their policies."**

The I.A.M., represented oddly enough by a legal firm which usually serves management, had challenged the constitutionality of the Bill of Rights provisions and insists there are no requirements for **any kind of trial review.** The expelled unionists contend that the Bill of Rights sections are constitutional and do necessitate fair review within the union structure. Enough has been contributed to make the beginning. But far more is needed to carry the case through. Won't you help?

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"As a member of three different unions over the past twenty-six years, I have always been particularly interested in union democracy. It was therefore natural for me to become one of the first contributors to the Ciepley-Rappaport Legal Fund."

—JAMES PECK

(Jim Peck was a Freedom Rider on the first bus to Birmingham.)

truncated syntax, metaphorical flourishes, and verbal plays, they gave *U.S.A.* a poetic foundation. It seems clear that the enriched poetic prose of the "Camera Eye" belongs with the tamperings with structure which *Midcentury* has already taken over from *U.S.A.* Alan Pryce-Jones made this point when he said in *Harper's:* "Where trouble begins is in realistic fiction which makes no use of poetry yet cannot forbear to experiment with construction."

In *U.S.A.*, Dos Passos had defined a new type of novel which satisfied the experimental vigor of the Thirties. It made its own compromise with the stream-of-consciousness novel of Joyce, Virginia Woolf, and Faulkner and went in its own original direction. *Midcentury* uses many of the same tools but for quite a different purpose. It is much more of a "preaching novel" than the earlier trilogy. Dos Passos seems intent on disenchanting us about labor unions, strikes, "wobblies," and displaced Marxists. By rooting out the self-induced corruption which seems to be destroying the working class, Dos Passos is offering a thinly-veiled defense for his own conservatism. He seems to insist, by implication, that one can honorably side only with the status quo in the Fifties.

His long narrative sections read almost like sociological case histories of victimized workers. He traces Terry Bryant—one of his least convincing fictional portraits—from his release from the service through his death as a martyr for the cause of free enterprise. Blackie Bowman, who soliloquizes from a bed in a veterans' hospital, multiplies instances of the corruption of labor unions. Even the financially independent Jasper Milliron suffers from the pressures of betrayal in high positions. The "Investigator's Notes," which Dos Passos purposely keeps anonymous, rein-

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force the futility of a Terry Bryant or a Blackie Bowman when confronted by organized labor.

Midcentury thus has an organizing principle which keeps the diverse parts together and helps make possible the total symphonic effect. Dos Passos seems to be telling us that hundreds of small men are victims of debilitating forces. Only the exceptional ones can withstand the dulling effects of a wornout social system. It is not accidental that Dos Passos should be at his most poetic when he offers his profiles of these olympian figures.

Two Southern Novels

by Julia Whedon

SURELY lady authors spend as much time bending over slender, steaming Southern novels as they do, or did, that proverbial hot stove. Indeed, they seem to dish them out with the ease and regularity of short order cooks. Recently two new titles have been added to the expanding inventory of such novels.

The House on Coliseum Street by Shirley Ann Grau (Knopf. 242 pp. $3.50) deals with a young Southern woman and her relationships with a marriage-prone mother, assorted half-sisters, two unsatisfactory lovers, and the memory of her father. The sultry morbidity of the domestic scene and the lifelessness of one romance drive her into the arms of a second lover (one of her sister's hand-me-downs) who, having got her pregnant, proceeds to take up with other women. The book focuses, largely, on the girl's sense of abandonment and loss —and finally, following an abortion, her calamitous mental and emotional decline.

As is so often the case with sensibility novels, the reader finds himself clinging perilously to the fractured perceptions and impressions of the protagonist. Miss Grau succeeds in taking full advantage of this subjective, ephemeral relationship as she explores the heroine's mental disintegration. In some eerie and unsettling passages the reader (with only the heroine's autism as a point of reference) is swept gently, yet swiftly, along the gathering tide of psychosis. Ultimately, the book expresses a striking psychological irony: so long as the heroine remains reflective and inactive in the sickness of her environment, she is intact. It is not until she begins to act and takes issue with the events about her that she crumbles.

The Morning and the Evening by Jean Williams (Atheneum. 248 pp. $4), also set in a Southern clime, is the biography of an idiot—his effect on his family and the small rural community where he lives. Through death and desertion, he is finally left, as an adult, to the mercy of the villagers. The story then becomes a chronicle of their agonies, ineptitude, and abuse. The idiot serves as the catalytic agent exposing their humble, fumbling impulses of good will and greed. Eventually, this largo tale reaches a climax in the death of the idiot, and we are left with the feeling that there must be some philosophic conclusion to be drawn—probably something pastoral concerning the relentless rhythm of life.

It is not surprising, perhaps, that Miss Williams—having riveted her full intelligence and sensibility upon a figure who is unintelligent and virtually insensate—should have done a good job of it. But in any other game this would be called "two against one." Nevertheless, the monolithic perceptions and marginal sensitivity of the idiot are neatly conveyed. It could be argued that this is a legitimate literary exercise. But you may ask yourself if, for all your deference towards motherhood, charity, and children playing, you really care about what an idiot thinks or doesn't think, sees—or misses altogether. If you do care, you probably won't mind the simpletons that surround the idiot and will share their concerns as they make their primitive, mindless way through life. But if you are wicked, not totally undone by the human condition every time it leaves its wretched mark in life, or upon the printed page, then you may feel that the author has, in her first novel, squandered her talents on an insignificant project.

While both Misses Grau and Williams—most especially Miss Grau—have a respectable, and at times imposing, command of language and imagery, one hopes that they will see fit, in the future, to serve their readers something with a little more protein than these elaborately prepared, paper-thin slices of life which, like tea sandwiches, always leave you hungry.

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THE CALIFORNIAN

Free Enterprise and the American Telephone & Telegraph Co.

by CONGRESSMAN CHET HOLIFIELD

Our Financial Overlords

by THOMAS H. UZZELL

These are the two feature articles in the August issue of THE CALIFORNIAN, a throwback to the muckraking era of Lincoln Steffens, Ida Tarbell, Upton Sinclair, and others. Congressman Holifield's article is accompanied by factual material from a former employee of AT&T; together they make a strong case for nationalizing this, the biggest monopoly in America ($22.6 billion in assets).

Thomas Uzzell, the former managing editor of Nation's Business, was once the personal representative in Europe of the President of Bankers Trust Co. He has combined these qualifications to turn out a definitive expose of the Federal Reserve and our money and banking system. His material is supplemented by an article called **"HOW CONGRESS GAVE AWAY $15 BILLION TO THE PRIVATE BANKS,"** which has not been headlined in this advertisement lest readers think that nothing this sensational could possibly be true. Yet this material is taken from a speech by Congressman Wright Patman on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives. He calls it the biggest financial scandal of our times, and his presentation has gone unchallenged.

Coming in the September Issue:

Congressmen Praise Nazi-Like Organization — Leading West German publications themselves have referred to the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft, an organization of several million "expellees," as Nazi-like in leadership, philosophy, and physical actions. This article contains a long list of former Nazis at the head of the organization, states specifically and in quotes the identity between pre-war Nazi ideology and their present ideology, and shows how American Congressmen—who are named—were induced by a former Nazi to lend their names to the most important annual celebration of this rapidly growing movement.

Christian Anti-Communism Crusade Caught — By accident, THE CALIFORNIAN caught the mushrooming Crusade falsely advertising that Dr. Edward Teller, famed University of California physicist, would be on its faculty and lecture at a big "school" it is planning in the Los Angeles sports arena, after Dr. Teller had flatly rejected the request that he lecture. THE CALIFORNIAN exposes the whole story in the September issue, explaining why The Crusade so desperately sought Teller.

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